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ABSTRACT
The liberalisation o f transport capacities and prices o f  land-based transport of 
goods in Europe in the 1990s led to an increasingly market-orientated decision 
process for the users o f  piggyback transport services. However, the empirical 
research has not yet examined the contracts co-ordinating German piggyback 
transport chains in this changed environment.
This analysis seeks to explain the four types o f contracts most commonly used in 
German piggyback transport by relating them to the theory o f  transaction cost 
economics (TCE). The qualitative case study approach adopted here derives from 
the tradition o f Oliver W illiamson’s research.
The hypothesis o f  the thesis relates the different contract designs to the type of 
transport service: the higher the specificity o f an asset to fulfil the transport 
service required by the freight forwarder, the higher the tendency to vertically 
integrate piggyback transport services. Put differently, the following question is 
answered: ‘do the contracts used by freight forwarders to acquire the transport 
service o f  rail operators result in the lowest transaction costs o f  the existing 
contracts for the specific haulage requested?’
The thesis models these transaction attributes o f  the rail transport services for 
piggyback according to TCE and subsequently assigns them to the contract 
design elements o f the four types o f contracts. The first two contracts are efficient 
in all transport services they co-ordinate and the third is efficient to a large extent 
in terms o f  the volume o f  services co-ordinated. The fourth contract type cannot 
currently be designed in a way efficient for TCE.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 HYPOTHESIS
The aim o f this thesis is to relate the theory o f transaction cost economics (TCE) 
to the piggyback transport industry in Germany.
The hypothesis o f the thesis relates the different piggyback contract designs to 
the type o f transport service: the higher the specificity o f an asset to fulfil the 
transport service required by the freight forwarder, the higher the tendency to 
vertically integrate piggyback transport services.
Piggyback transport is defined here as a sub-segment o f land-based multimodal 
transport (MT) that deals with the conveyance o f the entire means o f 
transportation (truckloads), the parts thereof (trailers) or swap bodies. Multimodal 
transport is defined as a multimodal transport o f TEUs, i.e. a real process, using 
two or more separate transport modes to transport goods across a defined distance 
(Haesler, 1977:65). The following definitions have been provided by the ECMT 
(1993):
Multimodal transport: the carriage o f  goods by at least two different 
modes o f  transport.
Intermodal transport: the movement o f goods in one and the same 
loading vehicle which successively uses several modes o f transport 
without handling o f  the goods themselves in changing modes.
Combined transport: intermodal transport where part o f  the European 
journey is by rail, inland waterway or sea and any initial and/or final leg 
carried out by road is as short as possible.
TEUs’ in this thesis are transport containers used for piggyback, i.e. trailers, 
swap-bodies and whole truck loads for ‘Rolling Highway’. TEU is therefore used 
as the synonym for the means o f transport in piggyback. The distinction between 
M T and other forms o f  transport is that the TEU remains unchanged throughout 
the entire transport route (Seidenfus, 1974:2f; Bukold, 1996; Seidelmann, 
1997:322).
The term TEU (twenty-feet equivalent unit) may be used differently in other transport sectors. The 
widespread use in statistical data throughout the piggyback transport industry on the one hand, and 
the tendency of the term TEU to become synonymous for ‘transport container’ on the other hand, 
made this definition in the thesis plausible.
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The liberalisation o f  transport capacities and prices o f land-based transport o f 
goods in Europe in the 1990s led to an increasingly market-orientated decision 
process for the users o f  piggyback transport services. Two events were crucial to 
this development. Firstly, a cartel between European rail companies and suppliers 
o f  piggyback transport services was terminated in 1991. Secondly, the market 
regulation o f  price and capacity in Germany’s road haulage industry was 
abandoned in 1994. As a result, the determining criterion o f choice by freight 
forwarders when purchasing elements o f  piggyback transport services is no 
longer government dirigisme but efficient use o f resources.
From the practical perspective o f the transport industry, the thesis examines 
existing contracts in piggyback transport within an environment o f increased 
market competitiveness due to liberalisation.
The thesis analyses contracts used by market participants in the piggyback 
transport industry. These contract designs represent the thesis’s objects o f 
investigation. They embody the agreements between the freight forwarder and the 
rail operator for the provision o f piggyback transport. Significant investments are 
required by both the freight forwarder and the rail service provider.
In this context, the thesis examines whether there is an economic relationship 
between the different contracts in piggyback transport and the type o f transport 
service provided by the freight forwarder. In the analysis, the economic product 
is defined as the specific rail service, which is part o f  the piggyback transport 
chain and needs to be supported by the above-mentioned investments.
Vertical integration is understood as being the situation where a firm extends its 
activities over more than one successive stage in the production process. Asset 
specificity is defined as specialised assets which are not re-deployable without 
sacrifice o f  productive value.
The thesis analyses the purchase or the production - in the case o f  vertical 
integration - o f rail transport service for piggyback. This component represents 
one part o f  an integral system o f solutions in the form o f  a transport chain that 
freight forwarders offer to shippers. Therefore, the transactions analysed here are 
restricted to the relationship between freight forwarder and rail transport operator. 
Other transaction relationships in MT, i.e. between the freight forwarder and the 
shipper, are not the object o f  further analysis.
The transport mode combinations, the transport operator combinations, market 
segments and types o f TEU o f  the existing piggyback transport market are now 
described. The following continental transport modes are eligible for components 
o f MT chains (Willeke, 1966:310).
1) airline operators (air);
2) pipeline operators (land);
3) railway operators (land);
4) road transport operators (land);
5) domestic waterways shipping companies <Binnenschiffahrtsuntemehmen> 
(water).
Table 1.1 below, based on personal data and observations, describes the 
combinations o f transport modes that are used in European continental MT. This 
table does not contain pipelines as a transport mode. Its main focus lies on trans- 
and cross-continental transport. In the left column all major combinations of 
transport modes are shown. From these combinations, the transport operator 
combination, the respective market segments they operate in, and the types of 
TEUs used are listed.
With regard to the transport operator combinations, the rail transport operator- 
road transport operator in the top line o f Table 1.1 forms the focus o f  the analysis. 
The other transport operator combinations are consequently not the subject o f this 
thesis.
Three main market segments o f  land-based MT can be identified: ferry transport, 
transport o f containers to and from maritime ports, and domestic and 
international continental land-based piggyback transport together with container 
transport. The analysis in this thesis focuses on that latter market segment, as 
piggyback technology is used there. Container transport on the Rhine waterway 
does not have a land-based element and is therefore not regarded as land-based 
MT. In the subsequent contract analysis o f  the thesis, the term MT means ‘land- 
based M T’.
Table 1.1; Multimodal Transport: Transport Mode Combinations
Transport
mode
combination
Transport operator 
combination
Market segment TEU
Road/rail
(land/land)
Rail transport 
operator/road transport 
operator
Container
transport/piggyback 
transport (incl. ‘rolling 
highway’)
Maritime 
container/trailer/ 
swap body/truck
Ship/rail
(sea/land)
Rail transport 
operator/maritime 
vessel shipping 
company (seagoing)
Container transport 
serving maritime ports
Maritime
container
Ship/sea
(waterway/sea)
Maritime vessel 
shipping company 
(seagoing)/domestic 
waterways shipping 
company
Container transport 
Rhine waterway
Maritime
container
Ship/rail/road
(sea/land/land)
Maritime vessel 
shipping company 
(seagoing)/rail transport 
operator/road transport 
operator
Ferry transport (e.g. 
Oeresund 
F ehmam/Channel)
Truck/wagon
Source: personal data.
Table 1.1 also underlines the special technical peculiarity o f piggyback transport 
versus other segments o f the MT-market regarding the TEU used. Other 
combinations o f  transport modes have evolved into a single, mutually agreed 
TEU such as the standardised maritime containers or the technical harmonisation 
o f entire wagons or trucks. The standardisation o f the maritime container from 
the sea/land transport mode has resulted in a standardisation o f the container 
transport o f  the land/land transport mode. However, piggyback transport uses a 
variety o f different TEU types to date. As a result, a signifrcant distinction can be 
made within the rail-road transport mode combination between container 
transport and piggyback transport. The focus o f  the analysis in terms o f TEU 
types lies on swap body, trailer and entire truck.^ Other TEU types are not subject 
to this analysis.
‘Rolling Highway’ <Rollende Landstrasse>: for more detailed explanation see section 3.3.2. 
Words and phrases denoted in o  show die original German technical term.
The rail transport operator services in piggyback transport represent therefore the 
good exchanged between the two transport modes rail transport and road 
transport, that is subject to the contract designs o f the thesis. The rail transport 
operator can either directly exchange this good with the road transport operator or 
- more commonly - by using a freight forwarder. Piggyback transport 
intermediaries in this context are an instrument for freight forwarders to 
accomplish the organisation o f  the transport chain.
1.2 T H E  C H O IC E  O F T C E  AND EX ISTIN G  TC E RESEA RCH
This section firstly attempts to justify the choice o f  transaction cost economics 
(TCE) for carrying out the analysis o f piggyback contracts, and secondly gives an 
overview on existing TCE research.
Although choice o f the theory for investigating the thesis’ problem can ultimately 
only be justified ex-post via satisfactory findings o f the analysis undertaken, there 
are people within areas o f TCE who suggested ex-ante that this theory could 
provide an appropriate tool for analysing German piggyback contracts.
Due to the broken character o f MT-transport chains, which usually involve a 
multitude o f  transaction partners, transaction costs and their reduction are crucial 
areas in determining the choice o f institutional co-ordination. This applies 
specifically to the MT-sector piggyback transport where a transaction takes place 
between a freight forwarder company and a rail transport operator. Historically, 
an institutionally rooted friction between the road and rail sector exists (explained 
in detail in chapter 3), which leads to increased costs o f co-ordination between 
the transaction partners and potentially decreases the efficiency o f the 
transactions. TCE provides explanations for vertical integration and contractual 
choice, with emphasis on transactional efficiency by minimising transaction costs 
(TC).
MT constitutes a highly investment intensive service sector o f the transport 
industry. The initial empirical data gathered for the existing contract designs 
suggested that the high level o f assets invested was paramount for choosing non- 
market forms o f  co-ordination for these transactions. According to TCE, vertical 
integration as a contractual arrangement may be preferred to other institutions if 
transactions are supported by investments in highly specific assets.
TCE allows a detailed contract analysis by investigating typical contract elements 
and attributing these to types o f co-ordination. One o f these key elements is
mutual commitments between transaction partners. These elements (e.g. in the 
form o f  guarantees, liability clauses and profit sharing), could be found in the 
empirical data o f  contract elements in the piggyback industry, suggesting that 
TCE provides a suitable framework for the analysis o f  the piggyback contracts.
TCE explains how market failure can be cured using appropriate alternative 
contract designs. Most o f the transactions in piggyback transport are co-ordinated 
in non-market type transactions, i.e. with a longer-term commitment o f both 
partners to the transaction relationship.
TCE allows to form a hypothesis that links the degree o f vertical integration on 
the one hand and the efficiency o f contract arrangements on the other hand, and 
to relate this hypothesis to an empirical context. Different to other conventional 
theories (as explained in chapter 2), TCE provides a detailed framework for 
analysing contract instruments, which seemed to be necessary to match the wide- 
ranging contractual arrangements within the four contracts analysed.
In summary, the theory necessary for the analysis o f German piggyback contracts 
in this thesis should provide explanations o f different forms o f co-ordination, and 
should be able to generate hypotheses that are testable in an empirical context 
about the connection between the transaction context, contract form and 
economic efficiency. TCE appeared to suffice these criteria ex-ante compared to 
other conventional theories.
From the perspective o f economic theory, the thesis encounters a widely 
unexplored application o f TCE in the area o f the transport services industry 
regarding the aspects o f vertical integration and governance (Langner, 1996).^
Under governance is understood a contracting process in the context o f market or 
non-market co-ordination.
Relating TCE to the area o f contracts that co-ordinate German multimodal 
transport has not been accomplished so far. Nevertheless, wide-ranging 
investigations o f  TCE have already been undertaken in other industries such as 
the oil industry, car manufacturing, the gas industry, pharmaceuticals, aeroplane 
manufacturing and telecommunications, the first three representing the majority 
o f existing research projects (according to studies on existing research on TCE:
This publication is a test of TCE in the context of the airline industry in the field of vertical 
integration and governance aspects.
Shelanski & Klein, 1995; Motz, 1998.). In recent years, three branches of 
research within TCE have evolved: vertical integration, long-term contract design 
and measurement.
From 1980 onwards, the majority o f  research can be found in the field o f vertical 
integration. Almost 60 research projects focused on this area o f  TCE. Only 16 
projects dealt specifically with the aspect o f long-term contract design and 
complex contracts. Finally, only 9 sources could be found on research in the field 
o f measuring transaction costs (TCs). Moreover, these projects differ widely in 
the type o f measuring methodology adopted. The following overview sums up 
research in the field o f  vertical integration within TCE. Existing research on long 
term contracting and measurement unanimously backs TCE within the various 
industries reviewed - disregarding two projects where the degree o f  confirmation 
o f the theory was rated as neutral. However, the picture in the field o f vertical 
integration is not as clear: 42 out o f a total o f 52 projects confirm the TCE 
hypotheses; only 10 reject them (Shelanski & Klein, 1995). Nevertheless, this 
result is above average in empirically oriented research within economics.
In the past, W illiamson’s theory has been criticised, particularly regarding his 
attempt to measure TC levels and transaction attributes. Despite this, the existing 
empirical research clearly indicates that rejecting TCE outright (as in Schneider, 
1985; Sydow, 1992; Gerybadze, 1995) contradicts the above empirical findings. 
Thus Shelanski and Klein comment on the research results on vertical integration 
as follows:
“To sum up, the evidence on the transactional determinants of 
vertical integration seems quite striking. Asset specificity and 
uncertainty appear to have significant effects upon the vertical 
structure of production. This is especially remarkable when 
compared with the relative dearth of evidence on market power 
explanations for integration, and with the results of rare studies 
that explicitly compare TCE-based theories with market-power 
theories” (Shelansld & Klein, 1995:344).
The existing literature on TCE in the field o f  vertical integration seems to put 
forward a clear case for the necessity for more empirical evidence in the transport 
industry. Furthermore, it clearly indicates the need to ‘put more flesh on the 
bones* o f  the field o f  vertical integration within TCE. In the words o f Joskow 
(1993:133), the existing empirical research results have increased the likelihood 
o f “a pot o f gold to be found at the end o f  the rainbow” in terms o f the value of 
TCE for explaining co-ordination structures in an economy.
In summary, TCE has been applied through intensive empirical research in the 
past 20 years. The existing TCE research has underlined the importance o f TC 
considerations by firms investing in specialised assets and taking decisions about 
the degree o f integration o f their production. However, the empirical research has 
not yet examined the contracts co-ordinating German piggyback transport chains.
1.3 SOURCE MATERIAL AND LITERATURE
Data has been collected on both a macro and micro level. Governmental and 
other official agencies and transport associations were sources o f macro data.
On a micro level o f data gathering, annual reports and general terms o f business 
(GTBs) were examined and semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
representatives o f  the three relevant intermediary companies (Intercontainer, 
Kombiverkehr and Hupac) and the two main rail infrastructure companies in 
Germany and Switzerland (DBAG and SBB). The key aim o f these interviews 
(see Appendix I: people interviewed) was to filter information not available in 
secondary sources and annual reports about the piggyback contract details on the 
one hand, and about the transaction situation, especially details o f asset 
specificity, on the other hand. Under ‘semi-structured’, it is understood that all 
interviews were covering a similar range o f  topics regarding contract details and 
the h*ansaction situation. Where necessary, as the study progressed, interviewees 
were contacted more than once to improve the level o f detail necessary for 
applying TCE in this case study. Additionally, information was sought through 
specific information requests (see Appendix I: information contacts).
Unless otherwise stated, the year 1997 represents the latest year where full year 
figures are available at the time o f completion o f the thesis for the market and 
company data. Other literature and information sources are included up to the end 
o f  1999.
1.4 SCOPE OF METHODOLOGY ALTERNATIVES AND THE 
CHOICE OF MSRP
In this section on scientific methodology, the aim is to lay a foundation for 
application o f the theory o f  TCE, which is used here in the context o f piggyback 
transport.
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From the perspective o f  falsificationism as defined by Karl Popper, the exposure 
o f a theory to empirical counter-examples against observation statements drawn 
from the hypothesis is the object o f scientific methodology.
“We say that a theory is falsified only if we have accepted 
basic statements which contradict it” (Popper, 1977:86).
The falsification o f a theory is possible if  only one o f the systems o f statements 
from the hypothesis is falsified. Falsificationism recommends for the empirical 
research o f  economists the derivation o f hypotheses, or empirical propositions, 
from their theories with a high level o f specificity. Non-occurrence o f these 
propositions would invalidate the entire theory.
Kuhn, by contrast, stresses the continuity o f scientific growth. In replacing the 
logic o f  scientific recovery with a psychology o f scientific recovery, he replaces 
the volatile existence o f  a theory until its probable falsification as is the outcome 
o f intense testing with the concept o f paradigms. Over a normal period o f time, 
the dominant paradigm establishes a pattern o f growth o f knowledge as a result o f 
scientific discovery and is then eventually overthrown by a crisis (Lakatos, 
1970:178; Kuhn, 1970). In a comparison o f the two. Popper’s scientific research 
programme aims to achieve a description o f objective scientific growth, whereas 
Kuhn’s scientific research programme aims at a description o f change in the 
scientific mind (Lakatos, 1970:180).
In the ‘methodology o f  scientific research programmes’ (MSRP), a research 
programme is seen as an organic unit that contains both essential components and 
non-essential ones. As developed by Lakatos (1970:135),'* the non-essential, 
replaceable components are called the programme’s ‘protective belt’, whereas the 
essential, structural elements are called the ‘hard core’. The ‘hard core’, or 
‘negative heuristic’, is protected by the surrounding belt, or ‘positive heuristic’, 
o f the research programme. A ‘protective belt’ consists o f  a chain o f  models 
simulating reality and in the form o f auxiliary hypotheses represents the refutable 
variants o f  the research programme. This methodology may rationally disallow 
refutations o f this ‘hard core’ in empirical research, as long as changes made in 
the surrounding auxiliary hypotheses are progressive, i.e. i f  the supporting 
empirical content o f the ‘protective belt’ o f auxiliary hypotheses increases 
(Lakatos, 1970:134).
See also: Feyerabend (1981), Latsis (1976) and Kuhn (1970).
Figure 1.1; Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Positive heuristic
(flexible) long-term 
research policy
Negative heuristic
refutable protective 
belt of auxiliary 
elements for the 
theory
core theory elements 
which refutations may 
be rationally 
disallowed
Source: according to Lakatos (1970:134f).
Compared with the two scientific methodologies highlighted above, MSRP does 
not appraise a hypothesis or systems o f hypotheses only. The evaluation targets 
an entire research programme. As an organic unit, a research programme contains 
both essential components and non-essential ones (Latsis, 1976:14-16); the 
amendment or exchange o f  a non-essential element o f the research programme 
does not invalidate the theories in the ‘hard core*.
TCE - given the partly negative results o f empirical applications listed in chapter 
1 - would have been long refuted on the grounds o f a Popperian falsification 
methodology.
“The message of falsificationism is not mere testing but severe 
testing, and adoption of the techniques of qualitative 
comparative statics makes severe testing practically 
impossible.” (Latsis, 1976:8) [italic in original]
In this thesis, new institutional economics (NIE) - including TCE as one theory 
element - is regarded as ‘hard core* - or ‘negative heuristic’ - o f  the research 
policy, in which explaining vertical integration through TCs is one topical 
element. By using this approach, the addition o f  auxiliary elements - or ‘positive 
heuristic’ for the research programme - to the theory does not change the research
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path o f TCE. Empirical findings can be integrated which initially contradict the 
theory. Consequently, the conclusion in chapter 6 is allowed to contribute to the 
development o f  the theory rather than merely stating the falsification or non­
falsification o f  it. The choice o f MSRP underlines the thesis* aim to relate TCE to 
the empirical context rather than testing it.
1.5 THE CHOICE OF QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE 
APPLICATION OF TCE
The qualitative case study approach to the TC analysis o f  piggyback transport 
contracts adopted in the thesis derives from the tradition o f  Oliver Williamson’s 
research (Williamson, 1985). Although many research projects broaden his 
qualitative approach by using quantitative components in TCE, they do so mainly 
in order to achieve a better explanation o f the results derived from a previous 
qualitative analysis. Besides qualitative case study, the two other econometric 
and historical methods that can be observed in other empirical work on TCE are 
quantitative case study and cross-sectional econometric analysis (Shelanski & 
Klein, 1995:338).
Williamson’s qualitative approach consists o f a comparison o f discrete structural 
alternatives in the field o f  comparative organisation theory and can be traced 
back to Herbert Simon (1978). According to Simon, functioning organisation 
structures differ in their cause rather than in their extent. In other words, 
institutions and co-ordination designs in an economy for the transfer o f services 
and goods can be classified in non-discrete groups. Their difference is qualitative, 
not quantitative. Simon focuses upon how to seek economic solutions for the 
transfer o f  services or goods by choosing institutional organisation structures. 
Consequently, a marginal analysis o f TC-levels for a service co-ordinated under 
different contract alternatives is not necessary. The comparison o f TC-levels for 
discrete structural alternatives o f rail transport co-ordination is carried out, i.e. the 
search for optimum levels o f TC, within a given choice o f contracts for each 
piggyback service. Williamson him self states that, not the absolute level o f TC is 
decisive for TCE-analyses, but the difference between TC o f  alternative 
institutional arrangements (Williamson, 1990c:25). A simple comparison is 
sufficient to arrive at statements o f  preference in choosing from different contract 
designs. The exact amount o f TC does not have to be quantified (Picot, 
1982:271).
Subsequently, the term ‘qualitatively modelling’ stands for a qualitative analysis 
o f piggyback contracts together with the transport services that these contracts are
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supporting, using the perspective o f  TCE. In the course o f this analysis for the 
piggyback contracts, the contract elements are transformed into TCE’s pattern o f 
credible commitments, whose intensity is then qualitatively measured using 
W illiamson’s criteria set out in chapter 2. Regarding the transport services, the 
environmental factors (transaction attributes) o f  Williamson’s organisation failure 
framework are derived and qualitatively evaluated according to indicators set out 
in chapter 2.
In summary, this thesis performs an empirical qualitative case study in applying 
the hypothesis stated in chapter 1, based on the theory o f  TCE. It uses the 
methodology o f scientific research programmes (MSRR).
The incompleteness and imperfection o f markets - in this case the market for rail 
services as part o f piggyback transport - lead to market failure and to contract 
solutions away from the pure market co-ordination. Four different contracts, 
which can be used by freight forwarders to arrange piggyback transport to and 
from Germany, are analysed. The contracts in piggyback transport, from the 
perspective o f TCE, are mutual agreements between market participants to reduce 
the market failure. In this context, market co-ordination is one extreme o f a 
possible spectrum o f contract alternatives. Market co-ordination may be the 
efficient contract design from the perspective o f TCE, but only i f  factors for 
market failure are o f marginal importance in the transaction relationship. These 
factors - or transaction attributes - will be explained in chapter 2.
1.6 SEQUENCE OF ARGUMENTS IN THE THESIS
In chapter 2, TCE as the tool for investigating the objects o f research, the contract 
designs, is described. The thesis therefore answers the question o f what 
differentiates TCE from other theories that makes it more appropriate than other 
theories for the thesis’ hypothesis. The objects of investigation and the core 
problem o f  TCE are described, along with an accepted classification. The main 
emphasis o f  the chapter lies in the description o f  the elements and the 
instruments, which TCE uses to explain the degree o f vertical integration in the 
organisation o f business transactions.
Chapter 3 consists o f  an overview o f piggyback transport services and a 
description o f  the German piggyback transport market, which provides the 
context for the contracts investigated here. The chapter answers the questions of 
who the main players are in the German piggyback transport market, as well as 
what its market potential is in both multimodal transport in its entirety and
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piggyback transport specifically. Taking the perspective o f  TCE, the focus o f the 
chapter lies upon describing the transaction object, i.e. piggyback transport 
services, the transaction partners and the transaction situation, i.e. the market set­
up. An analytic framework with logistics dimensions to describe piggyback 
transport services is introduced. Part o f the description o f the transaction situation 
is an overview o f  the technology used in piggyback rail transport in the contracts 
analysed.
The fourth chapter comes from the perspective o f contractual relationships and 
focuses upon examining four contract designs in piggyback transport. These 
contract designs represent the contracts o f European piggyback transport 
operators, who cover transport originating from or terminating in Germany. The 
question asked in this chapter is, ‘what is the degree o f vertical integration from 
the perspective o f  TCE in these four contracts?’ Therefore, this chapter firstly 
pinpoints and illustrates the contract relevant companies which participate in the 
piggyback transport chain, and secondly the relevant contract elements. The 
contract designs, i.e. forms o f agreements, restrictions and scope o f contracting 
are looked at from the degree o f  vertical integration that forms the main criterion 
o f  differentiation. Although general terms o f business (GTBs) play an important 
role and contribute as an underlying foundation to the transactions’ governance, 
further contract elements such as national and international legislation, 
shareholdings between participants and existing infi^tructure assets must be 
included. Thirdly, the contract designs used for co-ordination o f piggyback 
transport are qualitatively modelled according to TCE.
The analysis o f contract elements creates a basis for the examination o f the 
coimection between transaction tasks (transport service) and forms o f contract 
(contract design) in chapter 5. On the basis o f this analysis o f the four contract 
types, it becomes possible to draw conclusions on the degree o f vertical 
integration within the transport chain from the standpoint o f the freight 
forwarder, i.e. the hypothesis in this thesis. In chapter 4, the existing 
infi^tructure assets o f  the transaction participants are analysed for the share o f 
special purpose investments in comparison to general purpose investments. An 
analysis for degrees o f  asset specificity follows in chapter S.
The contract designs are explained in chapter 5. In this chapter, the focus is on 
TCs. The analysis takes the perspective o f contract efficiency. From the 
perspective o f  transport costs, chapter 5 therefore answers the question: ‘Do the 
contracts used by freight forwarders to acquire the transport service o f rail 
operators result in the lowest TCs o f the existing contracts for the specific
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haulage requested?’ Therefore, the influence o f the type o f services in piggyback 
transport on the contractual factors - or transaction attributes - is investigated. 
Thereafter, an analysis o f existing contract designs in terms o f TC efficiency, i.e. 
their ability to minimise TCs, is carried out. The thesis models these transaction 
attributes according to TCE and subsequently assigns them to the contract design 
elements modelled in chapter 4. Finally, the comparative TCs o f alternative 
contract designs for the transport services are investigated.
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CHAPTER 2; DESCRIPTION AND 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE THEORY
2.1 THE DIFFERENT FOCI OF TCE
TCE is based upon interdisciplinary approaches o f economic, legal and 
organisation-theory research in the 1930s (Williamson, 1990a: 137)' Commons 
(1934:4ff) uses the transaction as the object o f study. From this the need arises to 
evolve institutions which have as their subject-matter trade between parties with 
opposed interests. Micro-economics is not institution-neutral, according to 
Commons, i.e. the choice o f contract design for a transaction influences the 
efficiency o f producing a good or service.
Coase (1937) starts from the notion that the utilisation o f markets is not cost-free. 
In examination o f the behaviour o f economic activities within markets or firms, 
according to Coase, the calculation o f TC is relevant to decision-making, as well 
as production cost calculation.
“Neoclassical micro-economics on the lines of general 
equilibrium theory reached the limits of its empirical use 
around the Sixties” (Richter, 1991:396).
2.1.1 Problem and Object of Explanation as a Starting Point
New institutional economics (NIE) - and, as one o f its lines o f research, TCE - 
rejects the premises o f social order (institutions) as exogenously given model 
variables. Institutions are influenced by economic behaviour (and vice versa), and 
are decision variables (Williamson, 1984:195).
NIE studies markets and firms, including their (hybrid) intermediate forms as 
economic co-ordination institutions (objects o f explanation) (Schumann, 
1987:391). Economics is conceived by Buchanan (1975:229) as a “science o f 
contract” in which firms fulfil a co-ordination function, as well as a production 
function.
For further literature on the origins and the focus of TCE see Commons (1934) (economic); Coase 
(1937) (economic); Llewellyn (1931) (legal); Barnard (1962) (organisation theory).
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2.1.2 Research Programme and Aims o f Explanation o f TCE
All o f the research lines o f NIE deal with the interdependence between human 
rational behaviour and institutional rules, from the standpoint o f the way in which 
markets operate (Hax, 1991:55). Among the explanatory objects o f TCE, the 
following can be identified as the most important:
1) The explanation o f organisational diversity (Williamson, 1984:195).
Why are there (besides the market) very many different forms o f firm 
behaviour?
2) The explanation o f vertical integration (Williamson, 1984:212).
What determines the depth o f a firm’s production?
Optimal substitution o f transactions in market co-ordination by such in co­
ordination with firms is achieved when the marginal costs, i.e. the sum of 
production costs and TCs, o f  in-house transactions have risen to the marginal 
costs o f  market-co-ordinated transactions (Schumann, 1987:392f). The TC- 
minimising institutional structure in a national economy consists, according to 
Coase (1937:320), o f  markets and “islands o f planning”, i.e. (permanent) firms. 
The existence o f  firms must be attributed to cost-intensive utilisation o f the 
institution market as a co-ordination tool. Costs arise here, on the one hand, for 
price information and, on the other, for negotiating, concluding and adapting 
contracts. The costs o f in-house co-ordination are, according to Coase, 
attributable to diminishing marginal returns in the co-ordinating capability o f the 
firm’s management with an increasing number o f transactions. Costs arise here 
owing to the increasing probability o f wrong corporate decisions and inefficient 
factor output (Schumann, 1987:392).
Both explanatory objects stated above regard cost-minimising as a core problem 
o f economic co-ordination (Williamson, 1990a: 137).
2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NIE AND NEOCLASSICAL  
ECONOMICS
The research programme o f neoclassical theory consists o f the study o f allocation 
o f  scarce resources by means o f  the market mechanism.
The elements o f  neoclassical theory are market participants and market 
equilibrium. Among market participants, producers behave so as to minimise 
costs (in accordance with the production function) and consumers so as to
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maximise utility (according to the utility function). All market participants have 
complete, cost-free information and behave in a perfectly rational way (Richter, 
1991:400). The equilibrium o f the market is static, i.e. time is not a fundamental 
variable; that which has happened in the past is unimportant. Market equilibrium 
is established free o f time- and cost-expenditure.
The market price o f Walrasian equilibrium on factor and production markets 
reflects all o f  the information relevant to resource allocation. Markets are a 
signalling device (Williamson, 1984:195). Whereas in perfect competition offer 
and demand are co-ordinated through the price mechanism, in-house control 
takes place within firms by means o f instructions. No clear distinction exists 
between market and firm, the distribution o f economic activities between markets 
and firms being assumed as an exogenously-given datum.
The interest o f  neoclassical economics in the firm applies only to the production 
quantity and the supply price (Teece & Winter, 1984:119). The production 
quantities are determined by the production function. The production function 
specifies particular technical rules, under the existence o f which an entrepreneur 
transforms factor input quantities into production quantities.^
The phenomena o f increasing returns to scale (mass production) and bundling 
income (team production) justify, as characteristics o f  the production function, 
only the size o f the production unit or o f the particular production stage 
concerned, but not the economically appropriate size o f the firm (Richter, 
1991:398). Several firms can take advantage o f economies o f scale through joint 
use o f  an industrial production unit. A single firm can overcome diminishing 
returns by connecting together several industrial production units.
Neoclassical economics studies the organisation o f  economic behaviour 
(economic organisation) via technological conformity to law, principally with the 
aid o f  the production function (Williamson, 1990b:61f). The characteristic 
question o f  neo-classicism is “W hat is the law here?”, whereas TCE concentrates 
on “W hat is going on here?” (Williamson, 1990b:65; McCloskey, 1986). 
Neoclassical theory is, therefore, institution-neutral and pursues a non-contractual 
approach, i.e. it is irrelevant for the equilibrium price whether each individual 
stage o f  production constitutes a separate firm, or several production stages are 
combined into firms (Baur, 1990:40).
Further literature on the production function in neo-classicism: Henderson & Quandt (1971:52); 
Lipsey (1992:177).
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The regulations o f  the legal system are strictly observed by all individuals. The 
result o f  this is that, when contracts are concluded, future contractual adaptations 
between market participants do not constitute a cost factor, since court ordering - 
according to Williamson’s (1984:195) TCE - is considered to be effective (legal 
centralism tradition). This assumption results - together with the assumption o f 
perfect rationality o f  individuals, mentioned above - in perfect contracts being 
concluded between individuals on markets. TCE is based upon neoclassical 
micro-economics, insofar as the latter embodies the case o f TC-free utilisation o f 
markets and hierarchies (business governance), i.e. represents a special case o f 
TCE. Three characteristics, in particular, distinguish TCE from neoclassical 
micro-economics (Hax, 1991:56).
1) The capability o f individual information processing is limited.
2) Opportunistic behaviour o f  individuals predominates.
3) In the case o f  long-term contracts, in contrast with spot deals on markets 
(perfect contracts), contractual adaptations result in potential high 
(consequential) costs.
2 3  THE CENTRAL HYPOTHESES OF TCE
The explanation o f  organisational variety is achieved in TCE by allocation o f 
appropriate governance structures to particular transactions under the efficiency 
criterion o f TCs (see section 2.1.2).
“Organisational variety is explained by the fact that 
transactions differ in their attributes, on account o f which their 
governance needs vary” (Williamson, 1984:196)
The description o f  TCE in this section follows this logic. First, the transaction is 
defined as a unit o f  investigation and TCs are defined as an efficiency criterion 
(section 2.3.1). Transactions are modelled by using transaction attributes (section
2.3.2 and section 2.3.3). The failure o f market co-ordination is the starting-point 
for explaining the great diversity o f  non-market forms o f governance (section 
2.3.4). Finally, non-market forms o f  governance are described in their varied use 
o f contractual instruments. Modelling o f contracts can be undertaken with the aid 
o f these contractual instruments (section 2.3.5). W illiamson’s concept o f 
assigning transactions to existing forms o f co-ordination (forms o f governance) is 
given in section 2.3.6.
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23.1 The Perspective o f TCE
2.3.L I  Transaction and TCs
The transaction in TCE is defíned here as follows:
“A transaction occurs, when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface” (Williamson,
1985:1)."
An MT-terminal can be used as an example for this type o f transfer. Its purpose is 
the loading and offloading o f MT-containers. The crane technology separates two 
transaction partners, i.e. a road transport company (haulier) and a rail transport 
company (railway). Arrow defínes TCs as “the cost o f  organizing the economic 
system” and implies three sources o f TCs (Arrow, 1969:48):
1) exclusion costs;
2) costs o f communication and information; and
3) costs o f disequilibrium.
Transaction costs as a criterion o f efficiency are defíned here as:
“Costs of planning, adapting and monitoring task completion 
under alternative governance structures” (Williamson, 1985:2)^
Williamson distinguishes between ex-ante and ex-post TCs (Williamson, 
1985:20f). The former are the costs o f drañing, negotiating and safeguarding an 
agreement. The latter include
1. maladaption costs incurred when transactions drift out o f alignment;
2. haggling costs incurred if  bilateral efforts are made to correct ex-post 
misalignments;
3. setup and running costs associated with the governance structures; and
4. bonding costs o f effecting secure commitments.
Further developed by Picot (1982:270) and Albach (1988:1160f), these cost types 
(with examples) are, in particular:
This definition of transaction, which follows John Commons, is used throughout the thesis. 
Further literature offering an overview on definitions which broaden, narrow or deviate from 
Williamson: Albach (1988:1159ff); Schmidt (1992:column 1855).
For further literature on definitions of transaction costs see Wegehenkel (1980:16) and Picot 
(1991a:344).
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1) Search costs, e.g. interview costs, market research costs, costs for the 
purchase o f specialist journals;
2) Start-up costs, e.g. tendering costs, costs o f information gathering, such as 
postage, telephone, entertainment, costs o f address gathering, lobbyists’ 
salary;
3) Negotiation costs, e.g. travelling expenses, production o f negotiation 
background literature/documents, costs o f  translation and interpreting, legal 
costs;
4) Decision-making costs, e.g. costs o f  co-ordination with works council or 
supervisory board, costs o f tax advice, costs o f examining alternative 
tenders, salaries o f  staff departments;
5) Agreement costs, e.g. costs o f drawing up and formulating agreements, legal 
costs, costs o f government approval or official registration, commission and 
success bonuses, costs related to the intensity and duration o f negotiation;
6) Execution costs, e.g. costs o f control (according to contract) (Osten, 
1988:58);
7) Inspection and testing costs, e.g. costs o f  in-firm monitoring o f deadlines, 
quality testing, costs o f securing secrecy agreements (i.e. setting up Chinese 
walls within companies), laboratory tests (quality control), costs of 
measurement technology, salaries for contract supervision;
8) Costs o f  adaptation, e.g. amendment o f  computer programmes, costs o f 
organisational adaptation, costs o f contract amendment in quality, price, 
quantity or duration;
9) Amendment costs, e.g. training costs, penalties, breach o f contract-costs, 
loyalty discounts;
10) Costs o f  termination, e.g. extraordinary depreciation-costs o f irreversible 
investments, redundancy costs, judicial costs, cost o f lawyers.
TCs are thus essentially costs o f  information and communication in the 
preparation, execution and supervision o f  job execution on a shared-work basis, 
i.e. using separate units or employees for value-adding, both internal and external 
o f firms (Picot, 1993:column 4195). The above listing will be referred to as TC- 
phases, below.
2.3.1.2 Contingent claims and imperfect contracts (contractual gap)
By ‘contingent claim’ (perfect contract) is understood a contract in which the 
beginning and end o f  the transaction are clearly defined and, in addition, the good 
or service provided and that which is provided in return by the transaction 
partners can be precisely determined when the contract ends. Occurrences which
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the contract does not itself settle can be eliminated or set aside by (e.g. 
dispositive) statutory law (legal centralism) (Richter, 1991:407; Williamson, 
1985:20).
It must be emphasised that TCE rejects the efficiency o f regulation o f the 
exchange o f  goods and services by contingent claims, not for all transactions, but 
for all o f those transactions which show transaction attributes (defined in sections
2.3.2 and 2.3.3) o f  the market failure framework (defined below in section 2.3.4). 
One key element o f contingent claims, court ordering, can be subject to 
opportunistic behaviour, i.e. behaviour o f lawyers, and bounded rationality, i.e. 
sentencing o f  judges.
Court ordering is understood as a procedure where contract disputes are settled 
by independent courts. Imperfect contracts displaying contractual gaps appear. 
Court ordering must therefore be supported by private ordering in cases o f  market 
failure (Williamson, 1990b: 67).
2.3.2 The Transaction Attributes o f the Transaction Partners
The TCs examined in this study can arise only through concurrence o f two 
behavioural assumptions (Williamson, 1981:676): behavioural uncertainty 
(opportunism) and bounded rationality, also called ‘human factors’. TCE sees in 
human factors only a prerequisite for contract problems to appear, whereas the 
environmental factors defined in section 2.3.3 influence the level o f TCs. This 
importance between the two categories o f transaction attributes for the 
explanation o f  contracts is taken into account here. The human factors 
opportunism and bounded rationality are explained in more detail below.
2.3.2.1 Opportunism
For the human factor opportunism, first its relationship with the choice o f  form of 
contract will be formulated in a hypothesis, then its definition follows. As the 
next step, the concept o f  man in TCE is explained and illustrated by means of the 
explanatory approach o f  neoclassicism.
•  Hypothesis
According to Williamson (1985:57), together with the environmental factor o f 
factor specificity, through the occurrence o f  TCs, the behavioural assumption of 
opportunism results in a failure o f market governance. This failure is caused by
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the potential o f hold-up in view o f the transaction partner’s sunk costs o f a 
specific investment.
Hold-up is defined here as a type o f opportunistic behaviour that exists only in 
combination with asset specificity. It is opportunity that profits from unprotected 
specific assets on the other transaction partner’s side. For example, a freight 
forwarder, who has invested in specific wagons for piggyback transport, can 
potentially be forced by the railway company into price increases for the rail 
transport service o f  these wagons. Subsequently, the term hold-up is replaced by 
opportunistic behaviour, as only situations relating to asset specificity problems 
are being looked at in this thesis.
As a result, opportunistic behaviour, even if  applied by only some o f the 
transaction partners, leads to reinforcement o f contractual problems in the TCs 
process and can result in the failure o f market governance (Williamson, 1985:47).
•  Definition
Opportunism is, according to Williamson (1985:47), at some point in the course 
o f the transaction, a form o f  behaviour perceivable to others (i.e. to transaction 
partners), consisting o f  action “self interest-seeking with guile” . If  only one 
transaction partner behaves in this way before or during the conclusion o f the 
contract, does it influence the contract already, i.e. affect the appearance o f TCs? 
This uncertainty o f  strategic behaviour (Williamson, 1984:204f) becomes visible 
in imperfect or misleading reporting o f information and in intentional striving to 
mislead, pretend, confuse others or impair the judgement o f others. For instance, 
in the example for hold-up above, the railway company could wait until the full 
investment o f the freight forwarder in specific wagons is completed before 
implementing price increases. Opportunism in this respect stands in sharp 
contrast to the uncertainty o f  a non-strategic nature, i.e. the uncertainty as defined 
in section 2.3.3.2.
•  The concept o f man in TCE
Transaction cost theory goes beyond the assumption o f neoclassicism that 
individuals act out o f  self-interest (Williamson, 1985:49).
“Opportunism refers to making false or empty, that is, self- 
disbelieved threats or promises, cutting comers for undisclosed 
personal advantage, covering up tracks, and the like“
(Williamson, 1979:957).
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Opportunistic behaviour is characterised as the self-interest o f certain individuals, 
achieving personal advantage at the expense o f others and, at the same time, 
disregarding contractual obligations and general standards o f  fair trading. An 
essential prerequisite for opportunistic behaviour is its applicability to the 
individual level. TCE does not study abstract units such as enterprises and 
households, but the individuals acting within these pursue specific objectives 
(Hax, 1991:56f).
Opportunism is a reinforcement o f the utility-maximising behaviour o f 
neoclassical economics. The background to utility-maximising behaviour, not 
explicitly explained by Williamson, is explained below. Opportunistic behaviour 
is not adequately explained by Williamson (1990a:138ff). However, neoclassical 
economics provides a basis for illustrating in more detail the reasons for 
opportunistic behaviour.
The neoclassical utility theory sees in people maximisers o f utility who take 
decisions with the aim o f maximising their expectations o f value (Williamson, 
1985:49; Weede, 1992:97). If  the benefits o f an action alternative multiplied by 
its probability is greater than the benefit o f  all other action possibilities, then the 
acting individual will decide in favour o f  the first and most favourable 
alternative. I f  the benefit from searching for further action alternatives proves to 
be negative, this will result in abandonment o f the search and will confine the 
benefit calculation to the existing number o f alternatives (Opp, 1992:36: 
Michaelis, 1985:107). According to Weede (1992:97), neoclassical utility theory 
can be considered only slightly rational, since probabilities o f the individual can 
diverge greatly from objective probabilities.
23.2.2 Bounded rationality
The second human factor, bounded rationality - a contributory factor towards 
TCs, according to Williamson - is described below.
•  Hypothesis
The behavioural assumption o f bounded rationality brings about, in conjunction 
with the environmental factor o f uncertainty, the imperfection o f contracts 
(contractual gap). Without this behavioural assumption, a contingent claim 
represents the most efficient contract alternative (Williamson, 1985:50).
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•  Definition
W illiamson’s definition o f bounded rationality goes back to Simon, who 
characterised the actions o f economic actors as intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so (Simon, 1961:xxiv). Bounded rationality is caused by the limited 
recording and processing capability o f the human brain for information. This 
results in transaction partners to take imperfect decisions in relation to the perfect 
utilisation o f information.
2.3.3 The Environmental Transaction Attributes
Now that transaction attributes between the transaction partners have been 
explained, a description follows o f the factors which influence the transaction 
from outside. These so-called environmental transaction attributes influence TCs 
directly, unlike the transaction attributes o f the transaction partners in section 
2.3.2. They are therefore also characterised as determinants o f  TCs (Baur, 
1990:48).
Three environmental factors are considered below: specificity, environmental 
uncertainty and frequency. Williamson’s hypothesis on the relationship o f the 
respective environmental factor with the choice o f contract is formulated first, in 
order then to define each environmental factor and to evolve indicators for 
determining its qualitative form.
2.3.3.1 Specificity and strategic importance o f investment (quasi-rent)
•  Hypothesis
Factor specificity is the sufficient condition, among the three environmental 
factors o f specificity, environmental uncertainty and frequency, for the efficiency 
o f  non-market forms o f  governance. However, according to Williamson, these 
contractual problems arise only in connection with the behavioural factor of 
opportunism.
•  Definition
The concept o f factor specificity (or asset specificity) can already be found with 
Alfred Marshall. He discusses idiosyncratic employment for workers who are 
specialised to the work o f a particular firm. According to TCE, elements for 
safeguarding employment will appear in their labour contracts (Marshall, 
1948:626). The following definition o f  factor specificity, according to 
Williamson, is used in this study:
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“Specialised assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of 
productive value if  contracts should be interrupted or 
prematurely terminated” (Williamson, 1985:54).
These specific investments have, via so-called lock-in effects, dominant effects 
(or “large and systematic ramifications”, according to Williamson (1985:53)) 
upon the negotiating position o f those transaction partners who make investments 
o f  this kind. So-called appropriable quasi-rents subsequently arise (Klein et a l, 
1987:298); the (neocleissical) anonymity o f the markets is destroyed. Klein 
defines quasi-rent value as follows:
“The quasi-rent value o f the asset is the excess o f its value 
over its...value in its next best use to another renter. The 
potentially appropriable specialised portion o f the quasi rent is 
that portion, if  any, in excess o f its value to the second highest- 
valuing user'" [italic in original].
Put differently, the quasi-rent value is a value difference. It is the difference 
between the asset’s value in one use compared to the asset’s value in its next best 
use.
The situation o f a customer with many suppliers (large-numbers bidding 
condition) is reduced to a small group o f bidders (in the extreme case consisting 
o f  one supplier) (Williamson, 1985:61). Williamson (1984:203) calls this process 
fundamental transformation, in order to illustrate the fundamental change in the 
transaction relationship.
“After a specific investment is made and such quasi-rents are 
created, the possibility o f  opportunistic behaviour is very real”
(Klein et a/., 1987:298).
•  Indicators
Transaction costs economics works with two aspects for the operationalisation o f 
factor specificity: type classification and degree-of-intensity classification. A 
distinction is made between four types o f factor specificity:
Site specificity, i.e. performers o f contractual obligations situated nearby. 
Human asset specificity, i.e. human capabilities are acquired which are 
useful only for the particular contractual obligation concerned, e.g. technical 
know-how or management know-how.
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3) Technical specificity (physical asset specificity), i.e. production plants 
tailored to the customer’s needs, e.g. specialist machinery, components 
thereof or other technical appliances.
4) Dedicated assets, i.e. increase in capacity for delivery to particular 
categories o f customers. The investments are not necessarily specific. (For 
example, a freight forwarder purchases an additional fleet o f lorries for a 
new customer’s transport demand. From the perspective o f the freight 
forwarder, this fleet is not a specific asset, yet it carries quasi-rent value as 
the investment cannot be deployed quickly to other uses from one day to the 
other, should the shipper’s demand terminate on short notice.)
Regarding the intensity o f  factor specificity, in this study a distinction is made 
according to two indicators:
1) Durability^ or possibility o f sale o f  the asset
With continued production, this is determined by the number o f alternative 
transaction partners, i.e. alternative buyers o f the good produced under 
factor specificity, taking into account the realisation o f sunk costs in this 
next-best use. Sunk costs are defined here as costs that even in the long run 
cannot be recovered upon termination o f a transaction. Alternatively, there 
may be sales possibilities o f  the asset in the event o f  collapse o f production 
whose success is determined by the number o f  potential buyers o f the assets 
and by the extent o f  sunk costs i f  the assets are sold.
2) Continuity
This arises out o f  the importance o f the transaction for the investor in factor 
specificity, e.g. the proportion o f the firm’s total turnover that depends upon 
production in conjunction with the examined factor specificity.
Williamson distinguishes three stages for asset specificity: none, mixed and high. 
For determining the level o f asset specificity, the following gradation is chosen. 
Sustainability, i.e. the number o f alternative transaction partners and the 
saleability o f  the asset (durability) are the most important indicators o f  the level 
o f asset specificity. A t a high number o f  alternative transaction partners and high 
selling opportunity, or one o f the two high, transaction specificity is ‘low’. With a 
small number o f  alternative transaction partners and little selling opportunity, 
transaction specificity will lie in the ‘mixed’ zone. High asset specificity appears 
where there is additional high proportion o f the investment in total turnover
 ^ See Williamson (1984:202); Williamson (1985:55).
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concerned to the transaction partner (continuity), i.e. only with all three indicators 
high can one speak o f  ‘high’ specificity o f investments. A high form o f the three 
indicators each will not itself result in any asset specificity.
2.3.3.2 Uncertainty
•  Hypothesis
Uncertainty is a necessary environmental factor for market failure. Imperfect 
contractual agreements, and as a consequence TCs in the case o f contractual 
adaptations, lead to non-market forms o f governance (Williamson, 1985:57f). 
However, according to Williamson, these contractual problems only arise in 
connection with the behavioural factor o f  bounded rationality and opportunism.
•  Definition
Uncertainty is a measure o f the ability to take account o f all future environmental 
states in their effects upon the contractual obligations between transaction 
partners (Rennings, 1992:32). In terms o f decision theory, the uncertainty in TCE 
can be categorised as uncertainty o f the first degree, i.e. as a decision-making 
situation with known event-intervals and unknown entry-probabilities (Albach, 
1976:column 4037). With increasing time-distance between decision and event- 
entry (e.g. in the case o f long-term contracts), decision situations with second- 
degree uncertainty arise, i.e. in addition to the unknown entry probabilities, the 
event-interval can no longer be determined, either.
Superimposed upon this (stochastic) uncertainty o f the first and second degrees is 
the absence o f any overview o f interdependencies between the individual events 
in their effect upon the transaction relationship (complexity) (Picot, 1991b: 148 & 
162). Complexity and uncertainty result in the inability o f the transaction partners 
to identify the decision tree as a whole (Baur, 1990:70 & 78). Even if  the 
possibility o f identification existed for the decision tree, this is not achieved, 
owing to possible high information costs. This implies the behavioural 
assumption o f bounded rationality: “Approximation must replace exactness in 
reaching a decision” (Simon, 1972:170). Williamson does not separate 
complexity from (external) uncertainty in their effect on the level o f TCs in a 
contractual relationship:
“... the distinction between deterministic complexity and 
uncertainty is inessential” (Williamson, 1975:23).
27
•  Indicators
Two indicators are used for uncertainty (Walker & Weber, 1984:376; 
Williamson, 1988:360): technological uncertainty, i.e. a change in the (originally 
provided for) economic useful life o f a technology or - as Walker and Weber 
(1984:376) put it - “a change in component specification.” Additionally, 
according to Fonger (1992:72), technical adaptation, damage in the operational 
process, but also change in the duration and scheduling o f  contractual 
performance and the development o f technological innovations (e.g. in the case 
o f information and communication systems (Picot, 1991b: 148)) can bring about 
changes o f this kind. The second indicator is demand uncertainty, i.e. effects o f a 
fluctuation in demand upon the transaction situation. This indication is 
influenced, for example, by change in the stability o f market prices and their 
forecasting, by change in the pace o f market innovation and also by spatial 
market size (Baur, 1990:73ff; Fonger, 1992:73).
Whereas technology- and volume-uncertainty in the case o f the contracts studied 
show a strongly defined form, less marked influential factors which are not 
considered further are presented below. These factors are random acts o f nature, 
changes in the competitive situation o f the market (i.e. changes in the regulation 
intensity), political/legal stability o f the market milieu (i.e. changes in the legal 
system), intellectual or cultural differences between the market partners (social 
framework conditions), or changes in the technological circumstances 
(technological framework) (Williamson, 1984:204; Eucken, 1989:133f; Baur, 
1990:84ff; Fonger, 1992:73). The four latter examples, sometimes referred to in a 
separate entity as complexity, are consolidated, following Williamson’s 
approach, into uncertainty.
Now that two indicators o f environmental uncertainty have been presented, the 
effect o f  environmental uncertainty upon vertical integration must be examined.
•  Effect upon vertical integration
Uncertainty affects the degree o f  imperfection o f contracts. Owing to uncertainty, 
contractual gaps appear in the adaptation phase o f  the transaction (Williamson, 
1985:60 & 79). Williamson (1985) discusses this influential factor o f TCs in the 
development o f  the model, first as a constant existing “in sufficient degree”, and 
then works out its change effects upon the formulation o f  contracts.
Depending in each particular case upon the time at which contractual 
consideration o f uncertainty takes place, the resultant TCs occur in different
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transaction phases (Picot, 1982:272). When consideration does not take place 
until añer changed environmental circumstances come into effect, considerable 
adaptation costs arise, depending in amount upon the willingness o f the 
participants to agree to adaptation o f  the contract to changed events. If  frequent 
changes o f these data occur in conjunction with a high degree o f factor 
specificity, i.e. the possibility o f  transaction partners exploiting contractual gaps 
to their own advantage, then hierarchical governance by means o f  instructions is 
the only possibility for effectively limiting TCs (Picot, 1993:column 4200).
For contracts within the spectrum between market and hierarchy, an increase in 
uncertainty has a polarising effect, i.e. elements o f the extreme forms o f hierarchy 
or market governance in the particular contract concerned are increased (Picot, 
1993:Section 4201; Williamson, 1988:360; 1991:35). This takes place through, 
for example, increased standardisation o f the product (reduction o f factor 
specificity), in consequence o f  which market governance becomes possible. 
According to Williamson, bilateral contracts can nevertheless survive a 
significant increase o f  uncertainty without modification o f the contract structure, 
provided the transaction partners are mutually independent (Williamson, 
1985:80).
Hierarchy is defined here as contract design, that uses full vertical integration as 
solution for a service or product transaction. This contract design is the opposite 
extreme to market contracts.
Increase o f uncertainty can also make the proving o f opportunistic behaviour 
difficult and therefore necessitates adaptation o f the incentive structure in the 
contract (Spremann, 1990:63Iff). A decrease o f uncertainty - e.g. when the 
maturity stage o f a market is reached - strengthens the tendency towards market 
governance. This tendency can be slowed if  the investments (factor specificity) 
are very long-term.
2.3.33 Frequency 
•  Hypothesis
In contrast with the environmental and human factors o f the market failure 
framework, frequency is not, according to Williamson (1985:60), an independent 
factor influencing contract formulation. However, a high frequency o f a 
transaction results in non-market contracts in high TCs during the starting phase. 
A longer or more intensive transaction relationship enables these higher TCs o f 
initial agreement to be paid off.
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•  . Definition
Frequency is, according to Williamson (1985:60), a measure o f the intensity of 
use o f a form o f contract.
•  Indicators
Indicators o f frequency in this thesis are the number o f transactions and the 
amount o f  a transaction in value terms (volume). Williamson (1985:79) 
differentiates between three levels o f frequency: one-off situations, occasional, 
and recurrent.
•  Effect upon vertical integration
Frequency influences the level o f  average TCs and hence the TC o f  economic 
efficiency o f transaction governance. For transactions which necessitate high TCs 
as initial agreement costs up to the end o f  the contract, calculation of average 
costs is usually necessary. These TCs must be paid off in the ensuing transaction 
phases, and this applies especially to (non-market) contracts with high factor 
specificity and uncertainty (Picot, 1982:272). Consequently, “ ...specialised 
structures come at great cost, and the question is whether the costs can be 
justified” (Williamson, 1985:60). Without factor specificity and uncertainty, 
contingent claims, i.e. according to Williamson market governance as the 
contract form, could be concluded, regardless o f  the form o f frequency.
The transaction attribute frequency thus does not affect contract formulation 
independently, but is a “relevant” factor (Williamson, 1985:60) for the degree of 
vertical integration: at the same time, more complex forms o f contract are 
presumed only in the case o f  repeated or, at least, occasional transactions 
(Rennings, 1992:32). Influential factors to change (lower) average TCs via 
frequency here are:
3)
Degressive fixed costs, which is important particularly where there are high 
initial agreement costs with long contract duration (Picot, 1982:272), 
learning effects achieved in the course o f  transactions, e.g. discovery of 
simplified procedures in the formulation and negotiation o f the contract 
(Pfohl & Large, 1992:23), automatisation o f information gathering in the 
case o f  longer-term business relationships (Rennings, 1992:33), 
economies o f  scale, e.g. by specialisation in particular transaction problems 
(Picot, 1982:272), and
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4) economies o f scope due to bundling o f demand according to similar 
transactions on a single, already existing (complex) contract, under 
reduction o f high initial agreement costs (Williamson, 1985:60), (e.g. by 
applying GTB to various, separate transactions), and utilisation of, for 
example, already-existing contract-specific monitoring systems (Pfohl & 
Large, 1992:23).
These influential factors shorten the period o f TC-amortisation, thereby making 
non-market contracts more advantageous (Picot, 1993:column 4201). Table 2.1 
provides measurement definitions for the transaction attributes defined in this 
section. These proxies are taken from the existing empirical research both in the 
field o f transport and, where useful to apply in the thesis’ context, from other 
industry research.*^
The three most important transaction attributes are measured according to their 
intensity. Asset specificity can be found in the top row, and uncertainty and 
frequency in the bottom row of the table. There is an equal weighting for all 
proxies. Asset specificity only contributes to TC if  sunk costs are a threat in the 
transaction relationship for one or both partners. Therefore, the proxies for asset 
specificity in the top row are split between asset specificity itself and sunk costs. 
The proxies for asset specificity follow the sub-segmentation by Williamson into 
four types (physical, site, human, dedicated). These proxies will be used in the 
modelling o f  the transaction situation by qualitatively assessing the transaction 
attributes in chapter 5.
See chapter 1 for sources of existing research in TCE.
31
Table 2.1: Transaction Attributes and Measurement Definitions
A S S E T  S P E C IF IC IT Y  (principal factor)
Physical (specialisation) Alternative use opportunity cost 
Alternative user opportunity cost (sale) 
Component complexity 
Research & development expenditure
Site (proximity) Amount of alternative nearby contractors
Human (specialisation) Degree of work-specific knowledge^^^
Dedicated (output volume) Alternative contractors with similar volume
S U N K  C O STS
Ratios Asset’s share of turnover produced (importance of 
transaction)
Asset/total assets ratio (importance in assets) 
Asset/fixed assets ratio (importance in assets) 
Investment/total tmnover ratio (write-off possibility)
U N C E R T A IN T Y  (supporting factor)
Non-economic Changes of business customs or law system 
Political instability 
External natural catastrophes 
Unpredictable changes in consumer preferences
Economic Demand uncertainty 
Technological uncertainty
F R E Q U E N C Y  (supporting factor)
Investment Speciflcity Amount o f single transactions 
Recurrence of transactions
Note: Sources are only given for measurement definitions which have not been mentioned in the chapter. 
These additional measurement definitions will therefore not be used in the subsequent analysis.
Sources:
<■> Masten (1984:417).
Shelanski & Klein (1995).
Monteverde&Teece(1982).
Koopmans(1957:162f).
32
2.3.4 Market Failure Framework According to Williamson
The transaction attributes listed in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 are, according to TCE, 
factors responsible for the failure o f the price mechanism, i.e. the co-ordination 
form o f  market governance. The priority factor (or principal factor) and the most 
critical dimension for describing transactions, according to Williamson (1985:30 
& 90) and Picot (1991a:342), is factor specificity; supporting factors are 
uncertainty, frequency (environmental factors) and also opportunism and 
bounded rationality (human factors) as necessary factors which together form the 
so-called ‘market failure framework’ (Williamson, 1975; Ouchi, 1980:132ff). 
Therefrom the hypothesis o f this thesis is derived (see section 1.1).
According to Albach (1988), there are three reasons for market failure, i.e. for the 
need to co-ordinate transactions in a higher degree o f vertical integration:
1) Scale effects (economies o f scale), i.e. possible lowering o f production costs 
through business concentration,
2) external effects, in consequence o f which distortions o f competition can 
appear, and
3) asymmetric information, in consequence o f which TCs rise, owing to 
bounded rationality and the possibility o f opportunistic behaviour, to a level 
which can no longer be handled by the individual firm.
TCE studies market failure which arises owing to the latter problem. Asymmetric 
information dissemination and asset specificity make contingent claims 
inefficient: contractual agreements in the contract conclusion-phase, i.e. all TC- 
phases o f the transaction up to phase 5 (see section 2.3.1.1), have to be 
supplemented or altered in the phase o f adaptation. From this market failure, i.e. 
the failure o f  contingent claims based on legal centralism (see section 2.3.1.2), a 
bandwidth o f imperfect contracts, bilateral in nature, arises.
The following can be stated in summary o f section 2.3.4 and in view o f the 
description o f elements and instruments o f  TCE so far: TCE explains how, with 
the existence o f asset specificity, market failure can be successfully cured.
2.3.5 The Governance Structures
The aim o f this section is to explain market governance and alternative forms of 
contract for co-ordination via the market. At the same time, these contract forms 
are described and their instruments for lowering TCs are presented.
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TCE examines alternative forms o f contract for co-ordination via the market. 
Contracts for curing market failure (on the basis o f  the factors o f the market 
failure framework) are directed in a continuum towards the degree o f 
controllability and the degree o f incentive intensity. Whereas the market 
maximises incentive intensity at one end o f the continuum, the contract form 
‘hierarchy*, i.e. the co-ordination o f a transaction within a firm, constitutes its 
opposite pole with maximisation o f controllability (Williamson, 1975:101).
In the (micro-economic) contract form which is efficient for the particular 
transaction concerned, the degree o f controllability and the degree o f incentive 
intensity (lowering o f TCs by means o f contractual instruments) are tailored to 
the scale o f the market failure framework factors. At the same time contracts, 
according to Williamson (1985:69) and Macneil (1978),^ are systematised 
according to the nature o f the relationship between the transaction partners, in 
accordance with the role o f the independent legal system (court ordering) for 
solving problems during the term o f the contract and according to the contract 
instruments.
2.5.5.1 Market governance
This form o f  contract is time-based, i.e. service rendered and service in return 
coincide in time (Picot, 1993:column 4197). On the basis o f standardised 
transaction services (no factor specificity), the identity o f the transaction partners 
is irrelevant (Williamson, 1985:69).
Disputes are settled by independent courts (court ordering). The consequences o f 
non-fulfilment o f the contract terms are predictable for both transaction partners. 
A judicial settlement is a way o f settling the dispute desired by both sides. A 
protracted contractual relationship is not sought by any o f the participants 
(Williamson, 1985:74).
For market governance, the contractual focus is upon strictly-defined, formalised 
contract terms and reference to standardised legal rules, which can be 
subsequently followed by courts.
Further literature about categorisation of contracts is given by Ouchi (1980) (market, bureaucracy, 
clan).
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2.3.5.2 Bilateral governance
The object o f bilateral contracts is first to create, with the aid o f  trust-building 
measures, a milieu in which the exchange o f  goods and services, accompanied by 
specific investments (factor specificity), is established. Specific investments can 
be justified - as explained in section 2.3.3.3 - only with a high transaction 
frequency. High transaction frequency allows a contract structure tailored 
specifically to the transaction partners to be established. Great importance is 
attached by transaction partners to continuity o f the contractual relationship 
(Williamson, 1985:75). Whereas in the case o f  market and trilateral governance, 
when there are problems or lack o f clarity recourse is had to the original 
agreement, with bilateral governance, the reference for analysing a contract is the 
whole contractual relationship, with all o f  its changes in the course of time 
(Macneil, 1978:890).
Contractual changes over time, with bilateral governance, are a reaction o f the 
transaction partners to the impossibility o f protecting oneself against uncertainty 
in long-term contracts (Williamson, 1975:9Iff). Contracts are therefore formed, 
in principle, in such a way that adaptations o f the contract are possible and 
feasible. The key requirement for bilateral co-operation to work is a trust­
building environment. Credible commitments are used as a means o f creating this 
trust-building environment.
Credible commitments o f bilateral governance analysed in the literature o f TCE 
(Picot, 1982:267ff; Williamson, 1985:163ff; Spremann, 1990) can be classified 
as such - according to Williamson (1985:163ff) - on the unilateral application- 
model and are also referred to as ‘hostages’ below. They are implemented in 
support o f a bilateral trading relationship. Five instruments o f  credible 
commitments - or hostages - between contract partners are to be mentioned (with 
examples given in brackets):
1. Sharing in the result o f  the transaction, i.e. turnover or profit sharing (a 
freight forwarder receives dividends through shareholding in rail transport 
operator).
2. Warranty, in the sense o f  a subsequent compensation for damage or loss. 
Liability commitment, guarantee, and warranty are all variations o f  this type 
o f  commitment (clearly defined compensation for loss o f transport container 
with defined compensation payment per kilo o f gross weight o f  container 
and included in GTB o f  that transaction).
3. Conventional penalty, i.e. tangible pledges higher in value than potential 
losses o f  the transaction partner (penalty for not finishing the building o f a
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MT-terminal on a defined deadline to be paid by a construction company 
and over a sum unconnected with the value o f that MT-terminal).
4. Reputation, i.e. intangible pledges with a value higher than potential losses 
o f  the transaction partner (due to non-fulfilment o f contract, the standing o f 
a transaction partner in future negotiations about similar transport but in 
separate transactions will suffer and as a result transaction partners may 
require additional guarantees otherwise not necessary) (Spremann, 
1990:637).
5. Asset specificity, i.e. the credible commitment consists o f specialised assets 
that are not re-deployable without sacrifice o f productive value (investment 
in low-profile wagons by freight forwarder only usable in trans-alpine 
transport and with one transaction partner).
In the case o f  the credible commitments, reputation and conventional penalty, the 
mere threat o f  punishment is intended to bring about behaviour in accordance 
with the contract. The above pledges vary in each case according to the required 
level o f  the atmosphere o f  trust (depending upon the degree o f factor specificity) 
and its potential effect in the particular transaction concerned.
The difference between the first three commitments and the last is that the former 
have a cost effect as a material compensation to the beneficiary, whereas the last 
yields no cost change for the beneficiary o f the commitment in case of a 
transaction amendment. Reputation - as the fourth and as a type o f immaterial 
credible commitment - has no direct cost effect on either the owner o f that 
hostage or the beneficiary o f  the hostage in case o f a transaction amendment.
It is be noted here that vertical forms o f co-operation which focus upon trusting 
co-operation and mutual obligation between legally independent firms also come 
under bilateral governance (Baur, 1990:101 ff).
Table 2.2 shows the types o f credible commitments under market co-ordination 
and bilateral contracting. They represent examples o f credible commitments 
under W illiamson’s unilateral hostage model (1985:179). The credible 
commitments in their categorisation are split between material and immaterial in 
the top row. The bottom row contains the ratios for measuring the intensity of the 
credible commitment. The ratios for the intensity o f the credible commitment are 
equivalent to the ratios used for asset specificity measurement in section 2.3.3.3. 
These proxies will be used, in chapter 5, in the modelling o f the contract designs 
by qualitatively assessing the intensity o f  the credible commitments as contract 
elements.
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Table 2.2: Credible Commitments and Measurement Definitions
TYPE S
Material Commitments Guarantee (e.g. liability)
Profit sharing (e.g. profit participation agreement, 
shareholding)
Contractual penalty
Specific investment (i.e. investment carrying asset 
specificity which is added into the transaction 
relationship by one transaction partner)
Immaterial Commitments Reputation
M E A SU R E M E N T
Ratios Hostage’s value share of single transaction turnover 
(importance of transaction)
Hostage value/total assets value ratio (importance of 
asset)
Hostage value/fixed assets value ratio (importance of 
asset)
Hostage value/total turnover ratio (write-off 
possibility)
Source: Williamson (1985:179).
2.3.5.3 Unified governance
Unified governance must be mentioned as the final form o f contract, in which 
production is vertically integrated. Under vertical integration, this thesis defines a 
situation where a firm extends its activities over more than one successive stage 
in the production process. The following barriers for vertical integration usually 
appear in the transport industry (Polzin, 1999a:206; Picot, 1991:347ff; Stahl, 
1995:118f).
1. know-how barriers o f acquiring specialist knowledge, e.g. high TCs of 
gaining the knowledge or information paradoxon, i.e. an information is 
devalued once passed on to recipient,
2. barriers due to special transport industry specifics, such as public access or 
government priority usage.
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O f these reasons against vertical integration that can appear in the transport 
industry, only barriers due to special transport industry specifics are relevant in 
this analysis.
Vertical integration o f a transaction relationship within a firm is used whenever 
contractual adaptations are so frequent or radical that the necessary co-ordination 
with an (autonomous) transaction partner gives rise to TCs, in an amount which 
can no longer be handled at the level o f the individual firm. Reasons for these 
adaptations can be behavioural uncertainty (exploitation o f the lock-in position in 
the case o f  factor specificity) and/or environmental uncertainty (Spremann, 
1990:622f).
In the case o f  unified governance, the intensity o f control is maximised by means 
o f  instructions within the firm. Forms o f governance which, formally speaking, 
do not appear to be unified governance, but are de facto o f  a unified nature, must 
be included also in this type o f governance. The term ‘vertical government’ is 
used here by way o f distinction from bilateral governance (vertical co-operation 
forms) since, in contrast with bilateral contracts, a unilateral power shift in favour 
o f  one transaction partner takes place and legal dependence comes into effect 
(Baur, 1990:96ff& 101).
2 3 .6  Assigning Transactions to Contracts
The description o f the forms o f governance represents only a categorisation o f  the 
great diversity o f  actual and conceivable contract alternatives between market 
and hierarchy. The TCE answer to the question o f the form of governance o f a 
transaction is not, therefore, market or hierarchy, but how much market, i.e. the 
proportion o f  contract instruments influencing incentive intensity, and how much 
hierarchy, i.e. proportion o f contract instruments affecting the possibility of 
control, is efficient for a particular transaction? (Picot, 1982:273 & 275).
Figure 2.1 below aims to answer this question. Williamson assigns the main 
determinants o f  TCs, i.e. the aspects for describing transactions, factor 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency, to the different forms o f  contract with their 
various levels o f  opportunity for control and incentive intensity, under the 
condition o f  TC-minimisation. This assigning is illustrated graphically: 
uncertainty is assumed to exist in adequate amount, i.e. present in sufficient 
degree (Williamson, 1985:79). The changing o f the uncertainty level causes the 
tendency, as described above, towards polarisation o f the contract form to the 
extremes o f the market-hierarchy continuum.
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The x-axis on Figure 2.1 (asset specificity) represents the main exogenous 
variable to this function o f assigning transaction attributes to contracts, whereas 
governance structures are endogenous variables. Asset specificity originates from 
the producer o f the service or goods to be subject to this transaction (Williamson, 
1985:72). The y-axis (frequency) originates from the buyer o f the service or 
goods. Together with uncertainty, the other exogenous variable, frequency, helps 
determine the extent o f hierarchy or market in the governance structure to be 
chosen. The forms o f contract relevant to the problem-formulation o f this study 
are market contracts (market governance), bilateral and vertically integrated 
contracts (bilateral governance and unified governance). Trilateral contracts do 
not occur for the transactions examined in this study.
Figure 2.1 shows that market governance - according to Williamson - is only 
efficient, ceteris paribus^ i f  asset specificity stays on a low level and uncertainty 
is non-existent, whereas this first contract can be applied to all types of 
frequency. Bilateral governance is only efficient, ceteris paribus^ with mixed 
asset specificity and frequency in all types. In the case where asset specificity is 
high (idiosyncratic), unilateral governance only can be applied to high frequency 
transactions with high uncertainty.
This chapter on description and classification o f  TCE thus concludes with the 
assigning o f  attributes to governance structures under the efficiency criteria 
minimising TCs. This assigning process will be applied in chapters 4 and 5 to 
practical cases o f the German piggyback transport market.
39
Figure 2,1; Eflicient Governance
FREQUENCY
ASSET SPECIFICITY
Non-specific Mixed High
Occasional
Market governance 
(classical contracting)
Trilateral governance
(neo-classical
contracting)
Recurrent
Bilateral governance 
(relational contracting)
Unified governance 
(relational contracting)
incentive control
Notes:
High uncertainty.
Uncertainty possesses a polarising effect on the choice of the governance structure. Therefore, if 
present (in its used manifestations as demand uncertainty and technological uncertainty on a low or 
high level), uncertainty draws contract solutions towards the left (incentive) or right (control) side of 
the x-axis spectrum of the figure.
Source: Williamson (1985:79).
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CHAPTER 3: OBJECT OF 
RESEARCH AND DEFINITIONS
The following chapter identifies and describes the object o f the research and its 
essential definitions. Following the setting up o f  the theoretical framework in 
chapter 2, this chapter establishes the practical link with the German piggyback 
industry as part o f the European transport industry.
Firstly, the chapter provides a systematic description o f the transaction object, i.e. 
the economic good subject to be exchanged between transaction participants, in 
section 3.1. Secondly, the transaction participants or partners, who exchange this 
object, are the centre o f  attention in section 3.2. From a neo-classical perspective, 
this section could be named as description o f market players in the German 
piggyback transport market. Thirdly, the transaction situation or environment is 
the focus o f  the analysis. The market environment (section 3.3.1) and 
technological environment (section 3.3.2) influence the exchange o f the 
transaction object between the transaction participants. From a neo-classical 
perspective section 3.3 can be called market structure o f the German piggyback 
transport market.
3.1 THE TRANSACTION OBJECT
The description and systematisation o f the transactions between rail operators and 
freight forwarders follows the logic o f TCE, i.e. the transport service provided by 
the rail operator is the transaction object.
The analysis o f  contract designs in MT concentrates on piggyback transport as a 
sub-segment o f  MT. This type o f  MT is dominant in North-South traffic across 
Europe. Container traffic dominates international transport in an East-West 
direction as well as in maritime traffic. Furthermore, in container transport there 
is lower shock-sensitivity and less risk o f theft. These two characteristics put the 
container-based MT systems at a significant advantage over the traditional rail 
transport to and from Eastern European countries.
The contract designs are analysed from the perspective o f the specific transport 
service that they fulfil. As mentioned above, piggyback-based and container- 
based MT differentiate in these specific underlying transport services: piggyback- 
based transportation is the clear land-based alternative o f MT (Bukold, 1996). 
Moreover, the container-based type o f MT includes a different range o f transport
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means, e.g. different types o f  wagons, terminals and transport units. Different 
types o f contract designs are a result o f these technological differences.
An institutional difference also plays a major part in the sharp separation in the 
maritime-container transport and the land-land-piggyback transport. In order to 
gain control over the transport chain, train operators have introduced a market 
separation which is neither technically nor operationally induced, namely through 
a special domestic multipurpose container <Binnencontainer> for both maritime 
ISO-containers and road transport on trucks. Due to the imminent threat for the 
stronghold o f the rail operators in maritime container transport, this bi-purpose 
container was artificially restricted to the maritime container transport segment 
only. Over a long period o f time since 1969, road-dominated piggyback transport 
operators in Germany, which were dominated by the road-side, were not allowed 
to transport these special domestic containers <DB-Binnencontainer>. There, rail 
operators fully control the land transport, whereas in land-based piggyback 
transport the freight forwarders dominate the transport chain. The piggyback 
operators from the rail domain kept out o f the transport in road-based trailers 
(Bukold, 1996). Often, piggyback transport and <Rollende Landstrasse> are 
separated (Bukold, 1996). This definition is not followed here, where piggyback 
transport includes ‘Rolling Highway’ <Rollende Landstrasse>.
The thesis now looks at the transport service o f the rail transport operator from 
the perspective o f  the theoretical framework o f  logistics. The framework of 
logistics <Logistiksystem>, according to Pfohl (1990:4 & 9), is defined as a 
system for the transformation o f goods in space and time. Therein, transport 
constitutes a logistic function next to job processing, storing and packaging. Pfohl 
(1990:7f) and Cerwenka (1993:134) distinguish four dimensions of 
transformation o f  physical and real goods in fulfilling the transport service: 
space, time, mass and information. These dimensions are based on the three 
fundamental dimensions o f classic mechanics - movement o f  mass objects in real 
space in real time - with information transfer added as the fourth.
By establishing these four dimensions, according to Pfohl (1990:7f), we are able 
to describe the transport services in MT, which are co-ordinated through the 
different contract designs. The first dimension is space. This dimension describes 
the transfer from the point o f  delivery to the point o f reception and the logistic 
processes when handling and transporting goods. The second dimension, time, 
can be influenced by the transformation o f goods, specifically through storage, 
but also through changes in speed and frequency o f transport (Ihde, 1991:152). 
The dimension mass refers to the handling o f  goods, where the physical amount.
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types and characteristics o f goods may be changed. Changes can be differentiated 
into those o f a qualitative nature, e.g. sorting, and quantitative, consolidating or 
de-consolidating.
The final dimension, information, constitutes a necessary prerequisite for the 
flow o f goods between point o f delivery and point o f despatch. Information 
initiates the flow o f goods ex-ante^ accompanies it and follows the physical 
transport. Information as part o f the logistic process therefore has a hybrid 
character. On the one hand, information can be seen as unlocked from the 
physical mass o f goods, e.g. documents o f carriage, and it achieves the character 
o f a solitary transferable object (Cerwenka, 1993:134). On the other hand, the 
information can be looked upon as the transfer o f goods to be performed in an 
efficient manner and as linked to the goods without gaining the character o f a 
separate entity. In the context o f the contracts o f transport services analysed in 
the thesis, examples for the information dimension are:
1) Changes in the logistic determination o f the physical (underlying) 
commodity, e.g. information attached to the commodity regarding the type 
o f goods transfer,
2) information regarding the type o f handling for facilitating the logistic 
process, and
3) position o f the physical commodity (Pfohl, 1990:8).
As a summary o f  section 3.1, piggyback transport - not container transport - 
constitutes the transport segment o f the thesis. The rail transport service o f the 
piggyback transport chain represents the transaction object in the context o f TCE.
3.2 THE TRANSACTION PARTICIPANTS
The transaction partners who exchange the transaction object are freight 
forwarders on the one hand, and rail transport operators <Frachtfhhrer Schiene> 
on the other hand, with the help o f  specialist intermediaries. The year 1997 
represents the latest year where full year figures are available at the time o f 
completion o f  the thesis. Germany in its borders before 1990, i.e. before the 
unification, consists only o f W est Germany regarding market data.
There are various definitions o f the role o f  freight forwarder. The freight 
forwarder in the context o f  the thesis is defined in his original role as ‘architect’ 
o f transport processes. Therefore he enhances the transparency o f the market for 
shippers on the market for logistic components. Moreover, he increases the
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efficient allocation o f resources due to wide-scale consultancy and his advisory 
role in finding individual and tailor-made solutions (Willeke, 1966:316; Ihde, 
1991:38f).
A road transport operator <Frachtfuhrer Strasse> in this thesis is a company 
professionally transporting goods.’ Due to the transport component o f transport 
service being the focus o f this analysis, a freight forwarder, who has been 
reduced to a mere road transport operator, is not treated as a freight forwarder any 
more. For the same reason, there are freight forwarders, whose product range 
includes the physical transport o f goods alongside co-ordinating the transport 
chain. These are treated consistently in the thesis as freight forwarders, not as 
freight forwarders in one instance and as road transport operator in the other.
The vertical integration o f transport services into freight forwarder companies is 
very common in Germany and can be explained by the existing market regulation 
origins in the past.^ The reason for this is that before the market liberalisation of 
the 1990s, the majority o f companies demanding rail transport services were as 
freight forwarders carrying a long-distance road transportation licence.^ 
Moreover, many road transport operators organise - not just produce - transport 
services themselves, i.e. they perform services typical o f  a freight forwarder. This 
can be explained by a high level o f potential arbitrage profits in the formerly 
regulated market.
Rail transport operators <FrachtfUhrer Schiene> in this analysis consist o f  the 
national railway companies, namely DB, SBB, FS, SNCF, to name the biggest by 
turnover used for national and international piggyback transport from Germany. 
Despite a decision to liberalise the access to the rail transport market on an EU- 
level - as outlined in chapter 1 - to date no private company has entered the 
market o f  rail transport services for the piggyback transport chain.
Road transport operators in general possess direct access to the freight 
forwarders, whereas the purchase o f rail operator services for piggyback transport 
is not possible directly by freight forwarders. Freight forwarders in Germany 
have to use piggyback transport intermediaries, which can be grouped as 
follows:
HGB, Paragraph 425.
See section 1.1.
Information from Hans Wenger, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten 
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 22.06.1993 in Sulzbach am Taunus/D.
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1) National and international subsidiaries o f rail operators, who focus 
specifically on container (not piggyback-TEUs) and swap body transport. 
The most important regarding turnover and market penetration in Germany
are:
- Transfiacht Deutsche Transportgesellschaft mbH (Transfracht), 
Frankfurt am Main/D, a subsidiary o f DB,
- Intercontainer (ICF), Brussels/B, a subsidiary o f  a conglomerate of 
Western European rail operators,
- Compagnie Nouvelle de Conteneurs C.N.C. (CNC), Paris/F, a 
subsidiary o f SNCF, and
- Cernât, Milan/I, a subsidiary o f FS.
2) National subsidiaries o f road transport operators, who focus specifically on 
swap bodies and trailers. Those are all 17 members o f the Union 
Internationale des sociétés de transport combine Rail Route (UIRR) (UIRR, 
1999:3) in Brussels. The most important UIRR members regarding turnover 
and market penetration in Germany are:
- -Hupac AG, Chiasso/CH and
- -Kombiverkehr GmbH, Frankfurt am Main.
3) The final group consists o f multimodal transport operators (MTO). These 
are freight forwarders, who offer intermediary services and therefore 
possess direct access to the MT rail component market, and who have 
partially or entirely integrated other non-rail MT components o f the 
transport chain. These hybrid companies therefore combine both freight 
forwarding activities - all o f  them are registered as freight forwarders - and 
transport operator activities, and can be typified by the use o f the transport 
mode they originally come from (maritime sea transport, road transport) 
into four sub-groups (Bukold, 1996):
- multinational freight forwarders such as Hoyer/D, Hangartner/CH, 
Bertschi/CH, using land based road transport,
- mid-sized freight forwarders with a strong focus on a special niche 
o f road-based MT, such as Ambroggio/I,
- multinational shipping companies <Reederei> such as Cast, 
Maersk, using sea based transport.
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- mid-sized freight forwarders with strong focus on port despatch 
traffic, such as ECT/NL or Eurokai/D, using land-based road 
transport subsequent to maritime transport.
The main difference legally between a freight forwarder who organises the 
different components o f the transport chain on behalf o f the shipper and an MTO 
is that the latter performs the transport through a transport certificate 
<Frachtvertrag> covering the full length o f  the transport. On the contrary, a 
freight forwarder ceases the responsibility o f road transport operator to the 
respective suppliers o f the piggyback transport chain that he organises (Polzin, 
1999:92).^
The choice o f the transaction partner by the freight forwarder for the transport 
service requested by the shipper is therefore a decision problem of purchasing 
transport services offered by different providers and intermediaries. In general, 
the choice o f a specific component producer by the freight forwarder determines 
the structure o f  the transport chain. On top o f  this purchasing decision problem of 
the freight forwarder, the thesis includes the alternative vertical integration,^ i.e. 
in this case the freight forwarder produces the trucking function himself 
<Selbsteintritt>.
The two transmission points in piggyback transport chains are technologically 
and institutionally rooted. While section 3.1 and section 3.3.2 refer to the 
technologically caused transmission points, this section defines the institutionally 
rooted transmission points in a MT chain to and from Germany. They originate 
through the existence o f  intermediaries, whose function is to establish a 
distribution channel for train operators on the rail transport service needed for the 
piggyback transport.
Therefore, from the perspective o f  market competition, the piggyback transport 
intermediaries between rail transport operators and freight forwarders form (i.e. 
bring together demand and offer) and shape the market (i.e. set the market 
practices for exchange o f  the transaction object in question). Piggyback transport 
intermediaries are key to understanding the makeup and competition on the 
German piggyback transport market. Nevertheless, from a contractual point of 
view, freight forwarders are using land-based piggyback transport components 
produced by companies with a core business interest both in piggyback and
See also Ihde (1991:54 & 98).
See section 1.1 for definition of vertical integration.
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container transport due to the historical development o f this transport industry in 
Germany. Because o f  the market liberalisation, as described in chapter 1, 
container transport operators offer intermediary services for piggyback transport 
components to the freight forwarders (Seidelmann, 1997:324). The following two 
figures show an overview o f the key piggyback transport intermediaries in terms 
o f  market size, both in the segment o f international (cross-border) transport and 
in the domestic segment o f the European piggyback transport market.
3.2.1 Main Domestic Players in Europe
Figure 3.1 contains data supplied by UIRR, Transfracht, the German container 
intermediary, and Freightliner, the UK MT intermediary. 1998 is the latest 
available data. The aim o f the chart is to identify the major domestic market 
intermediaries for both piggyback and container transport in Europe. As the 
domestic markets for the two segments are traditionally highly dominated by the 
domestic intermediary companies, as opposed to foreign intermediary providers, 
the intermediaries’ total o f consignments (in TEU) can be used as the measure for 
the size o f domestic MT-markets. The overall total for all domestic piggyback 
transport - i.e. non-container - segments is denoted ‘All UIRR’. There are no total 
figures available for the container market, i.e. the equivalent to the piggyback 
transport ‘All UIRR’ figure. As the thesis focuses on piggyback transport, the 
container market is cited for comparison purposes and only the biggest three 
European domestic container intermediaries are shown. Figure 3.1 underlines that 
Germany is the most important domestic market in Europe for national piggyback 
transport and national container transport in terms o f the amount of 
consignments. The three biggest domestic piggyback transport intermediaries in 
Europe make up for almost 80% o f  the total piggyback transport market.
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Figure 3.1: Multimodal Transport; Main Domestic Segments - Europe
Multimodal Transport -  Main Domestic Segments
Europe
(*  ■ container-based intermediaries)
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/  .0 ^ '
\
Intermediary
Source: UIRR (1999:9).
L egend: 1 consignment = 2.3 TEU = one 9m/12m-swap body = two 7m swap bodies = one
trailer = one truck load
1) estim ate 2) from 4/1998 - 3/1999.
3.2.2 Main International Players in Europe
Figure 3.2 contains data supplied by UIRR, the European piggyback transport 
association, and Intercontainer, the Swiss-based container and piggyback 
transport intermediary. 1998 is the latest available data. The aim o f the figure is 
to identify the major international market intermediaries for both piggyback and 
container transport in Europe. The international cross-border market is highly 
regionalised. As a consequence, although foreign intermediaries could offer their 
services for international transport abroad and bypass the major domestic 
intermediary, the terminal infrastructure and historical constraints usually keep 
the respective domestic intermediaries dealing with the international transport. As 
in the domestic market, the intermediaries* total o f consignments (in TEU) serves 
as the measure for the size o f  MT-markets. The overall total for all international 
piggyback transport - i.e. non-container - segments is denoted ‘All UIRR’. There
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is no total figure available for the container market, i.e. the equivalent to the ‘All 
UIRR’ fig:ure. The container market, with the two most important international 
container intermediaries, is only cited for comparison purposes.
Figure 3.2 underlines that Germany and Switzerland have the most important 
intermediaries in Europe for international piggyback transport in terms of the 
amount o f  consignments. The four biggest domestic piggyback transport 
intermediaries in Europe make up almost 70% o f the total piggyback transport 
market. The intermediary Intercontainer serves both the container and the 
piggyback transport market. As Intercontainer’s data splits consignments 
statistics by product types only, i.e. refrigerated and bulk transport, no 
differentiation between transport volume in piggyback and container transport is 
available.
Figure 3.2; Multimodal Transport; Main International Segments - Europe
Multimodal Transport • Main International Segments
Europe
(* ■ container-based Intermediaries)
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Source: UIRR (1999:9).
Legend: 1 consignment = 2.3 TEU = one 9m/12m-swap body = two 7m swap bodies = one
trailer = one truck load.
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To summarise section 3.2, the purchase o f rail transport services to be built into 
transport chains for MT-piggyback transport is organised through intermediaries 
in Germany, mostly attributable either to the transport modes road or rail. The 
transaction transmission points exist on the one hand technologically due to the 
change o f transport mode from road to rail, on the other hand institutionally due 
to the missing direct sales channel between rail transport operators and freight 
forwarders for MT rail transport services. The institutional market separation is a 
direct result o f  the train operator’s aim to control the MT-transport chain. 
Nevertheless, because o f the close attachment o f all piggyback transport 
intermediaries to one single land transport mode, the amount o f  transaction 
partner types for the freight forwarder can be reduced to three, namely rail 
company dominated intermediaries (for example Transfracht, Intercontainer), 
road transport dominated intermediaries (for example Hupac, Kombiverkehr) and 
MTOs (for example Bertschi, Hangartner, Hoyer).
The motives o f  the transaction participants to get involved in MT and 
consequently to enter the contracts described in this thesis are strikingly different. 
The main motive for train operators to participate in MT is and always has been 
to win back control o f the land-based piggyback transport chain (Bukold, 1996). 
On the other hand, for road transport operators it has been o f vital interest to 
regard railways only as a supplier to the transport chain best used in a position 
remote from client contact (Bukold, 1996). Therefore, the perception o f who 
should do what in piggyback transport has differed widely ever since its 
commercial start in Germany in the late 1960s.
3.3 THE TRANSACTION SITUATION
The exchange o f  the transaction object between the transaction participants is 
subject to the market environment and the economic and technological 
environment, henceforth defined as the transaction situation. Initially, no 
distinction is made between the general MT market and the piggyback transport 
market. Following a market-led approach in section 3.3.1, the technological 
alternatives in supplying rail transport to the piggyback transport chain are 
described in section 3.3.2. As the reason for the existence o f the contracts in 
piggyback-transport is not subject to this analysis, the explanation o f the variety 
o f technologies used in German MT is not the subject o f the thesis, either. An in- 
depth description and analysis o f  existing technologies for wagons, terminals, 
trailers and containers is therefore not necessary.
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3 J . l  The Market for Piggyback Rail Transport Operator Services
This section describes the existing modal split in land-based transportation in 
Germany, followed by the description o f the existing piggyback market. Finally, 
potential market growth o f the piggyback market is analysed.
There is no unanimously agreed definition o f  MT and particularly piggyback 
transport across Europe among the statistical sources. As a result, these sources 
do not provide particularly consistent information that can be applied to the entire 
piggyback market in Germany - including both domestic and international traffic 
(Bukold, 1996).
3.3.1.] Modal split in land-based transportation (Germany)
This section focuses on continental long-distance transport in excess o f 75 km, 
which is the area where MT can be reasonably used. Its minimum range in terms 
o f production cost efficiency starts between 200 km and 433 km, varying 
between different studies on M T’s production costs (Bukold, 1996; Backhaus & 
Bueschken, 1998:35-5873 Fn.l).
The data for Table 3.1 has been provided by the German Ministry o f Transport 
(BMVBW), with 1997 being the latest figures available. The left column 
represents the four domestic transport modes currently available in Germany. The 
breakdown by years shows their share o f the total transport volume in long-haul 
transport in tkm.^ This measure prohibits an overweighing o f the short-haul 
transport as compared to using the transport weight in t^  only. The rows 
highlighted show the two transport modes which this thesis concentrates on.
Table 3.1 shows that over the past 30 years the road has constantly improved its 
market position, whereas the rail more than halved its market share. Moreover, 
the only transport mode o f  the four shown on the table with constant and stable 
growth over the last quarter o f the past century has been road transport.
‘tkm’ used as abbreviation of tonne kilometre, 
‘t’ iised as abbreviation of tonnes.
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Table 3.1: Modal Split in Germany; Long Distance Transport 
(excess o f 7S km^ 1970-1997
Transport Mode 1970* 1980* 1990* 1997*
Rail 33.2 25.4 20.6 16.2
Road 36.2 49.0 56.7 67.1
Domestic waterway 22.7 20.1 18.3 13.8
Pipeline 7.9 5.6 4.4 2.9
Total 100 100 100 100
Total absolute in tkm 179.2 211.8 250.9 384.1
* = in % o f  tkm.
Source: Bimdesm inister für Verkehr (1999:223f).
Legend: 1997 is the latest year where full year figures are available at the tim e o f completion 
o f the thesis.
3.3.1.2 Real transport volume fo r M T and piggyback transport
This section describes the German market by transport volume within and 
between regions (axes) on the one hand and identifies the market share o f 
piggyback intermediaries on the other hand. As the thesis focuses on the 
contractual aspects o f  piggyback transport, an in-depth analysis o f market shares 
and market trends is not the intention o f  this section. The aim here is to give more 
transparency where the piggyback contracts analysed later are predominantly 
used.
Apart from transport volumes broken down by regions and intermediaries, the 
technology used (see section 3.3.2) is the third standard classification o f transport 
volumes. As far as types o f  goods are concerned, i.e. package freight or special 
freight (such as liquid, gaseous, refrigerated and hazardous goods) there exists 
currently no recent nationwide statistical data for the German piggyback market. 
The latest market study providing transport volumes on types o f goods dates from 
the late 1980s (Forschungskonsortium Kombinierter Verkehr, 1988). The scarcity 
o f data in this field can be explained by the historically engineering driven 
investigation o f data, focusing predominantly on technical measures such as 
transport distance and transport technology.
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•  Domestic market (Germany)
An overview o f  the main Western European domestic MT markets in Figure 3.1 
in section 3.2 found that Germany - represented by the intermediaries 
Kombi verkehr and Transfracht - is the most important market (region) in terms of 
the amount o f  consignments as a domestic MT market.
In terms o f the distribution o f transport volume across the German domestic 
piggyback market, a strong North-South and East-West direction o f the transport 
flows is manifest. The technological transmission points are evenly distributed 
across the country. So are - in broad terms - the transport volumes in domestic 
transport (Bundesverband des Deutschen Güterfernverkehrs, 1998:60). The main 
centres o f transport interchange regarding transport volume in tkm are Nordrhein- 
Westfalen (Duisburg, Köln, Bielefeld), Southern Bavaria (Munich, Augsburg, 
Ulm), coastal areas in the North (Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck) and Eastern 
Germany (Leipzig, Dresden, Berlin). Although, in general, transport volumes 
show a fairly even distribution regionally, there is an emphasis on the relation 
Ruhr-Area to and from Southern Germany. From the freight forwarders’ point of 
view entering into a piggyback contract, the intermediary Kombiverkehr 
dominates the domestic market and commands 100% market coverage 
(Kombiverkehr, 1999a).
•  International market (Germany)
Figure 3.3 originates from the German association o f  freight forwarders 
(Bundesverband Güterkraftverkehr, Logistik und Entsorgung, BGL). After 
highlighting the sizes o f the domestic markets, this figure describes the size of 
international piggyback transport to and from Germany broken down in target 
and source countries/regions with transport volume measured in consignments, 
one consignment being the equivalent o f  2.3 TEU. The vertical axis shows the 
target and source countries/regions split up into the six biggest on the left side 
and on the right the overall total including the separately listed counties/regions 
on the left.
For international transport, the German piggyback axes are directed North-South 
with Switzerland, Austria and Italy as target and source-countries occupying 
more than two thirds o f the entire transport volume. Therefore, trans-alpine 
relations clearly dominate the piggyback market from and to Germany.
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Figure 3.3: Market Share of Main Transport Relations; 
International Piggyback Transport - Germany 1997
Market Share of Main Tran^3ort Relations: International 
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Source: Bundesverband Güterkraftverkehr, Logistik und Entsorgung (1998:60).
Legend: 1 consignm ent = 2.3 TEU = one 9m/12m-swap body = two 7m swap bodies = one
trailer = one truck load
In Germany, only three piggyback intermediaries are selling international 
piggyback services to freight forwarders. In 1998, the following split existed 
between these intermediaries (in consignments) (Intercontainer, 1999; UIRR, 
1999):
1) Intercontainer 39%
2) Kombiverkehr 36%
3) Hupac 25%
Section 3.3.1.2 described the existing German domestic and international 
piggyback transport m arket Domestically, the transport volumes show a fairly
54
even regional distribution. Germany is the most important source or target 
country for international piggyback transport in Europe. Trans-alpine piggyback 
transport dominates in international transport to and from Germany.
The following sums up the existing market in terms o f piggyback transport 
volume in Western Europe (all in tkm): international piggyback transport 
contains 60% starting or ending in Germany, 70% trans-alpine traffic and 95% 
starting or ending in Germany or alpine countries (Switzerland, Austria, Italy). 
This underlines the dominating position o f the North-South axis in international 
piggyback transport. As regarding domestic transport, o f the overall domestic 
transport volume in Western European countries 35-40% can be found in 
Germany, followed by 15-20% in France.
3,3.1.3 M T market potential
Whereas section 3.3.1.1 (existing modal split) and 3.3.1.2 (existing MT-market 
through intermediaries) focused on an historic perspective, section 3.3.1.3 
(growth potential) centres on the potential o f  the MT-market. This section 
contains a comparison o f  growth o f the two major land-based transport modes 
versus MT in the continental long-distance transport in excess o f  250 km.
Figure 3.4 utilises data from the German ministry o f  transport (BMVBW). The 
latest figures available are from 1997 for MT transport and 1998 for the rest. The 
purpose o f  the chart is to compare the development o f  the absolute amount of 
transport between the transport modes rail and road with the development o f MT. 
All MT transport volumes are double counted in either the road or the rail 
operator figures and therefore appear twice on the chart. The tkm measure is 
chosen to allow a more even attribution pro rata to the underlying transport 
distances.
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Figure 3.4; Growth Comparison; MT vs. Road vs. Rail Transport
- Germany 1985-1998
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Source: Bundesm inister für Verkehr (1999:60f & 228f).
Legend: 1998 MT no figure available to date; 1997 14.4 million tkm.
MT, both piggyback and container transport, have taken a similar development in 
the past 15 years like the rail transport mode, a stagnation o f  the transport 
volumes. During that time, road transport more than doubled in transport volume. 
The existing MT market represents only approximately 10% o f  the overall MT 
market-potential. A continuance o f  the stagnation o f MT, in line with the rail 
transport volume, is expected by the latest market study commissioned by the 
German transport ministry.®
The annxial piggyback market volume has been stable since the mid-1990s at around 30 million 
tkm, with a volume projection of 38.8 million 1km until 2010 (Hacon Ingenieurgesellschaft, 
1999:7).
56
3.3.2 The Transaction Technology
3.3.2.1 The network
In piggyback transport, a technological transmission point normally occurs twice 
due to storage and moving processes (Pfohl, 1990:9f; 1993:section 2620), being 
once at a consolidation point and once at a break-bulk-point. These transmission 
points are also bottleneck situations in the changeover o f  the transport modes 
used. From the perspective o f  the freight forwarder the rail transport operator can 
only add value, i f  the TEU’s change o f  the transport mode is inherently built into 
the transport chain changeover at a piggyback terminal. Therefore, the 
changeover o f the transport mode is included in the analysis, but only in its 
relevance to the rail transport o f piggyback, which the thesis focuses on. Any 
further transport services <Logistikaufgabe>, which are performed in MT- 
terminals, are excluded from this analysis.
Figure 3.5 is supplied by the main intermediary o f piggyback transport in 
Germany, Kombiverkehr. Its purpose is to identify the technological 
infrastructure o f the piggyback transport market in Germany, i.e. the major MT- 
terminals. It is obvious that despite some regional strongholds o f  MT-terminals in 
the West o f  Germany, the major terminals are spread fairly evenly throughout the 
country, with a focus on North-South traffic links.
These MT-terminals, or points o f technological fragmentation o f the transport 
chain, represent the transmission o f  the TEUs from road to rail transport 
operators.
57
Figure 3.S: Technological Transmission Points: 
Piggyback Terminal Network. Germany
P iggyb a ck . T a r n ln a l
Source: Kom biverkehr (2000).
3.3.2.2 The means o f transport (TEU)
From the ultimate consumer point o f view - with the perspective o f shippers in 
mind - there are only three different TEUs, namely swap bodies, trailers and full 
truckloads. However, the perspective o f  producing the piggyback service on rail 
transport and exchanging it via MT-terminals to road users, forces to differentiate 
these three technology alternatives further to a total o f five. They form the
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technological environment o f  the transaction situation (Jiinemann, 1989:286ff, 
292ff&  329ff; Rossberg, 1990:4ff; Oelfke, 1991:158f):
1) ‘Zero-alternative*: no rail transport, entire transport chain on the road. Road 
transport o f swap bodies, trailers, or trucks that are not suitable for 
piggyback transport. Piggyback transport legally constitutes a road traffic 
diverted on the rail, therefore this alternative is piggyback’s most eminent 
competitor. As this thesis investigates contract choices within piggyback, 
not transport mode choices, this ‘zero-alternative’ is not analysed further.
2) ‘Rolling Highway’-altemative: rail transport with entire road transport 
vehicles. Rail/road-transport o f  traction engine <Zugmaschine> and trailer 
or truck-trailer <Lastkraftwagenzug> on special low altitude MT-wagon 
<Niederflurwagen>. These wagons are loaded horizontally. This alternative 
is called piggyback transport in a narrow definition <Huckepackverkehr im 
engeren Sinne>, which underlines the fact that the TEU operates 
independent o f other traction systems.
3) ‘Horizontal MT-terminal’-alternative: rail transport with MT-TEU only. 
Rail/road transport o f trailer or swap bodies on MT-wagons with horizontal 
changeover in the terminal. This alternative is also called ‘piggyback 
transport in a narrow definition’ <Huckepackverkehr im engeren Sinne>.
4) ‘Vertical MT-terminal’-altemative: rail transport with MT-TEU only. 
Rail/road transport o f  trailer, swap bodies on MT-wagons with vertical 
changeover via mobile or static crane systems on the terminal. This 
alternative is also called ‘piggyback transport in a broader definition’ 
<Huckepackverkehr im weiteren Sinne>.
5) ‘RoadRailer’-alternative: rail transport with technically bimodal trailers. 
Rail/road transport o f bimodal trailers without MT-wagons with horizontal 
changeover (Rossberg, 1990:6ff).
The last technology alternative is not yet used commercially, at the time of 
completion o f  the thesis, so an in-depth analysis on efficiency o f contract designs 
using this technology is therefore not possible (Klotz, 1994:154). The middle 
three o f  these five alternatives will be the reference for all further analysis. Figure
3.6 originates from the main domestic intermediary, Kombiverkehr. It highlights 
the three most commonly used piggyback technologies in Germany, named as 
alternatives 2, 3 and 4 above, whose analysis forms the central technologies for 
the thesis.
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Figure 3.6: Transaction Technology in Piggyback Transport
Non-accompanied
Freight-boxes, swap bodies and containers are loaded vertically 
via terminal crane or mobile crane on wagon.
Trailer is loaded vertically via terminal crane or mobile crane on wagon,
accompanied
—»I
Trucks (engine, trailer) are driven horizontally via ramp on special wagon (low- 
profile wagon). The driver accompanies the transport via sleeping car on rail.
Source: Kom biverkehr (1998b); Bukold (1996).
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Figure 3.7 originates from the German association o f  freight forwarders 
(Bundesverband Güterkraftverkehr, Logistik und Entsorgung, BGL). Its focus 
lies on describing the three major MT-technologies currently in commercial use 
in domestic German piggyback transport, i.e. three types o f  swap-bodies, trailers 
and full truckloads. The latter is also called ^Rolling Highway’ <Rollende 
Landstrasse>. The transport volume attributable to each technology is compared 
across time intervals measured by number o f consignments, one consignment 
being 2.3 TEU. One consignment either exists o f  1 truckload, one trailer, one 
9m/12m-swap body or two 7m-swap bodies.
Figure 3.7; Piggyback Transport Germany; 
Split Between MT-Technologies From 1970-1997
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Source: Bundesverband Güterkraftverkehr, Logistik und Entsorgung (1998:61).
Legend: 1 consignment = 2.3 TEU = one 9m/12m-swap body = two 7m swap bodies = one
trailer = one truck load.
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In domestic German piggyback transport, the swap body TEU technology far 
outweighs the trailer as TEU, with 70% o f share o f  consignments. In sharp 
contrast to this domestic figure is international transport to and from Germany, 
with 78% o f consignments in trailers (Oelfke, 1991:178).
The trailer technology - especially with southern European countries such as 
France, Spain and Italy, is the dominant piggyback technology used. There is no 
similar data on transport technologies used to and from Germany available that 
can be compared with the domestic data provided in Figure 3.7 above.
3.3.2.3 The technology components
In the MT chains, four technology components interact for the transport o f TEUs 
(Willeke, 1966:309):
1) transport route (rail track/road),
2) vehicle (trailer, MT-wagon),
3) engine unit (traction engine <Zugmaschine>, rail locomotive), and
4) terminals for start and end o f  the rail transport element o f the transport 
chain (despatch ramp on the MT-terminal).
The investments which accompany the contract designs in piggyback transport 
are broken down into TEUs and these four components in the subsequent analysis 
o f chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 3, which focuses on the transaction object, participants, situation and 
technology o f piggyback transport in Germany, can be summarised as follows. 
The transaction object is the rail transport operator service used for continental 
land-based transport rail/road. The transaction partners on the one hand are 
freight forwarders, who demand the transaction object, and rail transport 
operators and intermediaries on the other hand, who supply or broker the 
transaction object. The latter can be clearly attributed to be either dominated by 
the road or by the rail transport industry. Piggyback intermediaries consolidate 
demand and offer both on the national and international transport segments in 
Germany. Therefore, they are key to understanding the makeup and the 
competition on the piggyback market.
The market potential for MT - the transaction situation - in Germany is exceeding 
the volume o f the existing market transactions by many times. One possible 
explanation, to be investigated through this thesis, could be an inefficient supply
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o f contract alternatives or an inefficient contract selection for piggyback transport 
transactions in Germany.
As regarding the transaction partners and transaction technology, the control of 
the transport chain in MT has been the major motivation for train operators to 
join into a transaction with road-dominated freight forwarders for the train 
transport service needed for the MT-chain. On the other hand, the road transport 
providers teamed up with the railways mainly due to external factors outside the 
transport market: ecological pressures, transport policy, and demand from 
maritime shippers and freight forwarders to automate and rationalise the 
containerisation. The effect for the road carriers, from the point o f view o f the 
transport system advantages, has always been that road transport operators 
weaken the built-in strengths o f  their road network with the rail component. 
These control issues on the transport chain will be followed up in chapters 4 and 
5.
From the perspective o f the thesis’ hypothesis, this thesis examines the contracts 
in piggyback transport, the sub-segment o f MT, on their TCE-efficiency, and 
could therefore contribute to the answer for the unexplored market potential in 
MT. Moreover, it focuses on the trans-alpine traffic North-South, and therefore 
deals with the most significant part o f German piggyback transport both in size - 
as shown in chapter 3 - and profit margins.
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTION OF PIGGYBACK 
TRANSPORT CONTRACTS FROM THE 
FREIGHT FORWARDING STANDPOINT 
lAPPLICATION OF THEORY^
Chapter 4 analyses the contracts that are eligible from the standpoint o f freight 
forwarders in Germany to acquire rail transport services for piggyback 
transportation. As pointed out in chapter 1, from a methodological point o f view, 
this empirical work represents a qualitative case study.
Firstly, section 4.1 outlines the companies participating in the transport chain and 
their contracts. Secondly, section 4.2 presents the four contracts chosen for the 
TCE analysis in detail and qualitatively models them applying the instruments o f 
TCE described in chapter 2. The degree o f vertical integration, i.e. the amount o f 
control by one transaction partner over the transaction, forms the main criterion 
o f differentiation in this undertaking.
4.1 OVERVIEW OF MARKET PLAYERS AND CONTRACT TYPES
4.1.1 Market Participants
There are two parties involved in the transactions examined. Firstly, the freight 
forwarder, who purchases the rail transport service from the carrier; secondly, the 
railway company which, as rail carrier, renders this rail carrier-service. In the 
case o f forwarders, in addition to the traditional forwarding functions as 
explained in section 3.2, a distinction can be made between those which produce 
the combined transport examined here and those which specialise in road 
transport only. The former transport specialists are called multimodal transport 
operators (MTOs).‘
In international piggyback transportation, there are various rail carriers, and these 
are regarded as a single supplier from the forwarder’s standpoint, because 
balancing o f the service for rail infrastructure takes place through a single railway 
company. The services o f the European railway companies participating in 
transport are then offset against one another.
See defmition of MTO in section 3.2 and also Hide (1991:98).
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Between purchaser (freight forwarder) and supplier (rail transport operator) of the 
rail transport service, the following piggyback transport intermediaries for 
container and piggyback transport - introduced in section 3.2 - are interpolated in 
the contract analysis:
1 ) Intercontainer (container company/piggyback company).
2) Kombiverkehr (piggyback company).
3) Hupac (piggyback company).
The intermediary company Intercontainer has its original business activity, the 
transport o f  containers, extended over the transport o f  piggyback consignments. It 
can be observed here that contract terms are also transferred out o f container 
business into business with piggyback consignments. As intermediary for North- 
South piggyback transportation over the Alps, Hupac occupies a prominent 
position. More than 90% o f  piggyback transportation in transit, starting from and 
ending in Switzerland, is co-ordinated through this intermediary (Guggenbühl, 
1993:36).
Whereas Intercontainer is a subsidiary o f various railway companies, freight 
forwarding companies hold a majority interest in the intermediaries 
Kombiverkehr and Hupac. The Compagnie Nouvelle de Conteneurs C.N.C. 
(container company/piggyback company) and a further 15 piggyback transport 
companies can in principle be conceived as additional intermediaries, from the 
standpoint o f freight forwarding to and from Germany. O f these, the most 
important ones in terms o f transport volume are:
1) T.R.W. (Belgium)
2) Trailstar (Netherlands)
3) Novatrans (France)
4) Cemat (Italy)
5) ôkom bi (Austria)
6) Kombidan (Denmark)
7) Kombilux (Luxembourg).
The contractual analysis has been confined to transactions through the three 
formerly-mentioned intermediaries, since in Germany only these companies 
approach forwarders directly via (sales) agencies.
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4.1.2 General Terms of Business (GTB)
GTBs are defined here as conditions upon which a company bases particular 
transactions. GTBs become cmcial if  they are communicated to the other 
transaction partner before the contract is signed, or reference is made to them by 
means o f a notice clearly displayed at the place o f signature o f the contract.
If  both parties make individual contractual agreements, they will have precedence 
over GTB. The content o f  GTBs covers reservation o f ownership, liability for 
defects, place o f  jurisdiction and place o f performance. If  the GTBs impose 
unfavourable terms and conditions upon the contractual partner, or restrict the 
contractual partner’s economic mobility, the GTB become null and void. If  the 
meaning o f the GTBs drawn up by a company is doubtful, they will be 
interpreted in a way such that they are less favourable for that company.^ The 
three above-mentioned intermediaries use various types o f  contracts which have 
the form o f  GTB. The following types o f GTBs exist:
1) Intercontainer (international transportation via Intercontainer)
2) Kombiverkehr (for national transportation)
3) Union internationale des sociétés de transport combiné Rail-Route (UIRR) 
(for international transportation via Kombiverkehr or Hupac).
Intermediaries such as Intercontainer, who are dominated by the railway 
companies, use standard GTBs for both national and international transport. In 
the case o f those intermediaries who are controlled by freight forwarders 
(Kombiverkehr and Hupac), a distinction is made between GTB for national and 
for international transportation. The GTBs for national transportation are drawn 
up by the respective national piggyback transport company (here: 
Kombiverkehr), and those for international transportation by UIRR, the umbrella 
organisation o f the European piggyback transport companies.
4.13 Contract Forms
Four types o f  contract appear between supplier and purchaser o f  the rail carrier 
service in piggyback transport. A feature common to all these is their basic 
documentation in the form o f GTBs. The following four forms o f contract
Law concerning regulation of General Terms of Business Law (AGB-Gesetz), § 1 ,2 ,4  and 5.
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constitute the objects o f  explanation o f the thesis, as mentioned in chapter 1, 
They are named according to the specific intermediary companies:
1) Intercontainer contract.
2) Kombiverkehr contract.
3) Hupac with traditional freight forwarder contract.
4) Hupac with MTO contract.
4.1.4 Scope of Market and Technology Analysis
These above forms o f contract reflect the focal points and restrictions o f the
transport services examined:
1) The analysis is confined technically to piggyback transport which is 
provided by both piggyback transport companies and container companies.^
2) The transport chains examined here are organised by forwarders, not by 
shippers. The choice o f  contract after the transport order has been placed is 
therefore also made by the freight forwarder on behalf o f the shipper.'*
3) By focussing on piggyback transport the analysis is confined to continental 
land transportation. For international transportation, the focus falls upon 
North-South relations, since West-East transportation is carried out mostly 
with container technology, particularly to Eastern Europe.^
4) Four piggyback techniques in commercial use will be analysed, namely 
swap bodies, trailers for vertical loading, trailers for horizontal loading and 
‘Rolling Highway’ <Rollende Landstrasse>.^
4.1.5 Scope of Contract Analysis
Apart from GTBs, a freight forwarder faces various other legal prescriptions 
when organising an MT regarding the liability o f the transaction participants. A 
significant degree o f detail analysing the four contracts mentioned had to be 
undertaken, as there is no general law applicable for the entire MT chain 
regarding liability for failure to meet delivery deadlines and loss/damage o f the 
TEU. Various intentions to combine these liability clauses into a unified law code
See section 3.1. 
See section 3.2. 
See section 3.3. 
See section 3.3.
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for the freight forwarder have not yet been realised. These ongoing attempts are 
aimed at both German domestic and international MT.^ The GTBs on the basis of 
standard transport documents can also be interpreted as an answer from the 
transport industry to this vacuum. Nevertheless, as GTBs often interfere with the 
existing transport laws, both the commercial (GTBs) and the legal liability 
clauses are analysed in section 4.2, as they form an integral part o f what TCE 
understands as a contract between transaction participants.
In summary, the aim o f section 4.1 was to typify the players involved in the 
contracting process, compared to typifying the players involved in the piggyback 
transport market in chapter 3. A key finding in section 4.1 is that although GTBs 
play an important role and contribute as an underlying foundation to the 
transactions’ governance, further contract elements such as national and 
international legislation, participations, shareholdings and infi^tructure 
investment must be included. Otherwise, the level o f the vertical integration 
involved in the transactions, according to TCE, cannot be understood.
Following the thesis hypothesis, the contract analysis is carried out in the next 
section (4.2) according to the degree o f vertical integration. This includes 
incentive issues such as liability - in the contract spectrum at the market co­
ordination end - on the one hand, and ownership and control issues, such as 
shareholdings and direct investment - in the contract spectrum at the hierarchy 
end - on the other.®
Moreover, none o f  the examined intermediaries in combined transport is 
independent. They are dominated in each particular case by the purchasers o f the 
transaction object (freight forwarders) or their suppliers (rail carriers). The 
ownership and control issues related to these intermediaries will be explained in 
the following section.
4.2 CONTRACT ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
In this section, the forms o f  governance arising from contract types are analysed 
in the context o f  TCE. The whole structure o f the contract represents the object of 
study, i.e. the contract instruments, written and unwritten, that are used for
See also Mueller-Feldhammer (1996) and Wulfineyer (1996). 
See chapter 2.
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verification and as an inducement in the case o f the purchaser (forwarder) and the 
deliverer (rail carrier).
The five steps o f analysis o f each contract can be grouped into two areas. 
Contract issues, i.e. the contract taken from the practical application in the 
piggyback transport industry on the one hand, and the governance issues, i.e. the 
contract issues transformed in the context o f TCE on the other hand.
As a first step, ownership o f  the intermediary is summarised in terms o f  vertical 
integration. Secondly, the practical use o f the contract and the contract 
participants is summarised. The third step describes the sources o f the contract, 
which are important documents about the relationship between the transaction 
partners. This is followed by a description o f  the elements o f  the contract 
examined in each particular case. Under elements here, those contract 
components are examined which refer to the specificity o f  the contractual 
relationship between the transaction partners. In the context o f TCE, these 
contract elements can be transformed into contract incentives for further analysis. 
Therefore, as a final and fifth step, these contract elements are as instruments o f 
inducement to a transaction partner in accordance with TCE. Thus, these five 
steps create the basis for examining the connection between transaction tasks and 
forms o f contract in chapter 5.
The five steps can be summarised by using their underlying questions as follows: 
the first step asks, ‘who does the intermediary belong to?* The second step 
examines where the contract can be found. The third step deals with where the 
contract comes from. ‘What are TCE contract elements?’ follows as the next 
question. In this step, all elements apart from the transport investments are 
modelled according to TCE. The transport investments as part o f  the contract - or 
artificial hostages - will be modelled through TCE in chapter 5, together with 
transport investments as part o f the transport chain - or built-in hostages. The 
final question is: ‘How strong are these elements in causing or avoiding TC?’
On the basis o f  the analysis o f  the four contract forms, it is possible to draw 
conclusions on the degree o f vertical integration within the transport chain.
The contracts o f  Intercontainer, Kombiverkehr and Hupac are analysed below 
where, in the case o f  Hupac, a distinction is made between a contract involving a 
traditional freight forwarder and a freight forwarder as a multimodal transport 
operator (MTO). In the case o f measurement criteria for the types o f credible 
commitments, analysed here under ‘elements o f  contracts’, the rail transport
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operator Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) in Germany is split into two separate corporate 
entities, DB Netz AG (DB Netz) for infrastructure and DB Cargo AG (DB 
Cargo) for goods transport operations. The business data, such as total assets or 
total turnover o f  this rail transport operator, follows this split. For example, to get 
the measurement definition o f D B ’s damage liability in piggyback transport to 
the freight forwarder, the maximum liability figure in relation to the turnover of 
DB Cargo, the subsidiary which operates the rail transport, can be used. This 
specifically applies to the Kombiverkehr contract, where DB is the primary rail 
transport operator transaction partner.
4.2.1 Intercontainer Contract
This section typifies the Intercontainer contract between freight forwarders and 
rail transport operators. After a b rief outline on this intermediary and the practical 
use o f its contract, its sources and contract elements and secondly its TCE- 
contract incentives are analysed from the standpoint o f  the transaction 
participants.
4.2.1.1 Contract structure
4.2.1.1.1 The intermediary
The contract intermediary Intercontainer’ comprises stakeholdings o f 27 
individual European railway companies, together totalling EUR 37 million share 
capital.*® None o f the railway stakeholders, apart from DB with 16%, participates 
in a higher than 12% share. The company is established as a co-operative society 
registered under Belgian law (Intercontainer, 1999:26 & 36). With less than 10 
shareholders holding more than 50% o f  the share capital, decision taking in the 
AGM is facilitated despite the large total number o f shareholders. Adding to this, 
Intercontainer is operationally independent and not dominated by any single or 
group o f  railway companies. Nevertheless, it must be classified as a rail-based 
intermediary, due to its rail-only owner structure.
Intercontainer pursues as its corporate aim the co-ordination and development o f 
both maritime containers and piggyback TEUs <Grosscontainer> transport and 
the organisation and provision o f  appropriate additional services. For analysis of 
this contract, its sources and elements as well as the contract instruments are 
considered from the standpoint o f  the transaction participants.
Subsequently for; Intercontainer-Interfngo (ICF) s.c., Brussels/B.
As of September 1999. Interview with Jury Cavanak, Intercontainer, in Basel/CH, on 21.06.2000.
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4.2.1.1.2 The contract use
In the finalisation o f the contract, Intercontainer acts as intermediary agent. 
Intercontainer mainly organises international traffic, in the case o f  the thesis’ 
market segment starting and ending in Germany. This intermediary acts as an 
agent between the offer o f  rail transport service (from the rail transport operators) 
and its demand (from the freight forwarders) and mainly for international 
transportation. The average transport distance per TEU o f this contract amounted 
to over 1,200 km in 1997 for continental transport.
4.2.1.1.3 Contract sources
The sources o f contract between the freight forwarder and the rail transport 
operator are Intercontainer’s GTB <AGB Intercontainer>,*’ the delivery note 
<Übergabeschein> and the provisions o f  international rail transport law, i.e. the 
“Convention internationale concemant le transport des marchandises par chemins 
de fer (CIM)”.'^ The outsourcing o f rail transport services via MT through 
Intercontainer is governed by Intercontainer’s GTB. These terms explicitly allow 
separate written agreements on delivery deadlines.'^
The source o f  the contract certifying the process o f transport from a legal point o f 
view is the so-called delivery note <Übergabeschein>. As for road transport, the 
consignment note serves as legal evidence for the specific transport concerned. 
Despatch o f  the consignment to Intercontainer with this delivery note 
<Übergabeschein>, signed by the freight forwarder, represents the contract o f 
transport <Beförderungsauftrag> and documents acknowledgement o f the 
specific GTB.
In addition to the sources mentioned above, the legal regulations and 
requirements o f the (national) rail transport operators carrying out rail transport 
are applicable, insofar as there is no conflict with Intercontainer’s GTB.*^
GTB Intercontainer. See appendix.
CIM is part of “Convention du 9 mai 1980 relative aux transports internationaux ferroviaires 
(COTIF)”.
GTB Intercontainer. See appendix.
GTB Intercontainer. See q>pendix.
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4.2.1.2 Intercontainer governance
4.2.1.2.1 Elements o f the contract between freight forwarder and rail
transport operator
In this section the following contract elements are described: profit-sharing, 
liquidated damages, specialised investments, and liability between freight 
forwarder and rail transport operator.
•  Profit-sharing
From the freight forwarder’s standpoint, there is no profit-sharing in the contract 
with Intercontainer. The contract participants are directly - in the case o f rail 
transport operators - or indirectly - in the case o f Intercontainer - entirely state- 
controlled via participations. The state control also applies to the decisions about 
the use o f the profits from MT activities. Conversely, from the standpoint o f rail 
transport operators, there is no substantial profit-sharing with other companies 
from MT-activities. The rail transport operators involved in this contract own no 
substantial shareholding in the road haulage industry.
•  Specialised investment
The contract participants, freight forwarders and the rail transport operator, 
finance all investments into the transport chain apart from TEUs. According to 
Intercontainer’s GTB, even these freight forwarder-financed TEUs could be 
provided via In te rcon ta in er.In te rco n ta in er’s and rail transport operator’s 
investments cover:
1) wagons (5,342 fully owned), with the following wagon types (approx, as of 
1999) (Intercontainer, 2000:13):
- 4,700 fiat wagons
- 200 pocket wagons
- 299 Mega-wagons;
2) MT-terminals, i.e. investment in a minority stake o f CLB Container 
Logistics Bettembourg S.A., Bettembourg/F, a MT-terminal operator 
serving Luxembourg, where Intercontainer holds 10% share capital 
(Intercontainer, 1999:25);
3) rail tracks in terminal areas; and
4) sales agencies, i.e. 6 sales offices, o f  which five exist in Germany out o f a 
total o f 22 sales offices Europe-wide.
IS GTB Intercontainer. See appendix.
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•  Liability (general clauses)
Damage or loss occurring to transported goods is regulated through CIM.*^ 
According to CIM, the rail transport operator does not incur liability where 
damage or loss was unavoidable or was caused by circumstances whose negative 
effect could not be averted.'^ Liability is also not incurred in the case o f damage 
caused by wilful actions o f  persons not acting on behalf o f the rail company. 
Whereas the first risk can be classified from the point o f view o f TCE as 
uncertainty, the latter is opportunism. In both cases, the burden o f proof to 
exclude liability lies initially with the rail transport operator.’* Intercontainer, as 
the intermediary, can only be held liable through own fault. The burden o f proof 
in this case lies with the freight forwarder as principal.”
The following summarises the terms o f  liability for both rail transport operator 
and Intercontainer for exceeding the delivery deadline, on the one hand, and for 
damage/loss to the transported goods, on the other.
Time liability (exceeding delivery deadline): Intercontainer’s liability in relation 
to delivery deadlines is not covered by its GTBs, but requires a separate 
agreement in writing.^®
Although the GTB o f Intercontainer do not cover liability deadlines, for a 
delivery deadline problem, international rail transport law applies, i.e. CIM. 
Thereafter, Intercontainer - acting as the intermediary - can be held liable for a 
maximum o f three times the transport charge. As an indication o f  the maximum 
delivery deadline, a measure o f approx. 400 km per 24 hours is used.^’
The rail transport company is liable for up to three times the transport charge^^ 
for not meeting the above delivery deadline according to CIM. The legal option 
o f fixing delivery deadlines in writing, i.e. via regular transport timetables, is not 
normally used in this contract. This timeframe for continental transport is without 
practical relevance in most cases, as shippers demand much shorter delivery 
times from freight forwarders.
See section 4.2.1.1.3.
CIM Art. 36 § 2.
CIM Art. 37 § 1.
GTB Intercontainer. See appendix.
GTB Intercontainer. See appendix.
CIM A rt 27 § 2; Legal option for special delivery times: CIM Art. 27 § 2 and Art. 43 § 6. 
CIM Art. 43 § 1.
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Although delivery deadlines can be fixed between freight forwarders and 
Intercontainer in written form,^^ the liability is confined in these types o f 
agreements to damage for which Intercontainer is to blame. I f  no other special 
written agreement has been made, Intercontainer underlines its non-commitment 
to these competitive rail-based delivery deadlines by referring its own delivery 
deadline liability to less competitive delivery clauses o f CMR, the international 
road transport law.^^ Under CMR, the delivery period, i f  not specified, is 60 
days.^ ^
Damage/loss liability: The participating rail transport operators are held liable to 
the following extent, according to CIM, when the transported goods are lost or 
damaged:
1) maximum o f 17 SDR (Special Drawing Rights) per kg gross weight 
(approx. EUR 24.3),^^
2) in absolute terms at the current market price as a maximum, including 
customs and transport charges,^^ with the damage calculated as the fall in 
value o f  the goods despatched fully and on time, at the point o f 
destination.^*
The weight in the calculations above includes the TEU, i.e. the trailer or swap- 
body.
Intercontainer legally interprets its role as a ‘forwarding agent’,^ ’ therefore adopts 
liability levels that are closer to the CMR clauses o f road freight forwarding. For 
the non-rail-based portion o f the transport, CMR applies, anyway. In cases o f loss 
or damage,^® the liability o f Intercontainer according to the GTB is limited to a 
maximum o f  EUR 100,000 which includes goods and TEU.^’
GTB Intercontainer. 
GTB Intercontainer. 
CMR Art. 20: 1 and 
CIM Art. 40: 2.
CIM Art. 40: 1.
CIM Art. 42: 1. 
GTB Intercontainer. 
GTB Intercontainer. 
GTB Intercontainer.
See appendix. 
See appendix. 
CMR Art. 19.
See appendix. 
See appendix. 
See appendix.
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In the case o f incomplete fulfilment o f transport services, the liability of 
Intercontainer towards the freight forwarder only applies to damage through own 
fault.^ ^
4.2.1.2.2 Contract incentives and summary
Following the description o f the sources and elements of the Intercontainer 
contract between rail transport operator and freight forwarder, this section now 
appraises this contract in the context o f  TCE. The contract incentives, 
implemented to benefit fulfilment o f the contract between transaction partners, 
will now be attributed in accordance with TCE to each participant.
In the Intercontainer contract, the exposure o f the rail transport operator to 
specialised investments is on a very low level. Only a small percentage o f the 
contract turnover is exposed to specialised wagons. O f Intercontainer’s wagon 
investments, only about 10% o f the wagon fleet is specialised. Therefore, the 
specialised terminal investments remain at a low level and only one minority 
participation in one MT-terminal exists. Terminal investments undertaken by the 
national railways can be used for non-MT as well, and are therefore general 
purpose investments.
The liability o f Intercontainer, when it performs services normally covered by the 
rail transport operator, is very limited. The intermediary can only be held liable 
for loss or damage if  the freight forwarder proves a case o f  own fault for 
Intercontainer. The delivery deadline applied in this transaction is beyond 
commercial relevance for MT. On the other hand, on a practical level the liability 
o f the national railways involved is only enforceable with a high degree o f 
uncertainty, as will be seen in chapter 5.
The fi*eight forwarder provides only TEUs as investment into this transaction. 
These are standard piggyback containers, which could be used for any other o f 
the three contracts analysed in the thesis. The degree o f specialisation o f wagons 
on the rail transport operator’s side exemplifies the lack o f specialised investment 
by the freight forwarder. The motivation behind the rail transport operator to 
provide so called mega-wagons for this transaction, for example, is to increase 
the number o f standardised 9m swap bodies from one to a total o f  two on one 
wagon. The liability o f  the freight forwarder is o f a professional nature and not 
specifically designed for this transaction.
32 GTB Intercontainer. See appendix. Interview with Hans-Jörg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, Dürrenäsch, 
on 30.08.1993 in Birrfeld/CH.
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4.2.2 Kombiverkehr Contract
This section investigates the Kombiverkehr contract between freight forwarders 
and rail transport operators. After a b rief outline on the intermediary and the 
practical use o f the contract, firstly its sources and contract elements and 
secondly its TCE-contract incentives from the standpoint o f the transaction 
participants are analysed.
4.2.2.1 Contract structure
4.2.2.1.1 The intermediary
Kombiverkehr’s corporate structure is as follows. On the basis o f its legal 
structure, Kombiverkehr is a limited partnership company 
<Kommanditgesellschaft> with a 100% interest in the general partner 
<Komplementar> Kombiverkehr GmbH. The company’s annual shareholders’ 
meeting <Gesellschafterversammlung> consists o f 282 partners with limited 
liability <Kommanditisten> (Kombiverkehr, 1999a), who are representatives o f 
the road transport industry, mostly freight forwarders, liable only to the extent o f 
their share capital, approx. EUR 15,000 each. The supervisory board 
<Verwaltungsrat>, a non-executive board, is elected through the company’s 
general meeting <Gesellschafterversammlung> (Kombiverkehr, 1996:Arts. 2 & 
8; Kombiverkehr, 1999a:42).
In terms o f voting power, DB participates, through its goods transport operator 
DB Cargo,^^ in the profit o f  the intermediary via a capital share that amounts to 
double the obligatory contribution to capital as limited partner <Pflichteinlage als 
Kommanditist> o f Kombiverkehr (1996:Art. 12a), i.e. approx. EUR 30,000 
(Kombiverkehr, 1999a:41). A limited liability partner’s share 
<Kommanditisteneinlage> confers one ‘capital voting right’ <Kapitalstimme>, 
whereas every 0.5% contribution to Kombiverkehr’s group turnover confers one 
‘turnover voting right’ <Leistungsstimme>. The maximum voting power is 11 
votes in the company’s general meeting <Gesellschafterversammlung>, 
consequently, the maximum single annual shareholders’ meeting vote is limited 
to 4% o f all votes.
Kombiverkehr pursues three main aims (Oelfke, 1991:8.157). Firstly, it organises 
road trucking to and from the MT-terminals. This service is performed partly by 
the freight forwarders themselves and partly by road transport operators. In the
DB Cargo AG, Frankfurt am Main: 100% subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG.
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latter case, Kombiverkehr acts as intermediary. Secondly, it organises rail 
transport on behalf o f freight forwarders, not only for shareholders but also for 
shipper-owned road transport operators <Werkverkehrsuntemehmen>^^ and has it 
executed by DB Cargo. Consequently, it creates a joint demand for these 
outsourced transport services,^^ and acts as agent to DB Cargo. Thirdly, 
Kombiverkehr builds and maintains MT-infrastructure o f MT. This includes not 
only technical equipment for terminal transhipment and wagons, but also 
agencies at the MT-terminals.
To sum up, the intermediary Kombiverkehr^^ is a consumer co-operative.^^ Due 
to the dominant position which the freight forwarding industry holds in terms o f 
Kombiverkehr’s capital participation, this intermediary can be grouped with the 
freight forwarding industry. This attribution is underlined by the corporation’s 
aim to lobby interests o f road transport versus the rail industry (Kombiverkehr, 
1996:Art. 2:1). DB Cargo cancelled in 1999 the minority stake it had held in 
Kombiverkehr since 1969. The single shareholder’s voting power o f an 
individual company is nevertheless very limited.
4.2.2.1.2 The contract use
The MT organised by freight forwarders in domestic transport or international 
transport via Kombiverkehr is defined from a legal standpoint as road traffic 
using the rail network.^*
4.2.2.1.3 Contract sources
The sources o f  the contract between freight forwarder and rail transport operator 
can be subdivided into the rights and duties o f the road side on the one hand, i.e. 
o f  the freight forwarder him self and o f  the road-based intermediary 
Kombiverkehr, and o f the rail side, i.e. o f  the railway, on the other.
The legal contract documents from the standpoint o f the freight forwarder are the 
so-called shipping instructions <Versandauflrag>. As for the consignment note 
<Frachtbrief^ in road transport, this document serves as the legal evidence o f the 
contract. Moreover, Kombiverkehr’s shipping instructions are the legal
34 Interview with Rainer Mertel, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten 
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 18.06.1999 in Frankfurt am Main.
GTB Kombiverkehr Art. 1:1 and 2. See appendix.
Subsequently for: Kombivericehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten Güterverkehr mbH & 
Co KG, Frankfurt am Main/D.
See chapter 3.
GüKG Art. 3:2; Oelfke (1991:157); Geßler (1977:Art. 425, No. 34-39).
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equivalent to the delivery note <Uebergabeschein> o f  the Intercontainer contract 
as mentioned above. The contracts for this transaction, as far as the freight 
forwarders are concerned, are:
1) regarding K om biverkeh r in relation to the supplier ra il tran sport operator.
- Kombiverkehr* s GTB <AGB Kombiverkehr> covering domestic 
transport;^’
- UIRR’s GTB <AGB UIRR> covering international transport;^
- Legend appendix attached to the Kombiverkehr-timetable <Kombi- 
Fahrplan> (Kombiverkehr, 1999b); and
- Kombiverkehr’s (1996) articles o f association <Satzung>.
2) regarding individual fre ig h t fo rw a rd er  as transport operator in relation to 
the sh ipper.
- Para, 425 HGB, Para. 631 ff. BGB and Para. 675 BGB for domestic 
transportation; and
- “Convention relative au contrat de transport international de marchandises 
par route (CMR)”,^’ especially CMR Art. 23 Sect. 5 (damage/loss) and 
CMR Art. 20 Sect. 1 in conjunction with CMR Art. 19 (breach o f delivery 
deadlines) for international transport.
3) r e g a r d i n g fo rw a rd er  in relation to the ra il tran sport operator.
- CIM as foundation for the transport certificate <Frachtvertrag> with DB 
Cargo'*^ for international transport; and
- framework contract <Rahmenvertrag> between Kombiverkehr and DB 
Cargo.“*^
From the standpoint o f the railway, the general outline contract 
<Rahmenvertrag>, finalised in 1968 and updated only twice since, is the 
framework for the relationship between DB Cargo and Kombiverkehr. It 
guarantees special conditions for Kombiverkehr as the biggest buyer o f train slots 
for piggyback transport in Germany. The contract specifically makes the slots 
more easily available and cheaper for Kombiverkehr. At its last amendment, it
GTB Kombiverkehr. See appendix.
GTB UIRR. See appendix.
in full: “Convention du 19 mai 1956 relative au contrat de transport international de marchandises 
par route (CMR)“; enacted by law in Germany since 16.08.1961.
GTB Kombiverkehr Art. 7:1 and 2. See appendix.
Once revised since 1969. Information from Hans Wenger, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft 
fOr kombinierten Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 22.06.1993 in Sulzbach 
am Taunus/D.
78
even guaranteed a price for the purchase o f slots, i.e. this treaty guaranteed price 
stability until May 1998.^
Important operational changes in the rights and duties between the rail side and 
the road side that complement the contract details are now considered. Until 
1999, Kombiverkehr was not liable and did not directly deal with faulty rail 
transport service they sold to the freight forwarders, except where Kombiverkehr 
was itself to blame and for gross negligence.'*^ That is to say, it used to pass on all 
rights and duties o f  one contract participant directly to the other transaction 
participant.
A significant change - parallel to Kombiverkehr gaining the status o f freight 
forwarder'*^ - has occurred affecting contract disputes over railway contract 
clauses, which sometimes due to bureaucracy red tape from the railway 
companies were not enforceable in an efficient manner. Since 1999, 
Kombiverkehr does not forward smaller freight forwarders’ claims o f damage 
and delays to the rail transport operator directly, but deals with them itself The 
striking difference to the status-ante is Kombiverkehr’s decision to settle disputes 
immediately through payment o f  damages o f  some sort. This has been introduced 
in case taking up the evidence and tracing the faulty part in the transport chain is 
either against the transaction participant’s interest or may result in costs in excess 
o f the amount under dispute.
4.2.2.2 Kombiverkehr governance
4.2.2.2.1 Elements o f the contract between freight forwarder and rail
transport operator
In the contract between freight forwarders and the railway, the following 
elements relevant to TCE can be distinguished:
•  Profit sharing
On the one hand, DB Cargo holds two capital votes in Kombiverkehr, which 
qualify for dividend payments. On the other, Kombiverkehr’s profits above 5% o f 
share capital are distributed through dividend dependent on the annual turnover 
o f  the respective shareholder with Kombiverkehr. Given that Kombiverkehr’s 
annual shareholders’ meeting has a minimum o f  282 voters and the profits after
Interview with Rainer Mertel on 17.04.2000 in Frankfurt/Main/D.
GTB Kombiverkehr Art. 1. See appendix.
Since 01.07.2000 Kombiverkehr has legal status of freight forwarder; Interview with Rainer 
Mertel on 17.04.2000 in Frankiiirt/Main/D.
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tax have been on average DM 1 million (approx. EUR 500,000) in recent years, 
the relative power o f DB Cargo’s votes including the approx. EUR 300,000 total 
annual dividends distributable relative to the turnover o f DB Cargo make these 
incentives negligible from the standpoint o f the rail transport operator.
From the standpoint o f  freight forwarders, directly there is no substantial (i.e. 
relative to turnover) profit-sharing in place derived from freight forwarder 
activity specialising in MT-transport. With profit levels as above, a typical 
partner has less than 0.5% o f Kombiverkehr’s profits as dividend entitlement via 
shareholding and approx. EUR 300,000 total additional turnover dividend is split 
between all 282 shareholders. Therefore, the incentive profit sharing for the 
freight forwarder through shareholding in Kombiverkehr carries no substantial 
financial gains for freight forwarders and can be neglected in comparison to the 
full turnover o f these companies participating in piggyback transport.
•  Specialised investment
The following investments have been undertaken by Kombiverkehr:
1) Wagons
Kombiverkehr does not hold specialised sissets for rolling stock on a 
significant level. A former participation in Kombiwaggon GmbH,"*  ^Eltville, 
has been discontinued, as well as investments in special trans-alpine wagons 
for the ‘Rolling Highway’ <Rollende Landstrasse>. Kombiwaggon GmbH, 
Eltville, is the rail-based provider o f wagons for the piggyback transport 
industry. Kombiverkehr uses specialised wagons o f  other piggyback 
transport intermediaries for international transport and DB Cargo’s 
specialised wagons for domestic transport. Only on one international route - 
certain transport to Italy - has Kombiverkehr itself started to invest in 
specialised wagons on a very small scale in 1997.“**
2) MT-terminals
Almost 80% o f Kombiverkehr’s participations are placed in various 
companies involved in either planning or operating MT-terminals.^’
47 Subsequently for: Kombiwaggon Servicegesellschaft für den Kombinierten Verkehr mbH, 
M ainz^. Kowag is a 100% subsidiary of DB Cargo (total share capital DM 500,000). Interview 
with Juergen Hipp, Division KLV, DB Cargo AG, Mainz, on 29.05.2000.
Interview with Rainer Mertel on 18.06.1999 in Frankfurt/Main/D.
The most significant (above EUR 50,000 and consolidated) are: Terminal Mannheim (via 
Deutsche Umschlaggesellschaft Schiene-Strasse DUSS mbH, Bodenheim/Rhein), Terminal Basel 
(via Kombiverkehr Agentur Basel AG, Basel/CH), Terminal Krefeld (via HUG Hohenbudberg 
Umschlaggesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Krefeld), Terminal Neuss (via Neuss-Hessentor
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Kombiverkehr (1999a) is in direct possession o f  a fleet o f mobile cranes for 
handling TEUs in the terminals.
3) Sales agencies
Kombiverkehr (1999a) owns sales agencies in all major domestic 
terminals.
MT-
To summarise Kombiverkehr’s piggyback transport investment, it does not carry 
significant investment in wagons. However, its investments in MT-terminals 
through participations and direct ownership o f  sales agencies on the one hand, 
and through direct investment in mobile handling machinery on the other hand, 
are significant. In terms o f specialised investment, a clear difference exists 
between the Intercontainer contract and the Kombiverkehr contract.
The specialised piggyback transport investments o f  the railway in the area o f 
terminal operations are substantial, and even increased through a participation in 
Duss mbH, the company for planning, financing, building and organising the 
MT-terminals in Mannheim/D.^°
•  Liability
The liability o f the rail transport operator is governed by CIM for international 
transport and by DB Cargo’s GTBs for domestic transport. The domestic 
transport liability to be covered by the rail transport operator amounts to:
1) DEM 20/kg gross weight o f the goods (approx. EUR 10),
2) DEM 2,000,000 maximum (approx. EUR 1,000,000),
3) DEM 5/kg total weight o f TEU including goods (approx. EUR 2.5),
whichever amount is greater.
These liability limits apply to all cases apart from gross negligence and own fault. 
For domestic transport there are no liability clauses for breaking delivery 
deadlines in DB Cargo’s GTB. On the other hand, liability for the rail transport
so
Multimodal GmbH), Terminal Bremen (via Roland Umschlaggesellschaft für kombinierten 
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Bremen), Terminal Ludwigshafen (via Kombierminal 
Ludwigshafen KTL GmbH, Ludwigshafen). Kombivericehr (2000:48).
Subsequently for: Deutsche Umschlaggesellschaft Schiene-Straße (DUSS) mbH, Frankfurt am 
Main. Participation of Deutsche Bahn via DB Netz in Duss mbH: 50% (of total share capital of 
DEM 1,000,000). Interview with Juergen Hipp, Division KLV, DB Cargo AG, Mainz, on 
29.05.2000.
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opera tor  with in tern a tion a l transportation^  as outlined in section 4.2.1.2.1, is 
according to CIM:
1) a maximum o f  17 SDR (Special Drawing Rights) per kg gross weight 
(approx. EUR 24.3),^'
2) in absolute terms at the current market price as a maximum, including 
customs and transport charges,^^ with damages calculated as the value 
depreciation o f the goods compared to being despatched in full and on time 
at the point o f destination.^^
The weight in the calculations above includes the TEU, i.e. the trailer or swap- 
body. Furthermore, a maximum liability o f three times the freightage^"' is used for 
not meeting the delivery time according to CIM, which as a guideline requires 
approximately 400 km per 24 hours.^^
The liability o f  the in term ediary K om biverkeh r in dom estic tran sport amounts 
to:
1) SDR 8.33/kg gross weight o f the TEU (approx. EUR 11.9),^^
2) DEM 2,000,000 maximum (approx. EUR 1,000,000),
3) a maximum o f 3 times the freightage for breaking delivery deadlines,
according to Kombiverkehr’s GTB.^^
For in tern a tion a l tran sport  ^the liability o f the in term ediary K om biverkehr is:
4)
SDR 8.33/kg gross weight o f the TEU (approx. EUR 11.9),
SDR 300,000 maximum per TEU (approx. EUR 430,000),
SDR 2,000,000 overall maximum per incident (approx. EUR 2,850,000), 
and
a maximum o f 2 times the freightage for breaking delivery deadlines.
according to UIRR’s GTB for international transport 58
CIM Art. 40: 2.
CIM Art. 40: 1.
CIM Art. 42: 1.
CIM Art. 43: 1.
CIM Art. 27: 2; Legal option for special delivery times: CIM Art. 27: 2 and Art. 43: 6. 
At a rate of 0.70 SDR/EUR as of 30/05/00.
GTB Kombivetkehr Art. 8. See appendix.
GTB UIRR Art. 8.4f See appendix.
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Without special agreement, the intermediary Kombiverkehr - in this case acting 
as a freight forwarder for the entire transport distance, road and rail - can be held 
liable on the basis o f the HGB for domestic transportation for:
1) SDR 8.33/kg gross weight o f the TEU (approx. EUR 11.9), and
2) a maximum o f 3 times the freightage for breaking delivery deadlines,
according to Special agreements can be finalised in the range o f 2-40
SDR/kg gross weight o f  TEU (approx. EUR 2.85-57.0).^
In international transport^ CMR applies, with:
1) maximum freight value <Frachtwert> o f the goods for loss/damage,®’ and
2) the same liability as in damage or loss, for breaking delivery deadlines from 
30 days in the case o f  a specific agreement (if not specified: 60 days).“
CM R’s definition o f delay is not practicable for any scheduled service on 
piggyback transport. Therein, a delay occurs if  the actual duration o f the carriage 
exceeds the time it would be reasonable to allow a diligent carrier.^^
To summarise liability as an instrument o f guarantee in the contract for both 
freight forwarder and rail transport operator, there is a built-in incentive to the 
former for contract fulfilment via the liability clauses in DB Cargo’s GTB. 
Nevertheless, this incentive is relatively low. Its liability for damage and loss is 
significant, via Kombiverkehr’s GTB. However, for the rail transport element in 
piggyback transport, the exposure to potential damage compensation duties is 
fairly limited from a practical point o f view. Liability o f the freight forwarder is 
not relevant in this contract.
4.2.2.2.2 Contract incentives and summary
The above mentioned sources and elements o f the Kombiverkehr contract 
between freight forwarders and rail transport operator can be summarised as 
follows in the context o f  TCE.
HGB Art. 431: 1 and 3.
HGB Art. 449: 2.
CMR Art. 23:5.
CMR Art. 20: 1 and CMR Art. 19. 
CMR Art. 19.
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From the standpoint o f  the service provider (rail transport operator), the scope of 
control in this transaction is high, due to the widespread vertical integration of 
wagons and the production units used in terminals. The incentive o f profit 
sharing, however, is not significant for the rail transport operator. DB Cargo, i.e. 
the rail transport operator, finances and builds all major MT-terminals in 
Germ any.^ Moreover, in the area o f  terminal operations, the contract incentive 
through its participation in Duss mbH, the MT-terminal operator, is substantial. 
Most wagons used in this contract are financed and operated by DB Cargo, either 
directly or indirectly via Kombiwaggon, the German piggyback transport wagon 
service company.
From the standpoint o f  the service recipient (freight forwarder), its specialised 
investments focus on MT-terminals, i.e. fixed terminal investments and mobile 
cranes. There is no significant specialised investment in TEUs or wagons. Its 
exposure to potential damage compensation via Kombiverkehr or itself acting as 
a freight forwarder in the non-rail elements o f the piggyback transport chain is 
higher. However, the liability limits are not commercially relevant for the goods 
transported in this contract.
4.2.3 Hupac Contract with Traditional Freight Forwarder
This section typifies the Hupac contract between traditional, or so-called 
classical, freight forwarders and rail transport operators. This ‘Hupac contract 
with traditional freight forwarder’ will also be called ‘Hupac contract’ below. As 
in the previous contracts Intercontainer and Kombiverkehr, first will be an outline 
on the intermediary and the practical use o f the contract. This is followed by 
analysing its sources and contract elements and then its contract incentives, 
focusing especially on those incentives influencing the level o f TCs, from the 
standpoint o f  the transaction participants.
4.2.3.1 Contract structure
4.2.3.1.1 The intermediary
The intermediary Hupac, Chiasso/CH,^^ is established as a shareholder company 
<Aktiengesellschaft (AG)> with a majority holding by Swiss-based freight 
forwarders. Its share capital consists o f  72% freight forwarders and road transport
See chapter 3.
Subsequently for: Hupac S.A., Chiasso/CH. Interview with Peter Hafher, Hupac SA, Chiasso/CH 
on 20.06.2000.
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operators participation, and 28% railway companies participation, thereof 24% 
SBB (Swiss railways).^
The aims o f Hupac are firstly the marketing o f MT-services o f rail transport 
operators to freight forwarders and secondly the acquisition and operation o f 
piggyback transport with its own wagons and MT-terminals (SBB, 1991b:21; 
Hupac, 1998: Appendix). Hupac even provides rail transport services with its own 
locomotives within the boundaries o f MT-terminals in Switzerland (Hupac, 
1998: Appendix).
4.2.3.1.2 The contract use
The main transport axes o f the Hupac contract with traditional freight forwarder 
are trans-alpine routes in the North-South direction.
4.2.3.1.3 Contract sources
Freight forwarders who organise transport to and from Germany carry out 
international transportation under this contract:
1) with acknowledgement o f UIRR’s GTB <AGB UIRR>, published and 
governed via UIRR, the umbrella association for European road-dominated 
piggyback transport intermediaries;
2) subject to the legal terms o f  CIM, especially for the liability o f  the rail 
transport operators in relation to freight forwarders; and
3) there exists a co-operation contract between Hupac and SBB, the Swiss 
federal railway framework contract <Rahmenvertrag>.
This agreement between the intermediary and the rail transport service provider is 
comparable with the framework contract between Kombiverkehr and DB Cargo 
o f section 4.2.2.1. However, the Hupac-SBB contract does not contain any 
information relevant to the TCE approach o f  this thesis, unlike the 
Kombiverkehr-DB Cargo contract, as it does not touch investment, liability or 
profit commitments on either side.^^
The legal contract for international transport o f piggyback transport consignments 
with the three participants freight forwarder, Hupac as intermediary and rail 
transport operators, is the CIM consignment note/UIRR-contract <CIM-
Interview with Peter Ha&er, Hupac SA, Chiasso/CH on 20.06.2000.
Information from Hans-Jörg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, Dürrenäsch, on 30.08.1993 in Birrfeld/CH.
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FrachtbriefUIRR-Vertrag>.^* This document is equivalent to the shipping 
instructions <Versandauftrag> o f  the Kombiverkehr contract and the delivery 
note <Uebergabeschein> o f the Intercontainer contract (Oelfke, 1990:42).
4.23.2 Hupac governance
4.2.3.2.1 Elements o f the contract between freight forwarder and rail
transport operator
The elements o f  the Hupac contract are broken down into profit-sharing, liability 
and specialised investments o f  freight forwarders and rail transport operator.
•  Profit-sharing
There are no direct profit distribution structures in place from railway companies 
to freight forwarders. On the other hand, SBB, the Swiss national railway, holds a 
minority stake in Hupac which affects international transport to and from 
Germany. The SBB participation in Hupac’s share capital o f SFR 12 million 
(approx. EUR 7 million) is 29.2% (SBB, 1993a:23). As a reference, the share 
capital <Eigenkapital> and interest-free government loans <zinslose 
Bundesdarlehen> o f SBB amount to SFR 12 billion (approx. EUR 7 billion) 
(SBB, 2000a). From the standpoint o f rail transport operators involved in this 
contract, such as SBB, SNCF, FS or DB, relative to turnover there is no 
substantial profit-sharing in place with the freight forwarders from MT activities.
•  Liability
Claims can be submitted by the freight forwarder to the railway company 
according to CIM and to Hupac according to GTB UIRR. From the standpoint o f 
a German freight forwarder, only international, and not Swiss domestic, 
transportation law is relevant. Consequently, liability as governed by CIM - and
6« Comité International des Transports Ferroviaires (eds.): Rundschreiben CIT 4.0.6./135 dated 
21.01.1993: Lettre de Voiture/Contrat UIRR with the following elements (in German, due to 
specialist law system terminology untranslatable into English law terminology):
<1) Versandschein
2) Frachtbriefdoppel
3) Empfangsschein
4) Kopie En^)fangsspediteur
5) Frachtkarte
6) Frachtbrieforigiiud
7) Kopie Ausliefertransporteur>.
This contract corresponds in its set-up to the so called “KVO-Frachtbrief*. Art. 10 ff. KVO; Art. 
426 HGB; Oelfke, Wolfgang: Gütervericehr, 1991, 145. Similar stmcture of the so-called “EVO- 
Frachtbrief’ (rail transport). Art. 61 ff. EVO; vgl. Oelfke, Wolfgang: Güterverkehr, 1991, 96 ff  
Additional documents under 4), S) and 7) are necessary here due to the broken character of the 
MT-transport chain.
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Hupac’s GTB are important here. The liability clauses for international 
transportation o f  the railways involved and for the intermediary Hupac are 
identical to those cited in connection with the Kombiverkehr contract in section 
4.2.2.2.I.
•  Specialised investment
The freight forwarder receiving rail transport operator services, indirectly via 
Hupac, holds various significant specialised investments.
1) Wagons
For all MT-transport technologies commercially used (swap body, trailer 
and ‘Rolling Highway’), Hupac owns more than 1,800 wagons directly. The 
wagon types are (approximately, as o f  1999) (Hupac, 1998:Appendix):
- 30 ‘Rolling Highway’ sleepers
- 220 low-loader wagons 
-2 1 0  mega (2-part) wagons
- 20 jum bo (2-part) wagons
- 450 pocket wagons
- 450 flat wagons.
Hupac holds 20%, equivalent to EUR 20 million, o f Cemat SpA, Milan/I, a 
company that owns and manages piggyback wagons.
2) MT-terminals
Hupac owns three international MT-terminals for piggyback transport in 
Busto Arsizio/I, Singen/D and OleggioA. Additionally, Hupac owns or 
participates in a majority stake in two additional MT-terminals in Northern 
Italy, namely Milan and Chiasso.^® Moreover, a minority shareholding of 
C.I.M., Novara/I, o f approx. DEM 1 million (approx. EUR 500,000 and 
equivalent to 4.8% total share capital o f C.I.M.), represents another 
significant investment in terminal infrastmcture. Additionally, Hupac 
controls all terminals and rolling stock o f  Trailstar N.V., Rotterdam, the 
Dutch road-industry-dominated intermediary for piggyback transport. A 
majority shareholding was acquired in 1998 (Hupac, 1999).
Less than 7% of the rolling stock is leased.
The most significant participations (above EUR 50,000 and consolidated) are: Terminal Busto 
Arsizio (via Hupac S.p.A., Busto Arsizio/I), Terminal Oleggio (via Fidia S.p.A, Oleggio/I), 
Terminal Singen (via Terminal Singen TSG GmbH, Singen/D); Hupac (1999) and Hupac 
(1998: Appendix).
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3) Rail tracks
Hupac directly invests in all rail tracks in terminal areas.
4) Sales agencies
Hupac owns sales agencies in all o f  its terminals.
5) Investment in MT-know-how
Through its German subsidiary Hupac GmbH, Singen/D, Hupac holds a 
railway licence for Germany, i.e. the intermediary can act like a railway 
company <Eisenbahnverkehrsuntemehmen (EVU)> (Hupac, 1999).
In summary, Hupac undertakes specialised investments on a large scale along the 
entire MT chain, i.e. constantly invests in a wagon fleet, o f which approx. 50% is 
highly specialised investment suited only for alpine transport. Moreover, Hupac’s 
investments cover MT-terminals, including terminal agency offices. The 
geographical distribution o f these specialised investments underlines the 
importance o f the North-South axis as a market segment for this intermediary. 
Tangible fixed assets <Sachanlagen> in wagons and MT-terminals account for 
more than 60% o f  Hupac’s approx. EUR 90 million consolidated balance sheet 
total in 1997. Moreover, it directly owns sales agencies in key consolidation and 
distribution areas o f  in trans-alpine transportation.
On the other hand, the rail transport operator as the service provider only engages 
in specialised investment in rail tracks in MT-terminal areas. The remaining 
investments, such as TEUs, wagons, and terminal infrastructure like cranes, are 
owned by the road transport industry directly or indirectly via Hupac.
4.2.3.2.2 Contract incentives and summary
From the standpoint o f the service provider (rail transport operator), the scope o f 
controllability in this contract is much weaker than in the previous contract 
Kombiverkehr. This is due to the widespread vertical integration of the 
production units used in wagons, terminals, sales outlets and MT-know-how from 
the road transport industry via Hupac. The incentive o f profit sharing is very low 
for the rail transport operator, SBB. The latter finances and builds MT-terminal 
track investment in Switzerland. Its relevance for this contract from the TCE 
perspective lies in the area o f building and maintaining specifically designed MT- 
terminal approaches for trans-alpine traffic. Moreover, there is a contract 
incentive for the service provider via the liability clauses o f CIM, identical with
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the German railway DB Cargo’s liability mentioned in the previous contract. 
Nevertheless, just like for DB Cargo, this incentive is relatively low.
From the standpoint o f the service user (freight forwarder), the incentive o f profit 
sharing is non-existent. Its specialised investments in MT-terminal infrastructure 
and wagons above constitute an important incentive element in the Hupac 
contract. Via UIRR’s GTB, the freight forwarder’s liability for damage and loss 
is significant. Moreover, due to the high level o f vertical integration in the 
transport chain, the exposure to potential damage compensation is significant, 
different to the previous contract Kombiverkehr.
4.2.4 Hupac Contract with MTO
This section investigates the Hupac contract between freight forwarders as MTOs 
and the rail transport operator. After a brief outline on the intermediary and the 
practical use o f the contract, firstly the contract sources and contract elements and 
secondly the contract instruments and incentives from the standpoint o f the 
transaction participants are analysed. As this contract - especially from its legal 
sources - uses a similar set-up to the previous Hupac with traditional freight 
forwarder, the analysis focuses only on the differences to the three contracts 
typified so far.
4.2.4.1 Contract structure
4.2.4.1.1 The intermediary
Just like in the Hupac contract in the previous section 4.2.3, this contract also 
uses Hupac as intermediary. Therefore, Hupac’s ownership structure and 
corporate aims apply.
4.2.4.1.2 The contract use
A freight forwarder as MTO, specialising in MT, acts as the transaction 
participant in the contract Hupac with MTO, compared to a general-purpose 
freight forwarder in the contract Hupac with traditional freight forwarder. The 
previous Hupac contract vertically integrates specialised investments within a 
freight forwarder-owned co-operative. The contract type with an MTO differs 
from the previous contract with traditional freight forwarders, insofar as now 
some o f  the specialised investments are being vertically integrated within 
individual freight forwarder companies (MTOs).
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4.2.4.1.3 Contract sources
As for the contract Hupac with traditional freight forwarder already described in 
section 4.2.3.1, the most important contract sources used for this contract Hupac 
with MTO analysis are UIRR’s GTB for the intermediary’s liability and CIM for 
the rail transport operator’s liability. As for the previous contract, the transport 
instructions <Transportauftrag> are documented through the so-called CIM 
consignment noteAJIRR-contract <CIM-FrachtbriefyUIRR-Vertrag>, which the 
freight forwarder finalises with the intermediary.
4.2.4.2 Hupac with MTO governance
4.2.4.2.1 Elements o f the contract between freight forwarder and rail
transport operator
From the standpoint o f  liability and profit-sharing there is no difference regarding 
contract elements to the Hupac contract in section 4.2.3.2. However, the freight 
forwarder’s investments are significantly more specialised compared to the 
previous contract.
•  Specialised investments
The MTO provides specialised investments in fixed assets <Anlagegüter> at the 
MT-terminals, in wagons, swap bodies and trailers dedicated to MT-transport.^' 
Moreover, MTO investment can be found in information processing tools, i.e. to 
enable accompanying information ahead o f  or following consignments.
However, in contrast with the former contract, control over all these investments 
- namely from the freight forwarder as MTO - is absolute, compared with the 
indirect control over these investments o f  freight forwarders via Hupac in the 
previous contract. In the latter case, freight forwarders only participate indirectly, 
specifically in those MT-specialised investments involving wagons and MT- 
terminals. Now the specialised investment in the specific areas are assets 
provided directly by the MTOs. The following specialised investments apply for 
MTOs:
1) TEUs:
Due to the time-sensitivity and special physical appearance o f the goods 
transported under this contract, tailor-made TEUs are provided by MTOs.
71 Informatioii from Hans-Jôrg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, DttrrenSsch, on 30.08.1993 and Bertschi 
(1995).
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2) Wagons:
Investments with a high specialisation are low-profile wagons suitable for 
the Swiss railway tunnels, which carry a special profile.
3) MT-terminals:
Specialised investments are terminal infrastructure owned directly by 
MTOs. Examples o f this kind o f specialised investment are, Bertschi AG, 
Dürrenàsch/CH, and Giezendanner Transport AG, Rothrist/CH who own 
one MT-terminal each, Dürrenàsch and Rothrist (both CH).^^
Other examples o f piggyback transport MTOs, with highly specialised 
investments in TEUs in wagons, terminals or rail tracks, are Hoyer AG 
(Hamburg/D), Hangartner (Aarau/CH), Ambroggio (I) and Intermodali Italiana
(I).
4.2.4.2.2 Contract incentives and summary
The incentive instruments via profit-sharing and liability, applicable to both rail 
transport operators and freight forwarders, are identical with the Hupac contract. 
The control o f the rail transport provider over the transport chain in this contract 
is at its lowest level compared with all other contracts in the thesis.
All incentives, such as profit sharing and liability for service failures, and 
specialised investments are identical compared to Hupac with traditional freight 
forwarder. On top o f the freight forwarder’s commitment to the contract, 
however, significant specialised investments in TEUs and immobile fixed assets 
o f terminal infi^tructure apply to this contract. This contract marks the 
maximum control o f the road transport side o f all four contracts analysed.
Because o f  the low investment commitment in specialised assets, the tendency of 
the rail transport operator for a long-term contract horizon is weaker than in any 
other contract in the thesis. The Hupac contract with MTO allows the freight 
forwarder to control directly, via hierarchy and orders within the company, the 
entire transport chain except for the rail transport service itself.^^ Consequently, 
the motivation from the freight forwarder as transaction participant to negotiate a 
long-term type o f  contract with the rail transport operator for providing the rail 
transport service is higher than with any other contract analysed so far.
Information from Hans-Jörg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, Dütrenäsch, on 30.08.1993 in Birrfeld/CH. 
The reason for this is tiie insufficient finalisation of EU-regulation 1017/68 into national 
legislation. Verordmmg 1017/68.
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4 3  SUMMARY OF CONTRACT DESCRIPTION
This chapter has focused on TC-relevant elements o f contracts a freight forwarder 
can be involved with when organising piggyback transport in Germany. Its 
purpose has been to pinpoint and illustrate the relevant contract elements that 
allow an explanation o f  the degree o f vertical integration for the production of 
rail transport operator services in that industry. For this reason, the description of 
all contract elements apart from investments has been carried out in chapter 4.
Firstly, although piggyback transport intermediaries hold a prominent position in 
the contracting process, they can - due to their ownership structure - all be 
attributed to either the rail side (sell-side) or road side (buy-side) o f the 
transaction. Secondly, the key differences in the contract elements other than 
credible commitments via asset specificity have been established, that 
differentiate the four contracts in terms o f  the degree o f vertical integration, i.e. 
their position as form o f co-ordination in the spectrum between market and 
hierarchy. A full assessment o f  that degree cannot be carried out until the 
modelling o f  asset specificity for the use o f  credible commitments has taken 
place.
The qualitative modelling o f investments as artificial (contract-rooted) or built-in 
(service-rooted) asset specificity follows in chapter 5. Subsequently, the 
connection can be established between asset specificity, as defined in chapter 2, 
and vertical integration.
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CHAPTER S; EXPLANATION OF PIGGYBACK 
TRANSPORT CONTRACTS AND COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTS
5.1 EXPLANATION OF CONTRACT FORMS
The aim o f  this section is to explain the contracts described in chapter 4 which 
co-ordinate the freight forwarder’s purchase o f the rail transport operator’s 
service in piggyback transport.
For each o f  the contracts, the arguments are advanced in three stages: first, the 
transport services are described by using the logistics dimensions developed in 
section 3.1 (space, time, quantity, information). Then, the environmental factors 
o f W illiamson’s organisation failure framework are derived. At the same time, 
these transaction attributes are evaluated according to the indicators set out in 
chapter 2, i.e. qualitatively modelled. For the hypothesis o f  the thesis, the asset 
specificity from which hold-up situations can arise is decisive here. This asset 
specificity is modelled on four factors: physical, dedicated, site and human asset 
specificity. If  not stated otherwise, ‘asset specificity’ stands for physical asset 
specificity in this chapter. Besides the existence o f a hold-up position caused by 
one o f  these factors, the relative level o f sunk costs from this hold-up position is 
o f  key importance. In the third stage, the instruments used in the contract forms 
to reduce TCs are compared with the sources o f  TCs in accordance with the types 
o f contract described in chapter 2. Here, in addition to the incentives in the form 
o f material hostages, such as liability and profit sharing, the incentives in the 
form o f  specific assets play a decisive role. The absolute amount o f sunk costs o f 
these asset-based credible commitments is adjusted on the basis o f the difference 
between the respective lock-in effects o f the two transaction partners. The greater 
the resulting net lock-in effect on the part o f one transaction partner, the stronger 
the effect o f  the hostage upon the transaction as a credible commitment. Asset 
specific investments therefore are analysed firstly in their capacity as transaction 
attributes (built-in asset specificity) and secondly in their capacity as contract 
elements (artificial asset specificity). The former create TC, whereas the latter 
reduce them. As a result, attributes can be assigned to instruments, according to 
Williamson.
On the one hand, the achievement o f this section consists in a categorisation o f 
transport services through the logistics dimensions as developed in chapter 3. 
These transaction attributes are further modelled in accordance with TCE. On the
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other hand, the contracts described in chapter 4 are assigned to these modelled 
transport services (assigning o f  contracts to transactions).
As explained in chapter 1, the method used here is a qualitative case study, i.e. 
the calculation o f  the degree o f  market failure - hold-up situation and sunk costs - 
as well as the attribution o f contracts to transactions - assigning - is undertaken in 
a qualitative way. The credible commitments other than asset specificity used as 
hostage, such as profit sharing and liability, have already been modelled 
qualitatively in chapter 4. The credible commitments based on asset specificity 
are now analysed in conjunction with the lock-in-effects in this chapter. On the 
one hand this sequence o f analysis allows a clearer view on the assigning process 
later in this chapter. The distinction between ‘artificial’ asset specificity as a 
hostage and ‘transaction built-in’ asset specificity cannot always be drawn clearly 
in piggyback transport. In most cases, the hold-up effects can only be weighted 
against each other without exact attribution as to whether the assets in question 
constitute an ‘artificial’ or ‘transaction built-in’-type o f asset specificity. On the 
other hand, in perspective o f  the thesis’ aim to explain contracts and to judge on 
their efficiency, a distinction is not necessary.
At the same time, the connection between the degree o f the asset specificity and 
the degree o f  vertical integration necessary for the production o f the piggyback 
rail transport service will be examined.
5.1.1 Intercontainer Short-term Purchase Agreement
The contract between the freight forwarder and the rail transport operator, co­
ordinated via the Intercontainer intermediary, is explained below. The procedure 
here is in three stages. First, the transport services co-ordinated through the 
Intercontainer contract are characterised using logistics dimensions. Then follows 
an analysis o f  possible sources o f TCs and, finally, an assigning o f contract 
instruments to these transport services for minimising TCs. The instrument 
liability via GTB and via transport law is highlighted.
5.1.1.1 The transport service: package freight
The transport service via Intercontainer can be characterised by the dimensions 
space, quantity, time and information, as developed in chapter 3.
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•  space
Goods transport under this contract shows a wide dispersion spatially, over a 
comprehensive network o f MT-terminals within Europe.’
•  Quantity and time
In this contract, the transport o f package freight predominates. This is understood 
to mean solid transport objects transported individually or in batches, e.g. cartons, 
sheet metal, pipes, crates and machinery. Planning and organising is not a 
strategic success factor. These goods are considered problem-free, purely 
operational, and standard (Offergeld, 1984:27f). Package freight goods have a 
high proportion o f transport under this contract (Ihde, 1989:78). In addition, there 
is transport, owing to excess demand, which the forwarders cannot handle in road 
transport alone. This transportation in the form o f wagon-loads exhibits lower 
time-sensitivity.
•  Information
In general, the transport chains under this contract exhibit lower sensitivity to 
consignment information. For example, no information speeding ahead o f the 
consignment is offered with this contract (i.e. the transmission o f  information on 
the consignment for the shipper and the recipient beyond the statutory standard 
(accompanying documents under §425 HGB) is not a strategic success factor).
5.1.1.2 Sources o f TCs
TCs arise owing to opportunistic behaviour by a transaction partner in 
transactions in which specific assets are used to skim off quasi-rents. Uncertainty 
and asset specificity are presented below as a source o f TCs in the handling o f a 
transport assignment which is typical o f the Intercontainer contract.
•  Uncertainty
In all four contracts the transaction attribute o f uncertainty in the form of:
1) change in customs or legal system,
2) arbitrary use o f  political power,
3) theft,
4) political unrest, or
5) danger from random acts o f nature,
are slight.
See cluster 3 and ICF (2000).
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Political instability and changes in the legal system are disregarded as factors o f 
uncertainty, as well. Since the start o f  piggyback transport in Western Europe in 
the late 1960s, contracts between the transaction participants have not been 
influenced by these two types o f uncertainty. As this applies to all four contracts 
analysed in the thesis, political and legal changes as a source o f  TCs will not be 
further investigated in the following three contracts, either.
Technological uncertainty is not considered here, as no specialised technologies 
are used for transporting package freight. The only applicable factor o f 
uncertainty in this contract is demand uncertainty.
•  Asset specificity
Owing to investment by the freight forwarder and the rail transport operator, the 
extent o f  asset specificity is decisive for the level o f  TCs. Specialised assets for 
this contract have been summarised in section 4.2.1.2.1. This data is now looked 
at from the perspective o f TCE’s asset specificity with the measurement 
definitions laid out in section 2.3.3.
-TEU s
Only the forwarder invests in TEUs as assets in the Intercontainer contract. 
However, a large re-purchase market exists for TEUs as swap bodies or trailers 
for standard transportation. They can, moreover, be used alternatively in 
container transport (in the case o f swap bodies) or in road transport alone (in the 
case o f  trailers) without substantial extra costs. A possible asset specificity 
therefore does not exist, as far as the forwarder is concerned,
- Wagons
In the case o f  unilateral termination o f the transaction, wagons can be sold off to 
a limited extent by rail transport operators. Owing to technological diversity 
within Europe, only a small number o f potential purchasers can, therefore, use 
these wagons. The criterion which exists here o f asset specificity - number of 
alternative transaction partners - is analogous to the case o f  the MT-terminal 
described above. Thus here, too, no asset specificity can be observed. It must be 
emphasised that factor specificity as an important causal factor o f TCs does not 
arise for either o f  the two transaction partners in the case o f wagon assets.
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- MT-terminals
The rail transport operator invests in MT-terminals to fulfil the contract. When 
the transaction relationship is terminated by the forwarder, there are no sales 
opportunities for MT-terminals, since they represent fixed capital assets. 
However, the decisive criterion o f  asset specificity is sustainability (number o f 
alternative transaction partners) which the rail transport operator finds when the 
transaction relationship is terminated. Since the contract has been concluded with 
only one forwarder, the rail transport operator will probably find a new 
transaction partner, as any forwarder in Germany who has swap bodies or trailers 
at his disposal can enter into the contract. Consequently, no specificity o f assets 
exists in the case o f  terminals.
5.1.1.3 Assigning the instruments fo r reducing TCs to transport services 
The analysis below o f incentives to reduce TCs follows the classification of 
credible commitments introduced in chapter 2. As explained there, the following 
incentives exist for reducing TCs in accordance with the unilateral hostage 
model.
1) Participation in profits,
2) liability guarantee,
3) specific assets.
The incentives thus introduced were complemented by empirical contract data in 
section 4.2 for each o f  the four contracts studied. These incentives were then 
subject to a qualitative analysis according to TCE. This analysis prepared the 
allocation o f  transactions to contract forms in this chapter. Here, transactions 
according to factor specificity, frequency and uncertainty are assigned to the 
individual contract forms and fiieir varying degrees of controllability according to 
TCE. This allows the efficiency o f transport service co-ordination in the 
piggyback transport industry in Germany to be judged.
•  GTB and statutory liability o f  the rail transport operator
The Intercontainer contract is clothed legally - as explained in chapter 4 - in the 
form o f GTB. Compared with the purchase o f  road transport operator services by 
forwarders according to the general legal system, the Intercontainer contract is 
harmonised more specifically with the transaction situation. Compared to using 
general legal system clauses, only the higher information and agreement costs o f 
GTBs can be offset owing to the higher frequency o f  contract use with each 
contract partner. In spite o f absence o f specific assets, the frequency o f the
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transport service leads to a contract tailored more to the transaction partner than 
to market co-ordination based upon the GTB legal system.
“The cost o f specialised governance structures will be easier to 
recover for large transactions o f a recurring kind”
(Williamson, 1984:206).
Also regulated in the GTBs is the assumption o f liability by the supplier o f the 
transport service. This is equivalent to the liability o f a road transport operator for 
road transport operator services.^ CIM, covering international transportation, 
imposes upon the railway no liability for external risks. In the Intercontainer 
contract the railway’s own intermediary Intercontainer assumes, just as in the 
case o f  road transport, no liability for unavoidable events, i.e. uncertainty. 
Moreover, without authorisation by Intercontainer, personal injuries are excluded 
from liability.
Incentives going beyond the above-mentioned instruments cannot be found, and 
due to lack o f asset specificity would not be an efficient contractual solution, 
either. Neither o f  the two transaction partners could exploit opportunistic 
behaviour for contract adaptation, since sunk costs for both forwarder and rail 
transport operator are not significant. Limits to liability are not very competitive, 
in the case o f both loss or damage and also late delivery by the rail transport 
operator. Moreover, the possibility o f recourse by the forwarder against the 
railway and Intercontainer is restricted. On the one hand. Intercontainer must 
itself be proved to blame. On the other, the rail transport operator can be sued at 
law only at great public expense.^ As already pointed out in section 4.2.1.2.1, 
there is no profit sharing agreement set up in this contract.
As a result, the only incentives from the standpoint o f TCE are guarantees in the 
form o f  liability clauses in the GTB used. No credible commitments in the form 
o f  reputation are recognisable. Intercontainer’s liability commitments in its GTB 
go beyond the legal statutory provisions for transport operator services. Owing to 
the absence o f any hold-up risk, failing specific assets, an incentive for 
Intercontainer to observe contract-compliant behaviour is not necessary and is not 
justifiable on grounds o f  TC-savings. However, the frequency o f  use o f the 
contract results in a contract on GTB being selected to co-ordinate the transaction 
instead o f  a market form o f co-ordination. The GTB are thus an expression of
§42SHGBandCMR. 
See section 4.2.1.2.2.
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frequent usage o f  this contract on similar conditions where a contract flexibility 
higher than that o f a statutory arrangement is desired. The GTB can be amended 
or changed more quickly, i.e. in negotiations with the transaction participants, 
than transport law as part o f  general legislation, such as the HGB or CRM 
applicable to road transport domestically or internationally.
Owing to the lack o f mutual hostages and significant incentives, the contract can 
be described as a short-term purchase agreement.
5.1.2 Kombiverkehr with Bilateral Co>operation
The contract between the forwarder and the rail transport operator which is co­
ordinated through the MT intermediary is explained below. As already takes 
place in the Intercontainer contract, in sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.2 there is firstly 
a characterisation o f the transport service using dimensions, followed by an 
analysis o f  the organisation failure framework (transaction attributes) resulting 
from this service. The incentive instruments o f contracts modelled in chapter 4 
can then - in section 5.1.2.3 - be allocated to the transport services (assigning).
5.1.2.1 The transport service: package freight and special freight
The transportation handled by forwarders through Kombiverkehr is characterised
below using the dimensions space, quantity, time and information.
•  Space
Kombiverkehr co-ordinates about 50% o f its piggyback transport consignments 
within domestic transport in Germany. These transport tasks exhibit a very wide 
dispersion structure within the network o f 61 domestic terminals."*
•  Quantity
The goods transported under this contract are usually package freight, similar to 
transport under the contract Intercontainer, i.e. solid goods carried in standard 
swap bodies, trailers or trucks o f the rolling highway. Besides package fi^ight, 
impact-insensitive special goods (bulk freight, liquid freight and gaseous freight) 
are transported, for which special swap bodies are needed.
Bulk fi-eight is understood as particulate, granular or powdery goods that are 
delivered loose for transport and for loading and unloading are poured into or out
See chapter 3.
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o f the transport vessels, e.g. grain, flour, sugar, artificial fertiliser (Offergeld, 
1984:27f). Liquid goods under this contract are goods o f  high or low viscosity 
which are likewise transported in bulk, e.g. leaches and acids (Offergeld, 
1984:27f). Under gaseous freight is understood all gases transported in a vessel 
belonging to the means o f  transport and transported in bulk, e.g. natural and 
refined gases (Offergeld, 1984:27f).
•  Time
Both standard goods and goods in special swap bodies exhibit low time 
sensitivity. High-speed scheduled transport services have been used by 
Kombiverkehr only on selected routes, e.g. Nuremberg-Hamburg with maximum 
speed o f  160 km/h. For this high-speed link, 90 special purpose wagons were 
used at the beginning o f the commercial service in 1991. This investment is an 
insignificant amount o f specialised and dedicated assets compared to the 1,500 
wagons in total o f Kombiverkehr’s main wagon provider Kowag GmbH, then 
50% owned by the Kombiverkehr. The high-speed link was no longer operating 
in 1999 (Kombiverkehr, 1993a:26).^ Transport o f 24 hours’ duration within 
Germany and 48 hours’ duration within Europe is usually adequate under this 
contract.^
•  Information
The transported goods do not exhibit any particular sensitivity to the flow o f 
information. The consignment follow-up is largely the same as that o f 
conventional rail transport by the German federal railway holding Deutsche Bahn 
AG (DB).
Not until the end o f 1993 was an EDP-supported information system for fast, 
advanced consignment information tested on an experimental stretch o f line and 
it still has not been used over the whole network. Only a few regional EDP- 
systems are currently used commercially. One example - Kombiverkehr’s “Ali 
Baba” - supports a 48-hour link between Busto/I and Stockholm/S. “Ali Baba” 
not only enables the transport monitoring, but also booking, check-in and 
invoicing o f  the transport assignments (Kombiverkehr, 1999c; 1999d). This 
information system gets its information via sensors installed next to the track. As
Interview witii Rheinhilde Priebe, Kombiverkehr I>eutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten 
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 17.04.2000 in Frankfurt am Main.
Interview with Rainer Mertel, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten 
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 11.12.1991 in Frankfurt am Main.
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the train passes these sensors, information is gathered on the nature and 
composition o f the consignments via bar-coding.
5.1.2.2 Sources o f TCs
The factors which appear as sources o f TCs in the transport o f  goods under the 
Kombiverkehr contract - frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity - are 
presented below.
•  Frequency
The value-level and number o f transactions serve as indicators o f frequency. If 
freight forwarders decide to use this contract, they usually transport significant 
annual transport volume. This fact is reflected in the formal requirements for use 
o f this contract. As a shareholder o f Kombiverkehr, forwarders enjoy more 
favourable transport terms and conditions, compared with outside forwarders. 
The minimum shareholding amounts to approx. EUR 15,000 (DEM 30,000) 
(Kombiverkehr, 1996: Article 3:3 & 4).^ On the other hand, freight forwarders are 
forced to set up an account with a specialist transport bank,* which offers 
Kombiverkehr appropriate guarantees.
As a result, frequency in the Kombiverkehr contract is accordingly higher 
compared with the Intercontainer contract, owing to the larger number o f 
individual transactions effected on the basis o f  capital participation and the more 
favourable terms and conditions.
•  Uncertainty
From the standpoint o f  the forwarder and the rail transport operator, uncertainty 
is caused by demand uncertainty and technological uncertainty. As the 
technological specialisation o f assets is still relatively low, uncertainty is 
comparable widi the Intercontainer contract. As a result, uncertainty as a 
necessary factor for market failure shows no distinctive form from that o f the 
Intercontainer contract.
•  Asset specificity
In the Kombiverkehr contract, specific assets o f  the transaction partners are split 
up in four areas o f  the transport chain: namely TEUs, wagons, MT-terminals and 
terminal equipment. The hold-up position for the potential transaction partners
See also chapter 4.
Deutsche Transportbank AG, Frankiuit am Main.
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resulting from these assets is determined below, on the basis o f the distinctive 
character o f the specificity o f  the respective assets.’ A detailed breakdown o f the 
specialised investments has been provided in section 4.2.2.2.I. The focus in this 
chapter is on assessing the specificity o f these assets.
-T E U s
Swap bodies, trailers and, for rolling highway < ‘Rollende Landstrasse’>, whole 
motor trucks are used as TEUs for MT with the Kombiverkehr contract. All 
TEUs in this contract are financed directly by the forwarder. The cost o f a swap 
body is approx. EUR 7,500 (DEM 15,000), that o f a trailer approx. EUR 20,000 
(DEM 40,000).'° However, with opportunistic behaviour by the transaction 
partner DB, these assets could be sold or used otherwise, including outside 
Kombiverkehr. A MT trailer with a more rigid chassis and gripping devices for 
vertical loading can be used, for example, without additional capital expenditure 
and without appreciable losses, in road transport alone.
Since sufficient alternative sales and application opportunities exist for transport 
TEUs, no physical asset specificity exists for forwarders in this contract.
- Wagons
From the total o f  approx. 11,000 piggyback wagons used under this contract in 
Germany, DB Cargo, the rail transport operator, owns approx. 83% (9095) 
(Bundesminister für Verkehr, 1991; DB, 1999)." Procurement costs for 
individual wagons are high. A standard flat wagon suitable for one trailer and a 
flat wagon suitable for two swap bodies amounts to approx. EUR 60,000 and 
EUR 40,000 respectively.'^ The total asset value o f DB Cargo’s wagons 
represents a substantial percentage o f its approx. EUR 750 million (DEM 1,530 
million) total fixed assets. I f  wagons are sold off, DB will be faced with the 
problem o f technological diversity within Europe. Only a small number o f 
potential purchasers can, therefore, use these wagons. However, the most 
important criterion for asset specificity is the number o f alternative transaction 
partners. Since Kombiverkehr represents a co-operation o f  all major MT- 
forwarders, i f  the contract is terminated, the rail transport operator is faced with 
the problem o f  finding alternatives. Kombiverkehr represents the principal
See section 2.3.3.1.
Jünemann (1989). Similar purchasing price estimates, approx. EUR 9,000 (FF 50,000), also in 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1984:Section 16).
Information by Herbert Essler, DB Cargo, Frankfurt am Main, on 02.10.2000.
Interview with Rainer Mertel, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft fttr kombinierten 
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 08.12.2000 in Frankfurt am Main.
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demand segment o f forwarders. High asset specificity exists in the case o f 
wagons for the rail transport operator.
From the standpoint o f  Kombiverkehr, 56 special purpose wagons for the transit 
line Germany-Italy are o f  no significance as potential sunk costs. These assets 
equal less than 1% o f Kombiverkehr’s annual turnover (Kombiverkehr, 
1999a:39).‘  ^ Consequently, no sunk costs emerge from this asset. All other 
special purpose wagons which Kombiverkehr includes in its product range are 
not owned by it. Kombiverkehr thus hires from Cemat S.p.A., the Italian 
piggyback transport intermediary, special purpose wagons for refrigerated 
transport, which form part o f the approx. 13% non-DB owned wagons listed 
above.
- MT-terminals
In the case o f MT-terminals, assets break down into three areas. These are the 
financing and operation o f complete terminals, organisation o f agency work and 
terminal equipment at the terminal. The terminal equipment will be analysed 
separately. As regards MT-terminals, o f  the currently 61 in Germany, only 
approx. 38% (23) are not owned by DB directly. An additional three MT- 
terminals - Hannover, Ingolstadt and Wolfsburg, - are financed in co-operation 
with private operators, all predominantly with car manufacturing related 
transport.'^ The majority o f  investment in MT terminals is therefore not carried 
by the freight forwarders. Nevertheless, as Kombiverkehr’s total fixed assets 
invested in MT-terminals amount to approx. 5% o f Kombiverkehr’s total fixed 
assets, the sunk costs are significant.*^
Agency work is shared to only a small extent by freight forwarders since, besides 
Kombiverkehr, agency work is carried out by DB mostly at small MT-terminals 
with little revenue. At larger MT-terminals, the agency work is also provided by 
road transport co-operatives <Strassenverkehrsgenossenschaften (SVGs)>, Duss 
mbH and various local terminal operating companies (e.g. Mannheim, Basle, 
Krefeld, Neuss and Bremen terminals).*^ As regards to the freight forwarders’ 
specialised assets via Kombiverkehr in principal MT-terminals (terminal assets 
and agency services), the freight forwarders are in a similar position as DB Cargo
13
16
Interview with Rainer Mertel, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 08.12.2000 in Frankfurt am Main. 
Information by Herbert Essler, DB Cargo, Frankfurt am Main, on 02.10.2000.
Interview with Rainer Mertel, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten
Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main, on 08.12.2000 in Frankfurt am Main.
See section 4.2.2.2.I.
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with its specialised wagon assets. The number o f potential buyers, or the number 
o f alternative transaction partners for these assets, is low due to the market 
dominance o f DB.
Asset specificity is now tested from the standpoint o f  the rail transport operator, 
holding the main asset share in MT-terminals and agency work. The first criterion 
o f asset specificity, number o f alternative transaction partners (physical asset 
specificity), is o f  a highly distinctive character, as DB Cargo would have to 
replace a customers base o f the size o f Kombiverkehr should the transaction 
relationship be terminated. The second criterion, sales opportunity, is likewise 
highly distinctive owing to the supplier monopoly o f  DB and the non-variability 
o f the asset, MT-terminal. The importance o f sunk costs - as measured by ratio o f 
the value o f the lost hostage over total fixed assets - is very pronounced. 
Moreover, MT represents a strategically important field o f  business for the rail 
transport operator. As a result, the degree o f asset specificity for DB Cargo in 
MT-terminals is, on the whole, high. Agency work represents, on the other hand, 
a human asset specificity and physical asset specificity in a mixed degree.
- Terminal equipment
Apart from the fixed cranes for vertical handling, the ‘piggypacker*, a mobile 
terminal crane for vertical handling, forms a substantial investment o f terminal 
equipment. The cost per piggypacker amounts to between EUR 0.55 million and 
EUR 0.75 million (DEM 1.1 million and DEM 1.5 million), depending in each 
case upon load capacity (Kombiverkehr, 1993a:27). For owner-operated MT- 
terminals, DB invests in portal crane installations and in mobile vertical terminal 
equipment. The latter exist at 35 out o f 61 MT-terminals.
In total, Kombiverkehr owns 24 piggypackers distributed between 8 o f the 61 
MT-terminals, in Germany (Kombiverkehr, 1993a:27). In the event o f contract 
termination by DB with the forwarder, the latter can sell o ff piggypacker cranes 
to only a limited extent. Alternative transaction partners do not exist, owing to the 
monopoly position o f DB. For forwarding, one may speak here o f high asset 
specificity in the case o f  terminal equipment. The proportion o f  total company 
turnover over total assets in piggypackers is slightly higher than 5% 
(Kombiverkehr, 1993a:39).
17 Information by Bernhard Judith, Deutsche Bundesbahn, Geschaeftsbereich Ladungsverkehr, 
Frankfurt am Main, on 26.08.1993.
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To sum up the entire asset specificity exposure o f the transaction partners, it must 
be emphasised that for the rail transport operator asset specificity is very marked 
in the case o f  wagons and MT-terminals (agency work and immobile assets). 
Asset specificity for the forwarder is, on the other hand, low in the case o f TEUs, 
but mixed for terminals (immobile assets) and high for mobile terminal 
equipment. Measures to reduce these TCs follow in the next section.
5.1.2.3 Assigning the instruments for reducing o f TCs to transport services
The contract instruments in the case o f the Kombiverkehr contract reducing TCs 
are, according to Williamson (1985:163ff), in all instances credible commitments 
typified in the unilateral hostage model.’* In addition, within these instruments a 
distinction is made between incentives for the forwarder (purchaser o f the 
transaction object) and incentives for the rail transport operator (supplier). These 
incentive instruments are intended to induce contract-compliant behaviour from 
the transaction partner.
An incentive for the forwarder for contract-compliant behaviour, through the 
instrument o f  profit-sharing, exists on the basis o f indirect participation o f the 
forwarding side through Kombiverkehr, as the MT-intermediary holds 50% of 
Duss mbH, the MT terminal operator. Nevertheless, as explained in section 
4.2.2.1, the profit shares o f both DB Cargo, the rail transport operator, and the 
forwarders in the piggyback transport intermediary company are negligible 
compared with the turnover and profit figures on both transaction partners’ 
balance sheets.
The liability clauses as credible commitments from the road side via 
Kombiverkehr are not significant from the TC point o f view, as Kombiverkehr’s 
exposure to potential liability duties for the rail transport component is limited 
from a practical point o f view. Also, as outlined in section 4.2.2.2.1, the liability 
o f DB Cargo is relatively low in absolute terms both for missing delivery 
deadlines and damage compensation. As a result, Kombiverkehr has introduced a 
new service since 1999 o f dealing with all smaller liability claims o f damage and 
delays from freight forwarders to rail transport operators directly, with direct 
client compensation. For these small claims, instead o f  acting as intermediary in 
liability disputes, Kombiverkehr takes financial responsibility.'^ Therefore, 
Kombiverkehr’s changed role regarding liability for services provided diminishes 
the TCs occurred at the contract execution stage.
II
19
See also section 2.3.S. 
See chapter 4.
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For transactions co-ordinated in the Kombiverkehr contract, the rail transport 
operator and the forwarder use built-in asset specificity as an incentive to prevent 
hold-up behaviour (Palay, 1984:S.277fl). The forwarding side provides specific 
assets in immobile and mobile terminal infrastructure which makes hold-up 
behaviour o f  the transaction partner, the rail transport operator, possible. In 
addition, the forwarder holds shares in the undertaking for financing and 
operating MT-terminals (Duss mbH). The hostage as an incentive to avoid 
possible hold-up behaviour by DB consists in its direct holding o f assets in 
wagons and immobile terminal infrastructure, on the one hand, and in the 
participation in an undertaking to finance and operate MT-terminals (Duss mbH), 
on the other hand, hold-up behaviour therefore cannot arise.
Taking the contract instrument analysis in chapter 4 (credible commitments and 
incentives ex-asset specificity) and chapter 5 (asset specificity as credible 
commitment) together, and owing to this mutual hostage, the contract can be 
described as bilateral co-operation between the purchaser/forwarder and the 
vendor/rail transport operator.
5.1.3 Hupac with Traditional Freight Forwarder Under Bilateral Co­
operation
The contract between the forwarder and the rail transport operator co-ordinated 
through the Hupac intermediary, is explained below. First, the characteristics of 
the transport service are described in logistics dimensions, followed by the 
analysis o f  the sources o f  the TCs. The instruments to reduce the TCs suffered by 
the transaction partners - as modelled in chapter 4 except for the hostages based 
on asset specificity - can then finally be assigned to these TCs.
5.J.3.1 The transport service: package freight and special freight in alpine 
transit
The forwarder’s transport services are to be described below by means o f  the 
logistics dimensions space, quantity, time and information.
•  Space
In transport services that are co-ordinated with this contract, the nature o f  the 
lines (alpine transit) predominates. As part o f Switzerland’s transport policy, 
there are international treaties with Switzerland’s neighbour states e.g. for the 
maximum amount o f 40-t motor trucks to transit Switzerland (SBB, 1993a:l 1 &
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21)}^ These treaties are used to a great extent as the basis for maintaining a rail 
corridor for 40-t motor trucks through Switzerland. The corridor runs over two 
lines via Gotthard/CH and Lôtschberg-Simplon/CH from Basle/CH to Milan/I. Its 
capacity totals 365,000 wagons annually, i.e. via the Gotthard route 44 trains and 
via Lotschberg-Simplon 14 trains per day. The maximal train length amounts to 
700 m and the maximum tare weight o f  wagons including 3 traction locomotives 
is 1,600 t (SBB, 1993a:20). Since this geographical bottleneck exists, no 
distribution covering the area, i.e. spatial dispersion, is carried out by Hupac as in 
the Intercontainer and Kombiverkehr contracts.
•  Quantity
The goods transported are not essentially different, in the structure o f  the types o f 
goods, from those o f  the Kombiverkehr contract. The transported goods are 
package freight and also special freight (bulk goods, liquid goods, gaseous 
goods).^’ A difference can be observed, however, in the weights (and lengths) of 
the MT-consignments. Besides so-called high-cube TEUs, large-capacity swap 
bodies and extra-long trailers are used (Hupac, 1993a: 18). These special purpose 
TEUs allow exploitation o f  the limited haulage capacity in alpine transit more 
intensely.
•  Time
Compared with the preceding contracts, the time sensitivity is high. Punctuality is 
a strategic success factor, particularly for overnight alpine transportation. For 
example, different from the previous two contracts. Intercontainer and 
Kombiverkehr, Hupac publishes service delay statistics (Hupac, 1993a: 11). In 
terms o f  delivery speed, on the Hupac timetable 75% o f  all transport has a 
delivery time within 24 hours, compared with 20% o f Kombiverkehr.^^
•  Information
Owing to the time sensitivity o f transported goods, a direct information link o f 
shippers via forwarders to the rail transport operator is a strategic success factor 
(Hupac, 1993a: 11). In addition, the information link serves the optimisation o f 
wagon planning and o f the operational terminal process. This optimisation 
measure is necessary due to the high line-share o f transportation under this 
contract in which, for example, circulation o f wagons and smooth throughput 
constitute a major bottleneck owing to the small number o f  alpine terminals in
Transitvertrag (Transit treaty Switzerland - EU dated 02.05.1992).
Information by Theo Allemann, Hupac SA, Chiasso/CH, on 29.04.1994.
Interview with Peter Hafiier, Hupac SA, Chiasso/CH, on 27.09.2000, via telephone.
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Switzerland (Hupac, 1993a: 14). The following transport information 
management tools are used: the consignment follow-up system ‘Goal’ o f Hupac 
and also ‘Caesar’, a jo in t venture o f  UIRR, the EU-Commission and the Swiss 
government, have been introduced especially to optimise the above-mentioned 
bottlenecks.
5.1.3.2 Sources o f TCs
Factors which cause TCs to appear in the Hupac with traditional forwarder 
contract are described below. These are frequency, uncertainty and asset 
specificity.
•  Frequency
By frequency is understood the value-amount o f  the transaction and the level of 
the number o f individual transactions in the exchange o f  services between the 
transaction partners. The special feature o f MT for trans-alpine goods transport 
must therefore be mentioned. Owing to given geographical circumstances and 
measures o f  government transport policy, the proportion o f total alpine freight 
transportation undertaken by a specialist freight forwarder is higher than, for 
example, by a freight forwarder with mainly domestic freight transportation in 
Germany. Consequently, for alpine freight forwarders, their respective share o f 
turnover in alpine MT is larger, and the latter therefore also use the Hupac 
contract more frequently than the Kombiverkehr contract. TCs which appear on 
conclusion o f the contract for this transaction can therefore be paid off faster over 
the duration o f  the transaction than is the case for transport expenditure for the 
Intercontainer and Kombiverkehr contracts.
•  Uncertainty
Uncertainty, in terms o f  demand uncertainty and technological uncertainty, is 
comparable with the Kombiverkehr contract.
•  Asset specificity
In the Hupac contract, specialised assets are invested on three levels o f the 
transport chain, namely TEUs, wagons and terminals. Whereas assets in TEUs 
are provided directly by forwarders, the Hupac intermediary, in which the 
forwarders participate with a majority o f capital, finances the wagon and terminal 
infrastructure.^^
23 See section 4.2.3.
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-TEU s
Compared with the other areas o f the transport chain, swap bodies and trailers o f 
the forwarders can easily be sold on. Moreover, just as in the case o f  the 
Kombiverkehr transport assignment, they can be used purely for road transport 
without significant extra costs. These assets therefore carry zero asset specificity.
- Wagons
Through Hupac, the forwarder’s assets in wagons are substantial,^^ particularly 
pocket wagons for trailers and swap bodies, flat wagons for swap bodies only and 
low-loader wagons <Niederflurwagen> for alpine transit in tunnels with low 
headroom. But also the so-called jumbo wagons and mega wagons, specially- 
developed 2-part wagons, are substantial in number. The high extra costs in the 
wagon fleet are incurred in order to fully exploit the changed tunnel cross-section 
(profile) and transport more TEUs per metre o f the complete train. For example, a 
low-loading pocket wagon costs about EUR 4,000 more than a normal pocket 
wagon. Pocket wagons are equipped with an extendable short coupling, providing 
two Euro-pallets o f  space more per wagon than with standard TEUs. As against 
this, however, procurement and maintenance costs are higher for these special 
couplings. Jumbo wagons allow two trailers to be transported on one wagon. 
Hupac owns approx. 1,900 wagons for swap bodies, trailers and ‘Rolling 
Highway* <Rollende Landstrasse>. The assets invested in alpine-specific wagons 
represent 50% o f  Hupac’s total fixed assets (Hupac, 1993a: 15; 2000).
Potential alternative transaction partners do not exist as suppliers o f rail transport 
besides SBB in the market for alpine transit, since SBB owns the actual rail 
monopoly. Container transport is the only possibility for use as an alternative to 
alpine transit. These possible alternative uses tend toweu’ds zero in the case o f 
jum bo wagons, mega wagons and low-loader wagons (for trailers and ‘Rolling 
Highway’) (Hupac, 1993a: 15; Jünemann, 1989:299).^^ For these wagons, in 
Europe only intermediaries specialising in trans-alpine transportation would 
come under consideration as buyers, such as ôkom bi Ges.m.b.H, Vienna/A, and 
Cemat S.p.A., Milan/I. Owing to the small number o f  alternative transaction 
partners and possible alternative uses, asset specificity o f freight forwarder 
wagons must be classed as high.
Hupac’s 20% participation in Cemat S.p.A., the Italian alpine MT-intermediary, 
must likewise be classed as high asset specificity. Compared with the total Hupac
See 4.2.3.2.1 for exact numbers and breakdown of Hupac’s wagon fleet. 
See also section 4.2.3.2.I.
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holdings, the participation amounting to approx. EUR 6 million (CHF 10 million)
- 45% of Hupac’s total consolidated participations (Hupac, 2000) - is substantial. 
Hupac’s majority holding in Trailstar N.V., the Dutch MT-intermediary, is not 
specific from the standpoint o f  wagon investment, since its wagons are 
comparable with those in the Kombiverkehr contract and can therefore be used 
elsewhere.
- MT-terminals
Hupac invests in Switzerland at MT-terminals in portal cranes for vertical loading 
and in office premises. The remaining terminal infrastructure such as tracks in the 
MT-terminals in Switzerland is owned by SBB. Only SBB - and for the terminal 
installations in Germany (Rielasingen) and Italy (Busto Arsizio), DB and FS as 
monopoly suppliers - can provide rail transport operator services to and from 
them (Hupac, 1993a:20; 2000).^^ The first asset specificity criterion - number o f 
alternative transaction partners - for office premises and portal cranes in the event 
o f termination o f  the contract by the rail transport operator is very high, as the 
railway enjoys a monopoly position and comes under consideration as the sole 
transaction partner. Regarding the second asset specificity criterion - possibility 
to sell the asset - only limited opportunities to sell exist, since MT-terminals can 
be used as an alternative only in container operation. Hupac’s approx. EUR 5.3 
million (CHF 7.5 million)^^ MT-terminal assets equal approx. 25% o f the 
company’s total fixed assets, so sunk costs are therefore significant. On the other 
hand, the terminal assets o f Trailstar N.V., which can be used for the Hupac 
contract as through-terminals, do not carry asset specificity. The alternative use in 
container transport with other transaction partners is very high in the Netherlands.
As already mentioned, the remaining terminal infrastructure (e.g. tracks, 
reinforcements for motor-truck approach ramps) is entirely owned by SBB, the 
rail transport operator in this contract. This is a specific asset since, owing to the 
monopoly position o f  SBB, this capital asset can neither be sold unchanged nor, 
for example, be used by alternative transaction partners. The total assets held by 
SBB in MT-terminal infrastructure amount to more than 3% o f its total fixed 
assets, therefore these sunk costs are significant for the rail transport operator.^^
Information by Theo Allemann, Hupac SA, Chiasso/CH, on 29.01.1994.
Exchange rate: 1.67 CHF/EUR.
Total fixed assets <Sachanlagen> SBB: CHF 15,479.8 mill, (approx. EUR 880 mill.) as per 
31.12.1999. Information by Silvan von Rohr, SBB Cargo AG, Bem/CH, on 26.06.2001; SBB 
(2000a:20); Interview with Peter Hafher, Hupac SA, Chiasso/CH, on 27.09.2000, via telephone.
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To sum up, it can be stated that, on the whole, freight forwarders’ assets in 
wagons, mobile assets (portal cranes) and agency work (offices) at MT-terminals 
represent a genuine and - compared with the preceding contracts, new - quality o f 
the rail transport operator’s hold-up potential which have a high TC potential. 
The high technological specificity o f  wagon assets and the lack o f  alternative rail 
transport operators in alpine transit must be regarded as the reason.
After the sources o f TCs, the instruments to reduce TCs now follow.
5.1.3.3 Assigning the instruments fo r  reducing TCs to transport services 
As for the contracts o f Intercontainer and Kombiverkehr, the instruments used in 
the Hupac contract with traditional forwarder to reduce TC are compared with the 
sources o f TC analysed in the previous section.
SBB, the rail transport operator, holds a 29% participation in the share capital o f 
Hupac.^’ Just as in the Intercontainer and Kombiverkehr contracts, as the second 
means o f reducing TCs, liability in the event o f damage or loss o f  the transported 
goods for the forwarder is contained in the liability provisions o f the international 
railway transport legislation (CIM).^® Whereas the freight forwarder holds 
specific assets in wagons, portal cranes and office infrastructure, only one sector 
o f investment, specific assets in MT-terminals, such as rail tracks and ramps, are 
to be observed by the freight forwarder’s transaction participant, the rail transport 
operator.
According to the unilateral hostage model, the question must be examined as to 
whether the specific assets o f the forwarder, modelled in section 5.1.3.2, are 
faced with incentives o f  the same intensity to minimise TC. From this 
perspective, a risk for hold-up exists for the forwarder owing to the unevenly 
distributed assets o f the two transaction partners.
Regarding contract incentives, the liability incentive is, as explained in chapter 4, 
only slight. The only incentive for the railway to offset this hold-up risk and to 
behave in conformity with the contract is its participation o f  29% in the profit on 
Hupac’s share capital. But this small share cannot be regarded as a significant 
incentive to prevent opportunistic adaptation o f the contract by the rail transport 
operator.
See section 4.2.3.
See section 4.1.1.2.3.
I l l
To sum up, from the standpoint o f TCE, this contract is not adequately protected 
for the forwarder. The Hupac contract thus tends to be sub-optimal: this sub­
optimality arises from the high potential TCs in the case o f contractual 
adaptation, or termination o f  the contract by the railway.
Why is an inefficient contract used by the transaction partners? From the logistics 
dimensions o f space, quantity, time and information, this contract clearly forms a 
difference to the previous two contracts o f Intercontainer and Kombiverkehr. The 
transport now is entirely trans-alpine, all have a high time sensibility and require 
a significantly different information technology. The dimension quantity may 
differ within the transactions co-ordinated under Hupac. This contract is used 
both with specialised MT-wagons and general purpose MT-wagons. As outlined 
in sections 4.2.3.2.1 and 5.1.3.2, only 50% o f  Hupac’s asset consists o f alpine- 
specific wagons. As a consequence, for the remainder o f its wagons, the hold-up 
position the rail transport operator can realise when changing transaction terms 
during the course o f  the transaction are on the same level as in the Kombiverkehr 
contract. Therefore, for the goods and transport services that do not require 
alpine-specific wagons the contract Hupac is efficient. There exists no more 
optimal transport contract alternative, either, for these goods.
Taking the contract instrument analysis in chapter 4 (credible commitments and 
incentives ex-asset specificity) and chapter 5 (asset specificity as credible 
commitment) together, the contract can be described as bilateral co-operation, 
given various mutual hostages but no full vertical integration from either side of 
the transaction partners.
5.1.4 Hupac with MTO Under Bilateral Co-operation
The following section explains the contact between MTO and rail transport 
operator using the intermediary Hupac. As in the previous three contracts o f this 
chapter, the process o f  analysis follows three steps. Firstly, the transport services 
are characterised via the logistics dimensions as developed in chapter 3. 
Secondly, the transport services are further modelled as attributes o f  TCE’s 
market failure framework as developed in chapter 2. Finally, these attributes - or 
sources o f  TCs - can be assigned to the contract instruments as modelled in 
chapter 4 (assigning contracts to transactions). Whereas the previous contract is 
called Hupac with traditional freight forwarder (or only ‘Hupac’), this fourth 
contract is named Hupac with MTO, below.
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5.1.4.1 The transport service: special goods in alpine transit
The transportation o f goods in this contract is orientated most strongly towards 
the preferences o f  the shipper. Compared with the other contracts o f MT, the 
multimodal transport operators (MTO) produce transport services at the interface 
between shippers and transport component suppliers, dominated by special 
freight transport. From the perspective o f  the shipper, MTOs provide a consumer 
market for logistics services and tend to be direct suppliers o f MT in what is 
completely owned production, including the rail transport operator service. New 
legislation in Germany allows this vertical integration. Via the legal status o f a 
so-called rail transport undertaking <Eisenbahnverkehrsuntemehmen (EVU)>, a 
freight forwarder can produce the complete transport chain itself At the moment, 
however, only large shippers are active within this segment. Also, the 
intermediary Hupac holds an EVU-licence in Germany,^' but without actively 
using it. Vertical integration along the value-added activities o f the transport 
chain is a vital characteristic o f  this contract and a key difference to the preceding 
Hupac contract.
Compared with the preceding Hupac contract, the forwarder as MTO continues to 
use the same contract intermediary for the purchase o f  rail transport operator’s 
service. However, the MTO uses its own TEUs, wagons and, to some extent, 
terminals.
•  Space
Special freight in scheduled alpine transit, i.e. on scheduled timetable services, is 
transported - just as with the Hupac contract - along two corridors via 
Gotthard/CH and L6tschberg-Simplon/CH. This is not an area-covering 
distribution, being line-orientated, and scheduled service prevails.
•  Quantity
In the contract there is a high proportion o f  special freight, such as:
1) refrigerated freight,
2) hazardous goods, e.g. liquid freight or gas,
3) pharmaceuticals,
4) high-value freight (Schomaker, 1993:675f; Bukold, 1993:496).^^
See section 4.2.3.2.I.
Information by Hans-J6rg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, DOrrenSsch/CH, on 30.08.1993.
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Compared with the transport services examined so far, the forwarder has to 
execute these transport services in a more varied and complex way. This 
includes, for example, safety precautions for the cargo and special wagons.
•  Time
The degree o f  specialisation within the goods often relates also to time 
sensitivity, i.e. ‘just in time* or ‘fastest in time*. The service offer now frequently 
includes storage cost-minimisation for the shipper. Consequently, service 
performance is a matter not only o f speed, but also o f  punctuality in delivery. For 
example, the higher vertical integration along the MT chain o f  the MTO Bertschi 
AG, Dürrenäsch/CH, has enabled the terminals Cologne, Mannheim, Hamburg, 
Antwerp/B and Busto Arsizio/I (near Milan) to be within daily reach from the 
central MT-terminal, Switzerland (in Birrfeld near Zurich/CH), overnight. The 
above Hupac contract - described in section 5.1.3 - does not contain this 
percentage o f  MT-terminals within a 24-hour reach.
•  Information
In the contract o f Hupac with MTO, consignment information systems are used 
for the first time as a key service o f  the transport function, instead o f just for 
shipper information.
An EDP-supported fast advance flow o f  information predominates. This transport 
feature is an important factor for avoiding disastrous accidents (Zöllner, 1990:55 
& 65). The MTO Bertschi AG, Dürrenäsch/CH, has, for example, a system o f 
fast advance information flow for all goods in road transport and in rail/road MT 
between northern Europe and Italy, i.e. over a large geographical area and across 
many national borders.^^ Own customs offices in the general collecting and buffer 
warehouses, i.e. for transit goods, arrange, in connection with the transport, fast 
flow o f information that is partly preceding the physical consignment. The 
customs service is integrated into the order processing, for speedier, more 
accurate goods distribution. In addition, vertical integration with process 
organisation and process control o f all information affecting the transport can be 
observed. A t the same time, the MTOs deliver logistics components to parts- 
suppliers, i.e. in MT the trucking to and from the terminals.
33 Information by Hans-Jörg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, DürrenSsch/CH, on 30.08.1993.
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5.1.4.2 Sources o f TCs
Factors relevant for the appearance o f TCs and means o f reducing them are 
described below.
•  Uncertainty
Characteristic for the contract o f Hupac with MTO are transactions in which the 
service contents have to be adapted ex-post owing to environmental changes 
(uncertainty).^^ In this case, the fixing o f long-term contracts is either too 
expensive, because the costs o f information gathering and contract negotiating 
exceed the overall benefits o f  the contract, or else they are not feasible because 
contract-relevant information on environmental changes is not accessible. This is 
seen here as a result o f  bounded rationality as introduced in section 2.3.2.2.
- Demand uncertainty
The unpredictable fluctuation in the shippers’ demand for piggyback transport 
services feed through to the MTO’s order levels in a significantly higher degree 
than in the previous three contracts due to the high specialisation o f the transport 
service in this contract. I f  it comes to a decline in demand for this transportation 
from the shipper side, then these demand losses cannot be offset by transport o f 
other goods, owing to incompatibility o f the TEUs for other transport 
assignments. This fluctuation o f shippers’ demand leads to a change in 
forwarders’ demand on the components market for transport operators’ services.
Demand on the components market for rail transport services through the MTO, 
assuming in-house production or outsourcing is to be considered below. With 
potential internal production by the forwarder,^^ the following TCs arise:
1) Costs o f  overcapacity and shut-down o f short capacity, or costs o f excess 
demand and quality defects, or costs o f building up extra capacity in the 
production o f transport services (Rennings, 1992:32).
2) The demand uncertainty leads to higher TCs than in the preceding Hupac 
and Kombiverkehr contracts. These TCs must be distinguished from the 
costs o f  hold-up caused opportunistically. The costs described above arise 
outside the intention o f  the transaction partner, although they are both 
rooted in sunk costs caused by asset specificity.
See section 2.3.3.2.
An internal production of rail transport services is not yet exercised by MTOs, see section 5.1.4.1.
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3) With outsourcing, the costs o f  protection over credible commitments or 
costs o f  writing o ff the sunk costs created by specific assets, with contract 
adaptation in the event o f hold-up behaviour, arise as TCs.
- Technological uncertainty
Because o f  the specific transport technology, due to the higher investments from 
the forwarder’s standpoint in EDP-controlled information systems, changes arise 
also with technological uncertainty. The probability and scope o f technological 
innovations and also the uncertainty in the service o f existing technology due to 
lack o f  experience (Walker & Weber, 1984:274f!) are fundamentally altered by 
the use o f  comprehensive transport information systems compared to the three 
other contracts. The most important uncertainty factors here are:
1) Uncertainty about the possibility o f  future use o f the selected transport 
technologies, and
2) technological breakdown or accidental breakdown due to misuse (Walker & 
Weber, 1984:377; Fonger, 1992:72ff).
A further source o f TCs, asset specificity, is examined below in the contract 
Hupac with MTO.
•  Asset specificity
Compared with the Hupac contract, the forwarder as MTO is now the full owner
1) TEUs,
2) wagons and
3) at least one MT-terminal (start- or destination-terminal in full ownership, 
one terminal is an outside terminal).^^
-TEU s
In this contract, special TEUs are used for the transport o f refngerated, hazardous 
and pharmaceutical goods and high-value freight. These are, for example, tankers 
and silo-type TEUs provided by the MTO. In the case o f a premature end o f the 
transaction relationship, the number o f alternative purchasers - i.e. possibility to 
sell the asset - for these special TEUs is limited owing to the relatively small 
value market segment which this special freight represents. The second
36 See section 4.2.4.2.I.
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specificity criterion - number o f  alternative transaction partners - is high for the 
same reason. For example, the share o f TEUs’ asset carrying this specificity level 
compared to the total fixed assets o f MTO Bertschi AG amounts to 5%.^^ 
Therefore, the potential sunk costs are significant for the freight forwarder. As a 
consequence, in this contract, unlike the preceding contracts, high asset 
specificity o f  the TEUs exists.
- Wagons
The asset specificity in wagons is identical with the Hupac contract and on a high 
level.
- MT-terminal o f  the MTO forwarder
The forwarder as MTO invests in its own MT-terminal in portal cranes, offices 
and the remaining infrastructure for exclusive use. It must be stated here that the 
forwarder as MTO uses in some instances the assets o f the railway and Hupac, 
described in the preceding Hupac contract, namely MT-terminals as a 
destination- or starting-point. In the event o f termination o f  the contract by the 
rail transport operator, for the forwarder as MTO no alternative transaction 
partners are available, owing to the quasi-monopoly position o f the railway in 
alpine transport. Direct selling opportunities exist only to a few other MTOs. The 
entire terminal assets o f the MTO Bertschi AG equals 25% o f its total fixed 
assets.^* Sunk costs, therefore are high and as a consequence, the specificity of 
the assets in MT-terminals must be classed as high.
O f all four piggyback transport contracts, this contract carries the highest asset 
specificity on the part o f  the freight forwarder. Compared with the Hupac 
contract, in addition to highly specific assets in wagons, specific assets in TEUs 
and full investment in owner-used MT-terminals now become effective. A hold­
up risk on a considerable scale thus arises for the rail transport operator. Besides 
asset specificity, technological uncertainty is a reinforcing factor o f this contract. 
Means o f  reducing this hold-up potential are presented below.
5.1.4.3 Assigning the instruments o f reducing TCs to transport services
According to the unilateral hostage model o f TCE, the following incentives exist 
for reducing TC. Profit sharing in the transaction exists indirectly through Hupac 
as a result o f  a shareholding o f  29% owned by the rail transport operator. The 
second incentive type, guarantee for damage or loss o f  the transported goods, is
Information by Hans-Jörg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, DOrrenMsch/CH, on 05.10.2000. 
Information by Hans-Jörg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, Dürrenasch/CH, on 05.10.2000.
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unchanged compared with the Hupac contract on the basis o f  the CIM in favour 
o f  the freight forwarder.
Both incentives are unchanged in their intensity compared with the previous 
contract. In view o f  the contract instrument analysis in chapter 4 (credible 
commitments and incentives ex-asset specificity) and chapter 5 (asset specificity 
as credible commitment), the contract can be described as bilateral co-operation, 
given various mutual hostages but no vertical integration from either side o f  the 
transaction partners.
However, new and significant specialised assets in TEUs from the MTO and the 
fact that all key assets are directly owned without having to use the intermediary 
Hupac through shareholding - as was the case in the previous contract - lead to a 
significantly higher hold-up-position in favour o f the rail transport operator. This 
additional hold-up-potential remains uncovered in the contract choice as there are 
no additional credible commitments from the railway company in the contract 
Hupac with MTO.
•  Effects o f  the TC-inefficient contract choice
This sub-optimality o f the choice o f contract is reinforced by the very marked 
technological uncertainty and demand uncertainty in this contract, which have a 
polarising effect towards vertical integration o f the transport operator’s service.^’
As a first consequence, sub-optimality o f this kind leads, for example, to 
defective price-fixing for haulage services o f the rail transport operator as against 
the forwarder as MTO. The railway does not take the selling prices for its 
transport operator’s services out o f  the general price-adjustment mechanisms. 
This means that, from the forwarder’s standpoint, the purchase prices for the rail 
transport operator’s services are, with a certain period o f adaptation (e.g. 3 
months), variable. Forwarders usually agree with shippers longer-term contracts 
with long-running price-fixing. Short-term price changes by the railways thus are 
not allowed to be passed on to the shippers by the MTO."^
A further consequence o f sub-optimality is the calculation o f prices for the rail 
operator’s service in relation to the forwarder’s. Instead o f  being per consignment 
(loading unit), as is usual here, a charging per haulage job (total train weight) 
would be based more directly upon the railway’s expenditure on locomotive
See section 2.S.3.2.
Information by Hans-Jörg Bertschi, Bertschi AG, Dttrrenäsch/CH, on 30.08.1993.
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haulage, and at the fínished-product market based more closely upon the trend o f 
the ultimate consumer’s demand for transport services, owing to the widespread 
practice there o f charging by loading weight.
A third consequence o f  sub-optimality is the written recording, hitherto lacking, 
o f agreements between MTOs and rail transport operators.
It must be stated that the limitation o f contract choice by tying MTOs to the 
agreements, e.g. o f  Hupac, which serves as an intermediary to the railways, 
hampers the development o f stronger bilateral contract instruments. A stronger 
bilateral line on the finished-product market (shipper-forwarder) is not met on the 
components-market with the rail transport operator in this way. The difference 
between the pledges used on these two markets thus persists in the case o f the 
forwarder. This is especially true for liability clauses such as loss, damage or 
delay.
To sum up, for the MTO determining the environmental factors o f  the transport 
services co-ordinated with this contract are: high specificity o f assets (TEUs, 
wagons and terminals) and high uncertainty, particularly owing to demand 
uncertainty and the technological uncertainty. A significant incentive to contract- 
compliant behaviour for the rail transport operator is only its profit sharing in 
Hupac, which is allocated to the forwarding side and whose activity as 
intermediary is used by the forwarding trade.
In view o f  the high asset specificity o f the MTO, this hostage is not sufficient to 
prevent hold-up behaviour by the rail transport operator. The rail transport 
operator has opportunities for short-term contract adaptation, sub-optimal 
calculation o f  locomotive haulage from the forwarder’s standpoint and absence o f 
written recording o f  agreements. This choice o f contract is thus inefficient from 
the standpoint o f TCE.
Why is an inefficient contract used by the transaction partners in Hupac with 
MTO? Compared to the previous contract - Hupac - the transport services under 
Hupac with MTO do not allow to choose between specific asset wagons and non­
specific asset wagons. As outlined in section 4.2.4.2.1, all wagons here are asset 
specific low-profile alpine wagons. As a consequence and different to the 
previous contract, even taking this differentiation o f transport services under one 
single contract into account, the current co-ordination o f Hupac with MTO 
remains inefficient according to Williamson’s TCE.
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5.1.5 Summary o f Assigning Transport Services to Contract Instruments
Table 5.1 provides a summary o f assigning contract instruments to transaction 
attributes as undertaken in sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4. Contract by contract, the 
sources o f  TCs - asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency - are compared with 
the contract instruments to control these TCs - profit sharing, liability clauses and 
hostages through asset specificity. The instruments and attributes highlighted in 
bold are excess factors that are either not necessary to be included in the contract 
- in the case o f instruments - or represent unprotected hold-up positions - in the 
case o f  attributes. In both cases a contract inefficiency appears. The levels o f the 
transaction attribute asset specificity are taken from W illiamson’s distinction into 
three stages outlined in section 2.3.3.1: none, mixed and high. Although the 
contract names carry the intermediaries’ names, the intermediaries themselves 
(Intercontainer, Kombiverkehr and Hupac) - as mentioned in chapter 3 - are part 
o f either the road transport industry (FF) or the rail transport industry (rail 
operator). They are not independent but belong to one o f the transaction partners.
The purpose o f Table 5.1 is to make contract inefficiencies according to TCE in 
the German piggyback transport market visually transparent.
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5.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTS
This section investigates co-ordinating each o f the underlying transport services 
o f the four contracts (Intercontainer, Kombiverkehr, Hupac and Hupac with 
MTO) with the three alternative contracts and pursues the question, whether there 
is a more efficient contract alternative within the contract alternatives analysed 
for a specific transport service. By ‘more efficient’ is understood, whether 
transferring a transport service to an alternative contract would decrease the TCs 
involved.
The analysis specifically compares contract incentives to lower the level o f TCs 
with the transaction attribute asset specificity. The analysis considers the assets 
necessary to perform the required transport services as directly linked or 
immediately caused by the service requirements, i.e. built-in asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1985:62 & 73). For example, trans-alpine transport can only be 
organised with special piggyback wagons that fit the maximum tunnel surface 
requirements and the standardised size o f  the TEUs.
The two transaction attributes frequency and uncertainty are not analysed 
specifically, as in the first three contracts (Intercontainer, Kombiverkehr and 
Hupac) they have the same characteristics. However, the attribute uncertainty in 
the contract Hupac with MTO is significantly higher and will be dealt with 
separately (section 5.2.4).
5.2.1 Assigning the Transport Service Intercontainer to Aiternative 
Contracts
The asset specificity o f the transaction participants rail transport operator and 
freight forwarder in this contract has been analysed in section 5.1.1. On the one 
hand, the rail transport operator holds out assets in TEUs, wagons and terminal 
infrastructure. These assets are nevertheless without specificity. On the other 
hand, the fi^ight forwarder provides no significant assets into the transport chain 
in this transport service.
5.2.1.1 Attribution o f transport service Intercontainer to Kombiverkehr 
contract
The incentives o f the contract Kombiverkehr from the perspective o f the rail 
transport operator consist o f  a participation o f the share capital o f  Kombiverkehr. 
Additionally, the rail transport operator is liable for loss, delays and damage on
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the basis o f  general transport legislation. The freight forwarder has an incentive 
for contract fulfilment in a 50% shareholding o f  Duss mbH, the terminal 
operator. Apart from the above unilateral credible commitments in profit sharing 
and liability, there is also a compensation o f the freight forwarder’s asset 
specificity through asset specificity operating as credible commitment from the 
rail transport operator’s side, i.e. an artificial asset specificity.
From the standpoint o f the Intercontainer transport service, no specific assets are 
necessary, so therefore no commitments are necessary to prevent hold-up for the 
contract. The above incentives included in the Kombiverkehr contract result in 
contract preparation and negotiation costs that are evitable.
The Kombiverkehr contract therefore represents an inefficient solution to the 
transport services linked to Intercontainer.
5.2.1.2 Attribution o f transport service Intercontainer to Hupac and Hupac 
with MTO
Thereafter, the contracts o f  Hupac and Hupac with MTO will be considered 
together, as in both the incentives profit sharing and liability derive from identical 
agreements, and these incentives exist only on the side o f the rail transport 
operator. As stated in section 5.1.3, the Hupac contract constitutes a direct profit 
sharing through a 29% participation o f  SBB in Hupac’s share capital, whereas in 
the Hupac with MTO contract the profit incentive works only indirectly through 
the use o f  Hupac by the MTO. The liability is based on transport legislation. 
There are no incentives for the freight forwarder in both contracts.
The profit sharing scheme as an incentive for the rail transport operator to non- 
opportunistic behaviour in the Hupac contract cannot be justified in the 
Intercontainer service, as asset specificity for the freight forwarder does not exist. 
The costs o f  negotiating these incentives are therefore evitable, as there are no 
hold-up opportunities for the rail transport operator. Similar to the co-ordination 
with the Kombiverkehr contract, the unilateral commitments to lower TCs by 
preventing hold-up situations are unnecessary. The high TCs due to negotiation 
make the Hupac and Hupac with MTO contracts as a contract solution for 
Intercontainer services inefficient.
5.2.1.3 Summary
For the transport o f standardised goods in regional distribution <Streuverkehr>, 
which is characteristic for the piggyback transport service linked to the 
Intercontainer contract, market co-ordination represents the most efficient
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contract solution compared to the three other bilateral contracts (Kombiverkehr, 
Hupac and Hupac with MTO). As stated above, safeguards to secure the 
transaction process from opportunistic behaviour lead to unnecessary TCs, as 
there is no asset specific investment necessary to perform the transport service.
5.2.2 Assigning the Transport Service Kombiverkehr to Alternative 
Contracts
In section 5.1.2, the assets necessary to fulfil the transport service Kombiverkehr 
were described. Rail transport operators’ assets in wagons and terminals were 
highly specific. The freight forwarder places assets in TEUs and mobile terminal 
equipment. The TEUs are non-specific, whereas the assets in terminal equipment 
are highly specific. This necessary set o f  assets for the Kombiverkehr service is 
now assigned to alternative contracts (Intercontainer, Hupac and Hupac with 
MTO), and compared with the set o f incentives in the respective contracts. The 
aim is to find a more efficient co-ordination o f  the transport service 
Kombiverkehr.
5.2.2.1 Attribution o f transport service Kombiverkehr to Intercontainer
The freight forwarder, compared to the rail transport operator, carries a lower 
asset specificity in this transport service. Consequently, according to TCE there is 
a freight forwarder incentive necessary to prevent hold-up. Such an incentive is 
non-existent in the Intercontainer contract, where only the railway is liable on the 
basis o f transport legislation. As a result, high potential hold-up costs (TC), due 
to hold-up opportunities, exist for the freight forwarder against the rail transport 
operator. The co-ordination o f  the transport service Kombiverkehr through the 
Intercontainer contract is therefore inefficient.
5.2.2.2 Attribution o f transport service Kombiverkehr to Hupac and Hupac 
with MTO
As in section 5.2.1, the contract alternatives o f Hupac and Hupac with MTO are 
analysed in combination. In the transport service Kombiverkehr, highly specific 
assets o f  the rail transport operator in wagons and terminals are balanced by 
specific assets o f  the freight forwarder in mobile terminal equipment.
From the perspective o f  the freight forwarder, there are no incentives in the 
contracts with Hupac and Hupac with MTO. Only the rail transport operator 
delivers incentives in its share o f 29% o f Hupac and the transport liability 
through transport legislation. Consequently, the highly specific assets o f the
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railway in the transport service Kombiverkehr are not compensated by incentives 
for the freight forwarder for keeping the contract agreement in the Hupac 
contract. Therefore, the freight forwarder holds a significant hold-up potential 
against the rail operator, should he wish to alter the contract during a transaction. 
From the perspective o f credible commitments via asset specificity, the freight 
forwarder invests specifically in wagons and terminals in the Hupac contract. 
Due to the intensity o f their asset specificity, these credible commitments 
transform a potential hold-up situation in favour o f the freight forwarder into a 
lock-in effect against him. As an overall result, the railway could compensate a 
breach o f  contract more easily than the freight forwarder.
Consequently, taking the entire set o f  incentives and credible commitments o f the 
Hupac contract with traditional freight forwarder (and Hupac with MTO) 
together, the potential hold-up costs (TC) from the perspective o f the freight 
forwarder are higher than in the original (Kombiverkehr) contract. Therefore, co­
ordinating the transport service Kombiverkehr with the alternative Hupac or 
Hupac with MTO contract results in an inferior efficiency level.
5.2.23 Summary
The service Kombiverkehr is co-ordinated efficiently. A comparison of 
alternative incentive designs to lower the TCs incurred through potential hold-up 
positions does not lead to a more efficient solution in terms o f TCs. The TCs in 
alternative contracts are higher in all three cases.
5.2.3 Assigning the  T ran sp o rt Service H upac to A lternative C ontracts
The transport services under the Hupac contract with traditional forwarder 
produce a significant mis-balance o f specific assets o f the transaction 
participants, as stated in section 5.1.3. While the freight forwarder invests in 
TEUs, wagons and terminal equipment, the rail transport operator invests in 
additional fixed terminal equipment, such as cranes and tracks. This unequal 
distribution o f  asset specificity requires commitments to protect the freight 
forwarder from hold-up.
5.2.3.1 Attribution o f transport service Hupac to Intercontainer
The incentives for the railway company to perform the agreed transaction 
agreement in the Intercontainer contract consist only o f liability in transport 
legislation. The specific assets o f  the freight forwarder linked to the transport 
service Hupac are thus insufficiently protected against potential hold-up o f the 
rail transport operator.
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5.2.3.2 A ttribution o f transport service Hupac to Kombiverkehr
The incentives in the Kombiverkehr contract focus on a liability o f  the rail 
transport operator. Its terms are deñned in the transport legislation. The freight 
forwarder holds highly specific assets in the transport service Hupac, in wagons 
and terminal equipment. A co-ordination under the Kombiverkehr contract would 
lead to these being counterbalanced by the rail operator’s assets in wagons and 
fixed terminal equipment, but the degree o f  specificity o f  the assets o f  the two 
transaction partners’ assets remains significantly different: the freight forwarder’s 
assets are on a high specificity level, whereas the rail operator’s only on a mixed 
level. As a result, the highly specific asset from the freight forwarders for the 
Hupac service receive insufficient protection in the Kombiverkehr contract 
through bilateral commitments.
5.2.3.3 Attribution o f transport service Hupac to Hupac with MTO
In comparison to the Hupac contract with traditional forwarder there is an 
identical profit sharing incentive for the rail operator in the Hupac with MTO 
contract. Additional incentives for the rail transport operator for dropping 
opportunistic behaviour in view o f the additional TEU investments o f the freight 
forwarder do not exist. The co-ordination o f a ‘Hupac with M TO’-service with a 
‘Hupac with traditional freight forwarder’-contract therefore does not change the 
inefficient TC level existing compared to leaving it in the original contract.
5.2.3.4 Summary
None o f the analysed contracts deliver a more efficient co-ordination in terms o f 
TC efficiency for the transaction service Hupac than the contract o f Hupac itself 
All alternative contracts share an insufficient design o f  incentives through 
unilateral credible commitments for the railway company to safeguard the freight 
forwarder’s highly specific assets in wagons and terminal equipment.
5.2.4 Assigning the Transport Service Hupac With MTO to Alternative 
Contracts
Both contracts, Hupac with traditional freight forwarder and Hupac with MTO, 
share the uneven distribution o f  specific assets in favour o f the rail transport 
operator. While the freight forwarder holds assets in wagons, terminal equipment 
and - in the latter contract - even in TEUs, the railway company only invests in 
additional terminal equipment.
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Consequently, a more efficient co-ordination o f the transport service Hupac with 
MTO compared to the contract now in use, Hupac with MTO, is possible through 
creating incentives to ease the lock-in effect o f the freight forwarder. The 
incentive design according to unilateral credible commitments, such as liability 
and profit sheiring, is either identical (Hupac) or lower (Intercontainer, 
Kombiverkehr) with alternative contracts compared to Hupac with MTO. The 
only contract which uses incentives bearing the nature o f unilateral credible 
commitments via asset specificity and which could potentially offset those 
missing incentives is Kombiverkehr. Nevertheless, in the Kombiverkehr contract, 
the incentives for the rail operator to conform to the transaction agreements via 
specific assets in wagons and fixed equipment on terminals cannot compensate 
the lack o f profit incentives for the rail transport operator in the Kombiverkehr 
contract compared to both Hupac contracts. This is because o f the lower level of 
asset specificity in the Kombiverkehr contract for the rail operator compared to 
the asset specificity level in the Hupac with MTO contract.
5.3 SUMMARY OF CONTRACT EXPLANATION
In the first two. Intercontainer and Kombiverkehr contracts, transactions are co­
ordinated which are efficiently organised according to Williamson’s TCE. 
Whereas the former is co-ordinated through a market-type contract design, the 
latter comes in the form o f bilateral co-ordination between freight forwarder and 
rail transport operator. The third contract, Hupac contract, shows sub-optimality 
for particular, but well-defined, transport services. For the goods and transport 
services that do not require alpine-specific wagons, and which form a significant 
part o f  the entire transport volume, the Hupac contract is efficient. Therefore, the 
contract supports the hypothesis for certain types o f transport services. The 
current co-ordination o f the fourth contract, Hupac with MTO, remains 
inefficient according to Williamson’s TCE.
The two contracts o f Hupac and Hupac with MTO contain - partially or entirely - 
uneven distributions o f asset specificity to the disadvantage o f the freight 
forwarder, or insufficient incentive structure for the rail transport operator. They 
therefore bear - partially or entirely - a significant risk for unilateral contract 
adaptations or even contract termination through the rail transport operators.
Regarding the Hupac contract, only specific areas o f  services are non-efficient. 
From the standpoint o f TCE, this contract is not adequately protected for the 
forwarder in the case o f trans-alpine shipment o f  specialised goods. This sub­
optimality arises from the high potential TCs for contractual adaptation, or
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termination o f  the contract by the railway. The level o f  uncertainty in the 
contract’s underlying transactions, though, is inferior to the fourth contract, as 
volatility o f  demand and technological uncertainty are at a low level. Despite all 
transport under the Hupac contract being trans-alpine, this contract is used with 
both specialised MT-wagons and general-purpose MT-wagons. As outlined in 
sections 4.2.3.2.1 and 5.1.3.2, only 50% o f Hupac’s assets consist o f alpine- 
specific wagons. As a consequence, for the remainder o f its wagons, the hold-up 
position which the rail transport operator can realise when changing transaction 
terms in the course o f the transaction, is at a level similar to the Kombiverkehr 
contract. As a result, the contract for part o f its transactions is efficient; for the 
remaining part it could be carried out with a more favourable TC level in an 
alternative contract design, namely full vertical integration.
The contract o f  Hupac with MTO represents in contrast a sub-optimal governance 
solution for all transport services co-ordinated through it. High specificity of 
assets (containers, wagons and terminals) is the determining environmental factor 
o f the transport services co-ordinated with this contract. Moreover, the factor 
uncertainty now plays a decisive role in the polarisation o f transaction co­
ordination towards a hierarchy solution, particularly owing to demand uncertainty 
and technological uncertainty. Uncertainty in the contract’s underlying 
transactions is high. The transport services from the shipper to the freight 
forwarder could therefore be carried out more efficiently in practice - with a more 
favourable TC level - through an alternative contract form, namely through 
higher vertical integration, whereby the MTO provides the rail transport in-house. 
The thesis argues that this alternative is currently not feasible in practice, due to 
insufficient application o f  existing EU transport legislation. Compared to the 
previous Hupac contract, the transport services under Hupac with MTO do not 
allow choosing between specific asset wagons and non-specific asset wagons. As 
outlined in chapter 5, all wagons here are asset specific low-profile alpine 
wagons. As a consequence and unlike the previous contract, even taking this 
potential differentiation o f  transport services under one single contract into 
account does not change the state o f inefficiency. In view o f  the high asset 
specificity on the part o f  the MTO and the overall high uncertainty environment 
o f the transaction, the bilateral co-ordination used as the current contract design is 
not sufficient to prevent hold-up behaviour by the rail transport operator.
In the concluding chapter, an explanation outside TCE’s market failure 
framework according to Williamson will be outlined to solve the existing 
dilemma o f  a contract being used - Hupac with MTO - that carries inefficiency 
with respect to TCs.
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CHAPTER 6; CONCLUSION
The aim o f this thesis was to relate the theory o f TCE, developed by Oliver 
Williamson, to the German piggyback transport industry. The objects of 
investigation were the forms o f contract designs in this industry. The service 
investigated was the rail transport provided by the rail transport operators for the 
piggyback transport chains, both within Germany and to and from Germany.
The hypothesis o f the thesis stated that the degree o f  vertical integration is a 
function o f the degree o f asset specificity o f the rail transport service, i.e. each 
contract in the German piggyback transport industry is adapted to meet different 
degrees o f sisset specificity. This analysis sought to explain the four types of 
contracts most commonly used in German piggyback transport by using TCE and 
testing their TC-efficiency.
The thesis found that three o f the four contract designs support the hypothesis. 
The first two contracts are efficient in all transport services they co-ordinate and 
the third is efficient to a large extent in terms o f the volume o f services co­
ordinated. The fourth contract type cannot currently be designed in a way 
efficient for TCE.
6.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROCESS
Following the introduction to the thesis in chapter 1, TCE and the instruments for 
analysing the objects o f  investigation, the contract designs, were described in 
chapter 2. Contract problems occur when human-factor opportunism influences 
the contract relationship, i.e. opportunism is a key contributor to market failure 
and, therefore, the existence o f TCs. Contracts for curing market failure can be 
positioned with their degree o f controllability and their degree o f incentive 
intensity. Whereas market co-ordination maximises incentive intensity at one end 
o f the continuum, the contract form ‘hierarchy’, i.e. the co-ordination o f a 
transaction within a firm, constitutes its opposite pole where control is maximised 
by means o f  instructions within the firm. The following types o f  contract designs 
exist according to Williamson: market governance, bilateral governance and 
unified governance. TCE explains how, with the existence o f asset specificity, 
market failure should be cured.
Chapter 3 described German piggyback transport in a market context. From the 
perspective o f  TCE, the main elements are firstly the transaction object, i.e. the
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rail transport service for piggyback transport chains, secondly the transaction 
partners, i.e. freight forwarders (road side), rail transport operators (rail side) and 
intermediaries, and thirdly the transaction situation, i.e. the market set-up and the 
market players. The transport object was described by means o f  four logistics 
dimensions for the transformation o f goods. Piggyback transport as one sector o f 
MT was defined as the transport o f  TEUs, using two separate transport modes to 
move goods over a defined distance. The transport services analysed in this thesis 
comprised the entire means o f transportation (traction engines and trailers o f the 
‘Rolling Highway*) and the parts thereof (trailers) or swap bodies. Piggyback- 
based transportation is the clear land-based alternative o f MT. In terms o f the 
market participants, i.e. the transaction partners, the purchase o f  rail transport 
services to build into transport chains for piggyback transport is organised 
through intermediaries in Germany. Regarding the transaction situation, the 
market potential for MT in general and piggyback transport specifically exceeds 
the volume o f existing market transactions many times over. The annual market 
volume for piggyback transport has been around 30 million tkm since the mid- 
1990s and a volume o f  38.8 million tkm is projected up until 2010, according to 
the latest government market study o f  the German transport ministry (Hacon 
Ingenieurgesellschaft, 1999:7).
From the perspective o f the thesis* hypothesis, the contracts in piggyback 
transport could now be examined in terms o f their efficiency. In chapter 4, the 
contract designs used for the co-ordination o f piggyback transport were specified. 
The contract instruments were described and then qualitatively modelled 
according to TCE. As a result, the degree o f vertical integration, as the first 
element o f  the thesis* hypothesis, could be differentiated. According to 
Williamson*s typification o f contract designs, described in chapter 2, ‘degree o f 
vertical integration* for the four contracts analysed in the thesis means the degree 
by which the freight forwarder controls the production o f  the rail transport 
component o f the piggyback transport chain. A low degree o f  vertical integration, 
i.e. a spot contract purchase o f the service, represents the lowest level o f control 
for the freight forwarder in terms o f  instructions within a firm. The highest 
degree o f  vertical integration on the other hand is the in-house production o f the 
rail transport element, where control is maximised from the perspective o f the 
freight forwarder. Chapter 5 firstly classified the underlying transport services* 
characteristics in terms o f logistics dimensions introduced in chapter 3. Secondly, 
the transaction attributes o f TCE from these transport services were extracted and 
then qualitatively modelled. Thereafter, the degree o f asset specificity, as the 
second element o f  the thesis* hypothesis, could be differentiated for the contracts* 
underlying transport services. In the third step, the contract instruments, i.e. the
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means for reducing TCs, as modelled in chapter 4, were allocated to the 
transaction attributes, i.e. the sources o f TCs, as modelled in chapter 5, It was 
possible thereby to assign degrees o f vertical integration to degrees o f asset 
specificity. As a result, the contract designs used for providing the rail transport 
service in piggyback transport could be explained through TCE.
6.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
This section will outline the results o f the TCE-analysis o f  German piggyback 
contracts in chapters 4 and 5 graphically. This is followed by the implications of 
these findings.
Figure 6.1 uses W illiamson’s framework o f  the contract for transaction 
assignment and places the piggyback transport contracts analysed into this 
framework. The figure sununarises the contract position on the basis o f the 
analysis o f the three most important transaction attributes: asset specificity, 
frequency and uncertainty from chapter 5.
The transaction attributes frequency - in 2 levels - and asset specificity - in 3 
levels - are shown on the y-axis and upper x-axis. Uncertainty - in 2 levels low 
and high as defined in the notes - causes the polarisation o f  the contract choice. 
Trilateral governance as governance structure does not appear on this figure, as it 
is not used in the piggyback transport contracts in Germany. The figure shows the 
status quo transaction attributes o f the contract designs o f the German piggyback 
transport market within W illiamson’s framework o f ideal, i.e. most TC-efficient, 
governance structures. The status quo governance structures result from the 
analysis o f contract design elements in chapters 4 and 5. A discrepancy between 
the most efficient contract design and the status quo contract design is 
highlighted in the figure (circle - status quo position and triangle - most efficient 
position).
In all three contracts. Intercontainer, Kombiverkehr and Hupac with traditional 
freight forwarder, transactions are co-ordinated which are efficiently organised 
according to W illiamson’s TCE. However, in the third contract, Hupac with 
traditional freight forwarder, specific areas o f services were shown to be non­
efficient. The fourth contract, Hupac with MTO, in contrast to the three contracts 
above, represents a sub-optimal governance solution for all transport services co­
ordinated through it. However, the transport services could be carried out more 
efficiently - with a more favourable TC level - through an alternative contract 
form, namely through full vertical integration o f the piggyback rail transport
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service. The thesis argues in section 5.1 that this alternative is currently not 
feasible.
New legislation in Germany allows for freight forwarders to set up a railway 
operation as a subsidiary company. Nevertheless, the quasi-monopoly o f the 
German national railway (DB) over the distribution o f time slots on the rail 
network diminishes the profitability o f  this contractual alternative for freight 
forwarders in a significant way. New entrants are only awarded unattractive time 
slots and as a result o f  these access restrictions no full vertical integration o f the 
entire piggyback transport service has so far taken place.
Figure 6.1; Piggyback Contracts in Germany
incentive control
Notes: High uncertainty.
► Contract design, where status quo governance structure differs 
conq)ared to most efficient governance structure.
Source: Williamson (1985:79) and personal data.
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This thesis supports Shelanski’s assessment o f the TCE theory’s predictions:
“Taken as a whole, the body of empirical research in TCE 
shows that a good deal of economic activity aligns with 
transactions in the manner predicted by the theory” (Shelanski 
& Klein, 1995:352).
However, the thesis’ findings hint at areas o f further development o f TCE, which 
now follow as implications o f  the thesis’ results.
As a first implication o f the results o f relating TCE to the piggyback transport 
industry, the concept o f uncertainty could be worked out in more detail. Its 
impact is different to that o f  the continuous shifiing effects o f  asset specificity 
and frequency. Given its polarising effect on the choice o f contract, uncertainty 
should be separated more clearly into complexity and stochastic uncertainty.*
A second implication o f the thesis’ results is that more discrete sub-types should 
be integrated into W illiamson’s framework o f efficient governance. Bilateral 
governance had to be split up more discretely into sub-types than in Williamson’s 
governance structures, due to the non-existence o f  alternatives to full-scale 
vertical integration o f  rail transport services in the German piggyback transport 
industry. The contracts o f  Kombiverkehr and Hupac with traditional freight 
forwarder are both bilateral contracts, although contract incentives built into the 
latter contract move this governance structure more towards vertical integration. 
The asset specificity involved creates an environment o f increased control for the 
freight forwarder side in the Hupac contract. This applies especially to the crucial 
area o f  MT-terminals along the piggyback transport chain. On top o f these two 
additional subtypes, a further subtype had to be added due to a discrete difference 
in the area o f asset specificity. A full take-over by the MTO o f all TEU 
investments involved in the transaction in the Hupac with MTO contract was 
instrumental for this marked difference.
The third implication arises fi’om the result o f  analysing the fourth contract, 
Hupac with MTO. Highly specific assets support the transactions under this 
contract, which together with high frequency make vertical integration the 
efficient contract design. The Hupac with MTO contract (i.e. incentives and 
hostages) is based on bilateral elements. The three other contracts do not contain 
this mismatch, although part o f the Hupac contract - as mentioned above - would
See definitions in chapter 2.
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be more efficiently co-ordinated via unified governance, i.e. vertical integration 
o f the train transport service by the freight forwarder. However, current 
legislation restricts this contract design alternative. The MTO would have to 
establish a railway operation in the form o f a separate railway company 
<Eisenbahnverkehrsuntemehmen (EVU)>, e.g. as a subsidiary company,^ 
instead. This option o f  vertical integration has not been used so far by freight 
forwarders, due to the quasi-monopoly o f the German national railway for the rail 
transport service o f piggyback. The current bilateral contract solution for 
piggyback transport o f  MTOs represents a substitute for the above-mentioned 
EVU.
Therefore, TCE may not be applied in the current form to the empirical 
framework o f  piggyback transport for the last contract, because o f  a possible 
deficiency o f the transaction attributes o f TCE. A causal explanation of the last 
contract (Hupac with MTO) may be accomplished through an alternative theory 
or an extension o f the theory o f TCE. These two routes for causal explanation for 
the Hupac with MTO contract are now being looked at in more detail.
In a first alternative for contract explanation, the freight forwarders’ decision to 
use the last two contract designs, despite the costly lock-in situations due to 
unbalanced specific investments, could be explained by the expectation of 
liberalisation o f  rail track access to the continental European rail networks. Those 
MTOs, who start integrated piggyback transport directly after liberalisation has 
been fully implemented, may achieve a superior competitive position over other 
MTO companies through ex-ante acquiring know-how of a fully integrated rail 
transport system before full access is permitted by legislation.
As TCE does not cover the acquisition o f  future know-how, an alternative theory 
to examine freight forwarders’ investments would need to be studied. This means 
that TCE theory is not suitable for the context o f the last contract investigated in 
this thesis.
As a second alternative for contract explanation, freight forwarders could 
interpret contractual and financial commitments by governments, i.e. 
Switzerland, as a long-term prospect for using piggyback transport for trans­
alpine traffic. The transit agreement between Switzerland and the EU dated 
02.05.1992^ forms an example o f this kind o f government commitment. This
See section 5.1.4. 
See section 5.1.3.
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agreement binds Switzerland to extend its trans-alpine traffic capacity and makes 
it more competitive through piggyback transport. The contract commitment 
would therefore involve the reputation o f the Swiss government, acquired 
through consistent historical transport policy. In contrast to the first alternative of 
theory deficiency, an element o f existing theory - namely, credible commitments 
o f  the transaction participants - could possibly be extended. The commitment in 
this case, contrary to Williamson’s TCE, stems from a macro-economic 
perspective outside the transaction participants, which do not directly participate 
in the transaction o f piggyback rail transport service. The concept o f government 
reputation as credible commitment could be added to the theory, i.e. national 
government policy in the case o f transportation across the Alps could be built into 
TCE.
The second alternative for explaining the Hupac with MTO contract is to be 
favoured from the background o f the methodology o f scientific research 
programmes (MSRP), as introduced in chapter 1. This alternative would also 
mean adjusting the ‘protective belt’ around the overall research programme of 
New Institutional Economics (NIE), o f which TCE is one element, by adding 
auxiliary hypotheses that would include government reputation into the contract 
instruments. This alternative would not query the ‘hard core’ o f  NIE, which on 
the one hand is the hypothesis o f  efficiency and represents the ‘negative 
heuristic’ o f the research programme and, on the other, the research programme’s 
aim of explaining vertical integration through TCs, which is the ‘positive 
heuristic’ o f NIE.
Taking these implications o f the thesis results with areas o f improvement for 
TCE into consideration, the cases examined show that the TCE is fundamentally 
suitable for providing causal explanations for contracts in the German piggyback 
transport industry.
Finally, weaknesses and strengths o f  the thesis are discussed. Specifically, after 
the liberalisation o f the road haulage sector under EU-legislation in the 1990s 
fi*om the previous regulation o f price and capacity, cross-border mergers within 
the Western European freight forwarder industry have increased substantially. As 
a result, the scope o f  alternatives as to which country to use as a hub for 
piggyback transport has broadened for the individual market participants in 
Germany. By looking only at contracts eligible for freight forwarders located in 
Germany for acquiring rail transport services in piggyback transport, it could be 
argued that the recent internationalisation o f  the freight forwarder industry is not 
sufficiently covered. However, as pointed out in chapter 3, Germany represents
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the most important source and target country for international piggyback 
transport in Europe. Moreover, Germany is by far the biggest European domestic 
piggyback transport market. Looking at only the four contracts eligible to choose 
from in Germany, it has been possible to carry out the case study significantly 
deeper than if  various other European piggyback contracts with their respective 
national transport law had been included.
Moving forward, the qualitative criteria for applying TCE to the piggyback 
transport industry that were developed in this thesis could be used for other 
European markets, as well.
The qualitative application to the TC analysis in this thesis, as pointed out in 
chapter 1, derives from Oliver W illiamson’s approach o f  comparing discrete 
structural alternatives, which differ in their cause rather than their extent. 
Although the findings o f the thesis are unambiguous in terms o f  transaction cost 
levels for the four contracts investigated, it could be argued that an additional 
quantitative approach may be used to confirm these findings.
A quantitative approach could prove specifically useful in cases where TC-levels 
as the result o f  assigning contract elements to transaction situations are not as 
unambiguous, e.g. when relating TCE to other piggyback contracts in other 
countries.
As a strength o f  the thesis one can emphasise its approach in applying the entire 
framework o f TCE to the contracts investigated and not focusing on certain 
factors causing market failure, such as uncertainty or asset specificity. In a step 
by step process, all transaction attributes from the transaction situation and the 
entirety o f credible commitments built into the contracts are analysed as 
developed by Williamson for the TCE-field o f investigating vertical integration. 
Moreover, the four contracts together with the corresponding types o f piggyback 
transport services that they support are systematically carried through this process 
in order to arrive at a judgement regarding their efficiency in chapter 5.
This qualitative case study o f  relating TCE to the contracts that co-ordinate 
German multimodal transport -  not accomplished so far -  could be applied to 
other countries internationally. As pointed out in chapter 1, the data gathering for 
analysing the piggyback contracts investigated in the thesis was predominantly 
though primary sources, i.e. interviews and primary literature. The criteria that 
have been developed as a result o f the process o f applying TCE to this sector of 
the transport industry could be applied to other countries internationally.
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APPENDIX I;
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
People Interviewed
Person Interviewed Duration Interview Date
Juri Cavanak, ICF, Basle/CH 30 min 23.10.2000
30 min 21.06.2000
Gabriele GERBER, Transfracht Deutsche 
Transportgesellschaft mbH, Frankfurt am Main
30 min 14.05.1999
Peter HAFNER, Hupac Intermodal S.A., Chiasso/CH 30 min 27.09.2000
30 min 20.06.2000
30 min 22.08.1995
Juergen HIPP, Division KLV, DB Cargo AG, Mainz/D 30 min 29.05.2000
Rainer MERTEL, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft 30 min 08.12.2000
fur kombinierten Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt 60 min 17.04.2000
am Main 60 min 18.06.1999
60 min 30.09.1993
60 min 11.12.1991
Reinhild PRIEBE, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft 60 min 17.04.2000
für kombinierten Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt 30 min 23.02.2000
am Main
Dr. Albert RICHEY, Geschäftsbereich Ladungsverkehr, 
Deutsche Bahn AG, Frankfurt am Main
30 min 21.06.1999
Horst SCHULZ, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
kombinierten Güterverkehr mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am 
Main
30 min 14.05.1999
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Information Contacts
Relevant date o f contact is listed in text footnotes.
Theo ALLEMANN, Hupac SA, Chiasso/CH
Werner BACK, Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Technik des Landes Hessen, Wiesbaden/D
Francois BEAU, Novatrans, Paris
Dr. Hans-Jörg BERTSCHI, Bertschi AG, Dürrenäsch/CH
Theo CONVENT, Convent Spedition + Transport GmbH, Emmerich/D
Luc DE DEYNE, Combi-Delta SA, Brussels
Herbert ESSLER, DB Cargo AG, Mainz/D
Filip D ’HOSE, Combi-Delta SA, Brussels
Bill HEDRICK, Road Rader Corporation, Chicago/USA
Dr. Hasso HÖLTERLING, Schenker-Rhenus AG, Frankfurt am Main
Bernhard JUDITH, Geschäftsbereich Ladungsverkehr, Deutsche Bahn AG, Frankfurt am 
Main
P ro f Dr. Guy KIRSCH, Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Université de Fribourg/CH_________
P ro f Peter KLAUS, D.B.A./Boston Univ., Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaft, insb. Logistik, 
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Nuremberg/D
Henner KLEIN, A. T. Keamey, Munich/D
Dr. Bernd H. KORTSCHAK, Wien
Dr. Hans-Wilhelm KREFT, Bundesverband des Deutschen Güterfernverkehrs (BDF) e.V., 
Frankfurt am Main
P ro f Dr. Fritz KÜBLER, Institut für Arbeits-, Wirtschafts- und Zivilrecht, Universität 
Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main
Eckhard KUHLA, Bayerische Trailerzug Gesellschaft für bimodalen Güterverkehr mbH, 
Munich/D
Roy A. LAWRENCE, British Rail Research, Derby/GB
Guy LIPPERT, ICF, Basle/CH
Serge MOREAU, Union Internationale des sociétés de transport combiné Rail-Route 
(UIRR), Brussels
Horst NEUROTH, Danzas GmbH, Frankfurt am Main
Michael PROBST, 
Mannheim/D
Deutsche Umschlaggesellschaft Schiene-Straße (DUSS) mbH,
Thomas RÜEGGER, ICF, Basle/CH
Bernd SALB, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Frankfurt am Main
Markus SCHMIDLE, ICF, Basle/CH
Dr. Christoph SEIDELMANN, Studiengesellschaft für den kombinierten Verkehr e.V., 
Frankfurt am Main
Silvan VON ROHR, SBB Cargo AG, Bem/CH
W erner WAGNER, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten Güterverkehr 
mbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main
Hans WENGER, Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft für kombinierten Güterverkehr mbh 
& Co. KG, Frankfurt am Main
W erner ZEHNDER, ICF, Basle/CH
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APPENDIX II;
INTERCONTAINER-INTERFRIGO a c n  S.C.; 
GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE 
TO COMBINED TRANSPORT 
iEDITION OF 03.01.2000>
Intercontainer-Interfrigo (ICF) s.c.: International Company for the development 
of combined and temperature-controlled transport
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Preamble
§1
Intercontainer-Interfngo (abbreviated to ICF) is a forwarding agent under Belgian 
law. It organises its activities with the railways, road hauliers, inland waterway or 
marine shipping companies and suppliers o f ancillary services by the 
intermediary o f its local representatives, a list o f  whom is obtainable on request.
§2
These General Conditions apply to combined transport and ancillary services 
marketed under the name o f  “Intercontainer” .
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§ 3
“Combined transport” comprises all transport o f UTI (Unité de Transport 
Intermodal = intermodal transport unit): large containers or swap bodies o f all 
types, containers or swap bodies fitted for controlled temperature (particularly 
mechanically refngerated, refngerated and insulated), similar units, semitrailers, 
etc.
§ 4
Ancillary services” comprise in particular terminal services inherent in combined 
transport (handling and road haulage); provision o f UTI; information concerning 
any irregularity occurring during transport o f UTI fitted for controlled 
temperature; supervision o f the working o f the machinery and maintenance o f the 
required temperature o f mechanically refngerated UTI during transport.
§ 5
The terms “principal” (party giving the order) and “receiver” (beneficiary) refer 
to the principal and receiver themselves or to any agent they may appoint.
§6
The term “client” denotes the freight payer, who, except with the prior agreement 
o f ICF, can only be the principal or the receiver.
Article 1: Offers and agreements
§ 7
Unless otherwise stipulated by ICF, its offers shall remain valid for thirty days 
from the date o f sending, subject to the provisions o f §§ 9 and 10.
These offers shall not be binding on ICF unless it has received the express 
acceptance o f  the client during the period o f  validity or the client has handed over 
a UTI to ICF within the same period, which implies acceptance o f the ICF 
General Conditions by the client.
§8
All offers and agreements, even all-inclusive, are based on the tariffs o f transport 
and ancillary services applicable to ICF as well as all other technical and 
commercial factors prevailing on the date o f  their compilation.
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§ 9
If  economic, political or technical circumstances, unforeseeable by ICF at the 
time o f  compilation o f the offers and agreements and entirely beyond its control, 
subsequently occur and upset the balance o f the above offers or agreements, thus 
placing an excessive burden on ICF in the discharge o f its contractual obligations, 
ICF may require the client in writing to adjust the offers or agreements, 
indicating the precise circumstances and giving the reasons for its request. If, in 
spite o f  an adjustment o f the offers or agreements, it appears economically 
impossible to maintain them, ICF may cancel them with effect on the seventh day 
after giving notice o f cancellation in writing. This provision does not concern 
force majeure referred to in § 10.
§ 10
The clause o f force majeure o f the International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC 
publication No. 421) applies to these General Conditions.
Article 2: Orders and instructions
§11
Before UTI are entrusted to ICF, details o f the composition o f the consignment 
(length and weight o f the UTI) shall be communicated to the ICF agent in good 
time, so that he can take the necessary steps for furnishing the services requested 
(provision o f wagons, handling, road haulage, etc.).
§ 12
For each consignment to be entrusted to ICF, the principal shall complete a form 
entitled “Transfer Note” (obtainable on request from ICF local agents) and attach 
all the documents required by Customs and other administrative authorities for 
the transport.
The handing over o f UTI, accompanied by signed and dated Transfer Note(s), 
constitutes the transport order.
§13
Before completing the Transfer Note, the principal shall ensure that the 
conditions o f  acceptance and delivery requested in the Transfer Note can be 
provided by consulting the “list o f  terminals and stations open to Intercontainer 
traffic”, obtainable from ICF on request.
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§14
The principal shall be responsible for entries made by him on the Transfer Note. 
He shall bear any consequences arising from incorrectness, inaccuracy, 
incompleteness or absence o f such entries. The same grounds for responsibility of 
the principal as well as delay in handing over the documents shall apply to 
documents required by Customs and other administrative authorities for 
transport. Without prior agreement, ICF shall not involve itself in the carrying out 
o f these formalities and shall not be responsible for the erroneous raising of 
duties, taxes, charges etc. by these authorities.
§15
Division o f charges and special prepayment provisions are not allowed, and 
consignments may not be made subject either to declarations o f cash on delivery 
or disbursements.
§ 16
ICF is not required to verify the accuracy o f information given on the Transfer 
Note or in the instructions or other documents submitted separately.
§17
Alterations to orders and instructions entered on the Transfer Note shall be 
accepted only if  they are requested in writing from the ICF local agent in good 
time and in the manner required by ICF (“Request for Modification to the 
Instructions o f  the Transfer Note”). Only written acceptance o f  this request shall 
mean that ICF will endeavour to carry it into effect, taking into account the 
capabilities and regulations of each carrier. Only the principal shall be authorised 
to modify the instructions. However, these may also be modified by the receiver 
if  the receiver is also a client o f ICF for the transport in question and provided 
that the new station o f destination is situated in the same country o f destination. 
The client shall bear the costs arising from such alterations.
Article 3: Dangerous goods
§18
Before entrusting consignments o f  dangerous goods to ICF, it is mandatory to 
give at least 24 hours’ notice.
§19
For consignments o f  dangerous goods, the principal is required to make all the 
necessary declarations and to comply with all the conditions prescribed by the
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prevailing national and international regulations, particularly the RID, ADR and 
CSC international conventions, with a view to taking the special measures 
required for this type o f  transport.
§20
The principal shall bear all the consequences for failure to make such 
declarations and non-compliance with these conditions. Furthermore, he shall be 
responsible for any loss or damage, any delays or costs that may result from the 
acceptance o f  these goods, their transport and any related service.
Article 4: Provision of UTI
§21
ICF shall endeavour to meet orders for UTI necessary for transport. Without a 
formal undertaking on its part, ICF shall assume no responsibility if  UTI are 
unavailable or are provided late or if  they are refused in accordance with § 22. 
Provision o f UTI shall entitle ICF to raise a charge or is subject to special 
conditions determined in each case.
§22
The user (principal or ordinary hirer or legally entitled parties) shall inspect the 
UTI before loading. This inspection must also include checking the working of 
the refrigerating system o f UTI fitted for controlled temperature.
The equipment may be refused if  it is defective or unfit for conveyance o f the 
merchandise to be loaded therein. Failing such refusal, the equipment supplied 
shall be deemed in good condition and fit for the transport in question. If  the 
refusal is not communicated in the 24 hours (Sundays and public holidays 
excluded) following the supply o f the equipment, the user shall be liable for 
possible demurrage charges as well as a daily compensation based on the daily 
rent applicable to this type o f UTI, and if  applicable, on the daily wagon standage 
charge.
§23
The user shall be responsible for the careful treatment o f the equipment placed by 
ICF at his disposal. He shall be responsible to ICF for any damage to said 
equipment while it is in his custody or in the custody o f entitled parties, and he 
shall be required to compensate ICF for the replacement value o f  the UTI in the 
event o f  its destruction or loss.
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Any UTI not returned within three months o f the date o f  provision or by the end 
o f the period o f hire shall be considered lost. The aforementioned damages 
comprise direct damage to the equipment and loss o f income due to repairs.
§ 2 4
The user shall make every effort to return the UTI to ICF in good condition, 
cleaned and, if  necessary, disinfected or deodorised, with the motors stopped and 
the doors closed, either by the receiver after unloading or by the user at the end of 
the period o f  hire. If  the user fails to comply, ICF shall have the aforementioned 
work undertaken at the user’s expense. A daily compensation corresponding to 
the daily rent applicable to this type o f UTI shall be payable to ICF for late 
restitution o f  UTI.
A rticle 5: Use o f wagons
§25
If  the principal requires a specific type o f wagon or placing o f UTI on wagons in 
a particular fashion, ICF shall endeavour to satisfy such requests without formal 
undertaking.
§ 2 6
If  the principal or the receiver loads or unloads the UTI from the wagon himself, 
he shall be required to comply with all the railway regulations and to bear all the 
consequences o f  inadequate loading or unloading.
§27
If  the loading or unloading periods allowed by the tariffs o f the railways are 
exceeded before or after railway transport, the party responsible (principal or 
receiver) shall pay “demurrage charges” directly to the railways for their wagons 
or to the wagon owner for privately owned wagons.
I f  demurrage charges are debited to ICF by the railways or other wagon owner, 
because ICF appears as consignor/consignee in the consignment note, ICF shall 
pass them on to the client.
§28
On the other hand, when transport is effected with wagons from the ICF fleet and 
the loading and unloading periods mentioned in § 27 are exceeded, or if  such 
wagons are delayed in transit through the fault o f  the principal or the receiver.
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ICF shall invoice “private wagon standage charges”, the rates o f which will be 
communicated to the principal on request.
Demurrage charges for wagons parked on railway lines shall be based on the 
prevailing tariffs o f  the railways.
Article 6: Condition, loading, storage of UTI
§29
UTI shall undergo inspection before they are handed over to ICF by the principal. 
This is a purely external inspection carried out from the ground with the doors 
closed. Consequently, ICF is under no obligation to detect possible roof or floor 
damage or to examine the loading o f the goods in the UTI.
§30
The principal shall be liable for any consequences arising from the inadequate 
condition or overloading o f  the UTI. He shall guarantee to ICF that the UTI and 
its loading comply with all the applicable standards and regulations and that it is 
resistant enough to satisfy the requirements both o f transport safety and handling.
§31
The principal shall bear any consequences o f inadequate loading o f the UTI or 
packing o f its contents. UTI loaded with goods subject to special regulations or 
packaging techniques must comply with these regulations or techniques.
§32
The principal shall bear any consequences, even indirect, in the event o f loss, 
shortage or theft o f  goods arising from failure to lock and seal the UTI properly 
or from a defect in the locks or seals.
§33
If  UTI are left by the receiver on the installations or wagons after delivery, 
typically in the case o f delivery on a private siding, immediate instructions for 
their reforwarding shall be given. Storage charges for UTI arising from the 
absence o f  instructions shall be passed on by ICF to its client.
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Artide 7: UTI fitted for controlled temperature
§ 3 4
This concerns transport o f  insulated, refrigerated or mechanically refrigerated 
UTI. Such transports can be effected with or without temperature supervision and 
with or without transport supervision. It is understood that the transport o f the 
UTI without temperature or transport supervision is assimilated to the transport of 
UTI not fitted for controlled temperature.
The provisions o f §§ 29 to 34 shall apply by analogy.
§35
Concerning transport o f UTI with temperature and transport supervision, this 
service comprises:
transport by fast and priority services,
supervision o f  the working o f the machinery and level o f the temperature 
required,
informing the principal of any irregularity occurring during transport.
This service applies to:
all mechanically refrigerated UTI o f the self-refngerating type for which 
temperature supervision has been requested.
This service presupposes:
the possibility o f reading the control instruments by a person standing 
beside the wagon,
sufficient mechanical autonomy for the whole duration o f the transport.
§ 3 6
Concerning transport o f UTI without temperature supervision but with transport 
supervision, this service comprises:
transport by fast and priority services,
informing the client o f  any irregularity occurring during transport.
This service applies to:
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any insulated, refrigerated or mechanically refrigerated UTl for which 
transport supervision has been requested.
§37
The principal must ensure that: 
the machinery is switched on,
there are sufficient fuel and additives for the whole duration o f the 
transport, and
the temperature is correctly adjusted.
Article 8: Impediments to transport and delivery
§38
If  circumstances prevent continuation o f transport according to instructions 
received from the principal, ICF shall take any steps it considers useful or 
expedient. In all cases, such steps shall be considered as having been taken with 
the principal’s consent. Any additional costs, particularly those incurred in 
protection or preservation o f UTI and their contents, shall be charged to the 
principal.
§39
If  impediment to delivery arises, ICF shall notify the principal who, on his own 
responsibility, must issue instructions to ICF without delay as to the steps to be 
taken (reforwarding, measures for preserving the goods, etc.). All resultant costs 
shall be charged to the client.
Article 9: Responsibility
§40
The responsibility o f  ICF begins with the handing over o f the UTI and ends with 
the unqualified acceptance o f  the UTI by the receiver.
Assessments o f damage or loss are only binding on ICF to the extent that ICF has 
been duly summoned to participate in them.
§41
If  damage to/loss o f  UTI and/or goods or detriment occurs and can be localised 
on the rail-based portion o f  the journey o f a combined (multimodal) shipment, the 
liability o f  ICF is subject, as the case may be, to the provisions of:
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the Beme Convention concerning the International Carriage o f  Goods by 
Rail (CIM),
the SMGS Agreement between several Central and Eastern European and 
Asian States concerning international shipments o f goods by rail, 
the national legislation applicable to the railway company, for national rail 
shipments.
§42
If  damage to/loss o f UTI and/or goods or detriment occurs and can be localised 
on any other non-rail-based portion o f  the journey (road, non-CIM shipping line, 
etc.) o f a combined (multimodal) shipment, the liability o f ICF is subject to the 
provisions o f  the Geneva Convention concerning international shipments o f 
goods by road (CMR).
The same applies when the portion o f the journey in which damage to/loss o f UTI 
and/or goods or detriment have occurred cannot be determined.
§43
ICF as a forwarding agent under Belgian law is responsible for ensuring that the 
order issued by the principal in the Transfer Note is executed properly.
In the event o f  a purely financial loss directly involving the liability o f  ICF 
through proven fault in the execution o f the aforementioned order, ICF shall be 
liable for compensation only to a maximum of EUR 100,000 for each proven and 
documented financial loss.
§ 4 4
If  a delivery period for an entire multimodal shipment is guaranteed by a special 
written agreement, the provisions o f the CMR shall apply should the delivery 
period be exceeded.
Article 10: Financial provisions
§45
All amounts due to ICF are payable on presentation o f an invoice.
During a period o f twelve months from the principal invoice, ICF reserves the 
right to send an additional invoice for costs unknown at the time o f the principal
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invoice. All taxes, duties and charges applicable to the services provided by ICF 
shall be stated on the invoice.
§ 4 6
Except by special agreement, invoices shall be issued in Euro and payable in 
Basle.
The bank transfer charges are payable by the client.
The currency conversions necessary for invoicing are based on the exchange rates 
applied by the Swiss Federal Railways on the date o f the invoice.
§47
Invoices are payable without discount or deduction within 30 days o f the date o f 
issue.
Any default in settling within this period shall lead to the invoicing o f interest on 
arrears calculated at the rate o f 12% per annum.
Any delay in settling shall cause the agreed period to lapse, and all the amounts 
invoiced shall become payable immediately.
Setting o ff claims against payment is not permitted.
§48
Without prejudice to § 6, the principal is jointly liable with any freight payer 
designated by him, and in the event o f default in settling by the last mentioned, 
ICF reserves the right to recover its debt from such principal.
§49
ICF reserves at all times the right to require the freight payer designated by the 
principal or the principal him self to give a guarantee for payments due and to 
stipulate the form and amount o f  this guarantee.
§ 5 0
ICF has a lien on all property, documents and monies handed to it for carriage or 
other operations, for all debts due from the freight payer designated by the 
principal, from the principal him self or the owner o f the goods.
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Article 11: C laim s
§51
All claims for damage/loss/detriment shall be submitted within six months o f 
delivery to the receiver.
All claims for exceeding the delivery period affecting the purely rail-based 
portion o f  the journey are to be submitted within 6 weeks o f delivery to the 
receiver.
These claims should be quantified and submitted in writing, clearly indicate the 
object o f the claim and include a copy or the number o f the Transfer Note.
ICF reserves the right to a six-month period for handling such claims.
§52
All claims concerning invoices must be submitted within six weeks o f the date of 
each invoice. ICF shall issue a credit or debit note or a new invoice for any 
invoice amendment.
§53
The submission o f  a claim does not dispense with settlement o f the invoice. 
Article 12: F inal provisions
§54
The principal is deemed to act validly on his own behalf and on behalf o f the 
legally entitled parties. He expressly recognises the General Conditions in force 
at the time o f the consignment, which are assumed to be known to and accepted 
by the client.
§55
In the event o f non-compliance with these General Conditions, particularly article 
10, ICF reserves the right to cancel all offers and agreements and demand 
payment o f  all charges, invoices, fees and indemnities due, with effect on the date 
when notification o f  such action is sent by ICF.
§56
No derogation o f  these General Conditions shall be binding on ICF unless it is 
based on a written agreement signed by two Directors o f  ICF.
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§57
These General Conditions are governed by Belgian law. Only the courts in the 
country o f the defendant’s domicile or registered office shall be competent.
§58
These General Conditions are published in Dutch, English, French and German 
and each version shall have equal validity.
Intercontainer-Interfrigo (ICF) s.c.
Head Office: Margarethenstrasse 38, CH-4008 Basle
Phone +41-61-278 2525, Fax. +41-61-278 2445, E-Mail: icf@icfonline.com
Co-operative Company, R.C. Brussels No 342546, Registered Office: Rue de 
France 85, B-1060 Brussels
Source: http://www.icfonline.ch/
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APPENDIX III;
ALLGEMEINE GESCHÄFTSBEDINGUNGEN DER 
KOMBIVERKEHR DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR 
KOMBINIERTEN GÜTERVERKEHR MBH & CO KG FÜR 
IHRE INLANDVERKEHRE ISTAND: 1. JULI 19991
I 1 V « rtra g sg ttg « n sta n d
D i e  K o m b i v e r k e h r  D e u t s c h e  G e s e l l s c h a f t  f ü r  k o m b i n i e r t e n  G ü t e r v e r k e h r  m bH & C o  
K G , n a c h f o l g e n d  K o m b i v e r k e h r  g e n a n n t ,  i s t  a l s  Z w i s c h e n s p e d i t e u r  t ä t i g .  F ü r  d i e  
S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g e  m i t  d e m  K u n d e n  g e l t e n  d i e  g e s e t z l i c h e n  R e g e lu n g e n ,  
i n s b e s o n d e r e  d i e  § §  4 5 3  f f .  H G B , s o w e i t  d i e  n a c h f o l g e n d e n  R e g e lu n g e n  k e i n e  
A b w e ic h u n g e n  v o r s e h e n .
K u n d e  v o n  K o m b i v e r k e h r  u n d  R e c h n u n g s e m p f ä n g e r  i s t ,  w e r  K o m b i v e r k e h r  d e n  
A u f t r a g  z u r  V e r s e n d u n g  v o n  L a d e e i n h e i t e n  e r t e i l t .
D e r  z w i s c h e n  d e m  K u n d e n  u n d  K o m b i v e r k e h r  g e s c h l o s s e n e  S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g  u m f a ß t  
d i e  B e s o r g u n g  d e r  V e r s e n d u n g  v o n  b e l a d e n e n  u n d  u n b e l a d e n e n  L a d e e i n h e i t e n  im  
R a h m e n  d e s  n a t i o n a l e n  K o m b i n i e r t e n  L a d u n g s v e r k e h r s  S c h i e n e / S t r a ß e .
I 2  V a r p f llc h tu n g a n  d ar V a r tr a g s p a r ta la n
A u f g r u n d  d e s  S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g e s  v e r p f l i c h t e t  s i c h  K o m b i v e r k e h r ,  d i e
V e r s e n d u n g  v o n  L a d e e i n h e i t e n  ü b e r  d i e  S c h i e n e  z u m  v e r e i n b a r t e n  E m p f a n g s o r t  u n d  
d e n  e r f o r d e r l i c h e n  U m s c h la g  z u  b e s o r g e n .  D e r  U m s c h la g  u m f a ß t  d a s  A u f -  u n d  
A b l a d e n  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t  a u f  u n d  v o m  W a g g o n .  K o m b i v e r k e h r  v e r p f l i c h t e t  s i c h
d a r ü b e r  h i n a u s ,  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  a n  d e n  K u n d e n  w e i t e r z u g e b e n ,  d i e  s i e  im  F a l l
e i n e r  U n r e g e l m ä ß i g k e i t  b e i  d e r  B e f ö r d e r u n g  e r h a l t e n  h a t .
D e r  K u n d e  i s t  z u g l e i c h  A b s e n d e r  u n d  E m p f ä n g e r  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t .  E r  h a t  d i e s e  
s e l b s t  o d e r  d u r c h  e i n e n  v o n  ih m  b e n a n n t e n  V e r t r e t e r  ( A u f l i e f e r e r )  am
V e r s a n d t a g  b e i  d e r  f ü r  d e n  V e r s a n d  v o r g e s e h e n e n  U m s c h la g a n la g e  a u f z u l i e f e r n  
u n d  a m  B e r e i t s t e l l u n g s t a g  b e i  d e r  U m s c h la g a n la g e  d e s  v e r e i n b a r t e n
E m p f a n g s o r t e s  s e l b s t  o d e r  d u r c h  e i n e n  v o n  i h m  b e n a n n t e n  V e r t r e t e r  ( A b h o l e r )  
a b z u h o l e n .
I 3 I n k r a f t t r e t e n  d e s  V e r tr a g e s ,  A b s te l lu n g
D e r  z w i s c h e n  d e m  K u n d e n  u n d  K o m b i v e r k e h r  z u  s c h l i e ß e n d e  S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g  
t r i t t  m i t  b e i d e r s e i t i g e r  U n t e r z e i c h n u n g  d e s  V e r s a n d a u f t r a g s f o r m u l a r s  i n  K r a f t .  
D i e  U n t e r z e i c h n u n g  k a n n  d u r c h  e i n e n  S t e m p e l a u f d r u c k ,  e i n e n  m a s c h i n e l l e n
B u c h u n g s v e r m e r k  o d e r  i n  s o n s t  g e e i g n e t e r  W e i s e  e r s e t z t  w e r d e n .
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D a s  V e r s a n d a u f t r a g s f o r m u l a r  d i e n t  b i s  z u m  B e w e i s  d e s  G e g e n t e i l s  a l s  N a c h w e is  
f ü r  d e n  A b s c h l u ß  u n d  I n h a l t  d e s  S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g e s  s o w i e  f ü r  d i e  Ü b e r n a h m e  
d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t .  E s  b e g r ü n d e t  n u r  d i e  V e r m u t u n g  d a f ü r ,  d a ß  d e r  K u n d e  d i e  
L a d e e i n h e i t  ä u ß e r l i c h  i n  e i n e m  f ü r  d e n  E i s e n b a h n t r a n s p o r t  s i c h e r e n  Z u s t a n d  
a u f g e l i e f e r t  h a t .  E i n e  w e i t e r g e h e n d e  V e r m u t u n g s w i r k u n g  h i n s i c h t l i c h  d e s  
ä u ß e r e n  Z u s t a n d e s  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t  u n d  d e s  i n  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t  b e f i n d l i c h e n  
G u t e s  b e s t e h t  n i c h t .
V o r  d e m  v e r e i n b a r t e n  V e r s a n d t a g  a u f g e l i e f e r t e  L a d e e i n h e i t e n  w e r d e n  i n  d e r  
U m s c h l a g a n l a g e  k o s t e n p f l i c h t i g  a b g e s t e l l t .  D i e  A b s t e l l u n g  k a n n  a u f  G r u n d l a g e  
e i n e s  g e s o n d e r t e n  L a g e r v e r t r a g e s  e r f o l g e n .  D e r  K u n d e  g e s t a t t e t  i n  d i e s e m  F a l l  
a u s d r ü c k l i c h  d i e  L a g e r u n g  b e i  d e m  j e w e i l i g e n  B e t r e i b e r  d e r  U m s c h la g a n la g e  (§  
4 7 2  A b s .  2  H G B ) . D i e  A b s t e l l u n g  e n d e t  m i t  d e r  Ö f f n u n g  d e r  U m s c h la g a n la g e  am  
V e r s a n d t a g .
I 4 V e r tr a g se n d e
D e r  S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g  e n d e t  m i t  d e r  Ü b e r g a b e  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t  a n  d e n  K u n d e n  
o d e r  s e i n e n  v o n  ih m  b e n a n n t e n  V e r t r e t e r  ( A b h o l e r )  a m  E m p f a n g s o r t .
A m  B e r e i t s t e l l u n g s t a g  n i c h t  a b g e h o l t e  L a d e e i n h e i t e n  w e r d e n  b e i  B e t r i e b s s c h l u ß  
i n  d e r  U m s c h l a g a n l a g e  k o s t e n p f l i c h t i g  a b g e s t e l l t .  D i e  A b s t e l l u n g  k a n n  o h n e  
v o r h e r i g e  E i n h o l u n g  v o n  W e i s u n g e n  a u f  d e r  G r u n d l a g e  e i n e s  g e s o n d e r t e n  
L a g e r v e r t r a g e s  e r f o l g e n .  D e r  K u n d e  g e s t a t t e t  i n  d i e s e m  F a l l  a u s d r ü c k l i c h  d i e  
L a g e r u n g  b e i  d e m  j e w e i l i g e n  B e t r e i b e r  d e r  U m s c h la g a n la g e  ( §  4 7 2  A b s .  2  H G B ) .  
W i r d  e i n e  a b g e s t e l l t e  L a d e e i n h e i t  n i c h t  i n n e r h a l b  v o n  1 0  W e r k t a g e n  n a c h  d e m  
B e r e i t s t e l l u n g s t a g  a b g e h o l t ,  i s t  K o m b i v e r k e h r  d a z u  b e r e c h t i g t ,  w e i t e r e  
M a ß n a h m e n  g e rn .  § 4 1 9  A b s .  3 H G B  z u  e r g r e i f e n ,  o h n e  z u r  v o r h e r i g e n  E i n h o l u n g  
v o n  W e i s u n g e n  v e r p f l i c h t e t  z u  s e i n .
I 5 B e s c h a f f e n h e it  von  L a d e e in h e it  und Out
M i t  d e r  Ü b e r g a b e  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t  h a f t e t  d e r  K u n d e  d a f ü r ,  d a ß  d i e s e  u n d  d a s  
d a r i n  g e l a d e n e  G u t  f ü r  d e n  K o m b i n i e r t e n  V e r k e h r  g e e i g n e t  u n d  t r a n s p o r t s i c h e r  
s i n d ,  o h n e  d a ß  e s  a u f  s e i n  V e r s c h u l d e n  a n k o m m t^ .
K o m b i v e r k e h r  k a n n  d i e  L a d e e i n h e i t  b e i  d e r  Ü b e r n a h m e ,  w ä h r e n d  s i c h  d i e s e  a u f  
d e m  A u f l i e f e r f a h r z e u g  b e f i n d e t ,  v o n  a u ß e n  v o m  B o d e n  a u s  b e s i c h t i g e n .  S i e  i s t  
n i c h t  v e r p f l i c h t e t ,  d a s  G u t ,  d e s s e n  V e r p a c k u n g ,  S t a u u n g  u n d  B e f e s t i g u n g  s o w i e  
d i e  d a z u  v o m  K u n d e n  g e m a c h t e n  A n g a b e n  o d e r  d i e  ü b e r g e b e n e n  D o k u m e n t e  z u  
ü b e r p r ü f e n .
Einzelheiten regeln die Verladerichtlinien der DB Cargo. Vgl. auch die von Kombiverkehr und 
DB Cargo herausgegebenen “Empfehlungen für die Ladimgssicherung im Kombinierten 
Verkehr”.
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D e r  K u n d e  h a f t e t  f ü r  d i e  R i c h t i g k e i t  u n d  V o l l s t ä n d i g k e i t  s e i n e r  f ü r  d a s  
V e r s a n d a u f t r a g s f o r m u l a r  g e m a c h t e n  A n g a b e n ,  o h n e  d a ß  e s  a u f  s e i n  V e r s c h u l d e n  
a n k o m m t .
I 6 0 « f& h r lic h e a  Out
D a s  g e f ä h r l i c h e  G u t  i s t  v o r z e i t i g  a n z u m e ld e n ,  w e n n  d i e s  i n  d e n  F a h r p l ä n e n  o d e r  
a u f  a n d e r e  W e i s e  b e k a n n t g e m a c h t  i s t .
E i n e  L a d e e i n h e i t ,  d i e  m i t  z u g e la s s e n e m  g e f ä h r l i c h e n  G u t  b e l a d e n  i s t ,  m u ß  d e n  
N o r m e n  e n t s p r e c h e n ,  d i e  f ü r  d i e  B e f ö r d e r u n g  a u f  S c h i e n e  u n d  S t r a ß e  d u r c h  
g e s e t z l i c h e  o d e r  b e h ö r d l i c h e  V o r s c h r i f t e n  f e s t g e l e g t  s i n d .
S o w e i t  z w in g e n d e  o d e r  A G B - f e s t e  R e c h t s v o r s c h r i f t e n  n i c h t s  a n d e r e s  b e s t im m e n ,  
h a f t e t  d e r  K u n d e  m i t  d e r  Ü b e r g a b e  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t  f ü r  
d i e  E i n h a l t u n g  d e r  i n  § 6  A b s .  2 g e n a n n t e n  V o r s c h r i f t e n ,
d i e  v o l l s t ä n d i g e n  A n g a b e n  ü b e r  d a s  G u t  u n d  d i e  n a c h  d e n  s p e z i e l l e n  
G e f a h r g u t v o r s c h r i f t e n  r i c h t i g e  B e z e i c h n u n g  im  V e r s a n d a u f t r a g s f o r m u l a r ,  
d i e  Ü b e r g a b e  d e r  r i c h t i g e n  U n f a l l m e r k b l ä t t e r  u n d  e r f o r d e r l i c h e r  w e i t e r e r  
U n t e r l a g e n ,
d i e  M i t t e i l u n g  v o n  V o r s i c h t s m a ß n a h m e n ,  s o w e i t  d i e s e  b e h ö r d l i c h  v o r g e s c h r i e b e n  
o d e r  s o n s t  e r f o r d e r l i c h  s i n d .
D e r  K u n d e  i s t  v e r p f l i c h t e t ,  d i e  L a d e e i n h e i t  e r s t  am  T a g e  d e s  V e r s a n d s  
a u f z u l i e f e r n  u n d  a m  B e r e i t s t e l l u n g s t a g  a b z u h o l e n .  I s t  d i e s e s  n i c h t  d e r  F a l l ,  
s o  k a n n  K o m b i v e r k e h r  g e r n .  § 4 1 0  A b s .  2  H G B d a s  g e f ä h r l i c h e  G u t  a u f  K o s t e n  d e s  
K u n d e n  a u s l a d e n ,  e i n l a g e r n ,  z u r ü c k b e f ö r d e r n  o d e r ,  s o w e i t  e r f o r d e r l i c h ,
v e r n i c h t e n  o d e r  u n s c h ä d l i c h  m a c h e n ,  o h n e  h i e r f ü r  e r s a t z p f l i c h t i g  z u  w e r d e n .
I 7 Z ah lu n g , A ufrechnung
D i e  Z a h l u n g  d e s  E n t g e l t e s  f ü r  d i e  d u r c h  K o m b i v e r k e h r  b e s o r g t e n  L e i s t u n g e n  
e r f o l g t  d u r c h  d a s  K o m b i f r a c h t k r e d i t v e r f a h r e n  e n t s p r e c h e n d  d e n  f ü r  d i e s e s  
V e r f a h r e n  f e s t g e l e g t e n  B e d in g u n g e n  d e r  D e u t s c h e n  V e r k e h r s B a n k  A G  ( D V B ) .
J e d e  A u f r e c h n u n g  o d e r  Z u r ü c k b e h a l t u n g  g e g e n ü b e r  F o r d e r u n g e n  a u s  d e m
S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g  w i r d  a u s g e s c h l o s s e n ,  a u s g e n o m m e n  b e i  r e c h t s k r ä f t i g
f e s t g e s t e l l t e n  o d e r  v o n  K o m b i v e r k e h r  n i c h t  b e s t r i t t e n e n  G e g e n f o r d e r u n g e n .
I 8 H aftu n g
D i e  H a f t u n g  v o n  K o m b i v e r k e h r  g e g e n ü b e r  d e m  K u n d e n  f ü r  S c h ä d e n  d u r c h  V e r l u s t  
o d e r  B e s c h ä d i g u n g  d e r  S e n d u n g  o d e r  w e g e n  Ü b e r s c h r e i t u n g  d e r  L i e f e r f r i s t  e r g i b t  
s i c h  a u s  § 4 5 9  i n  V e r b i n d u n g  m i t  § §  4 2 5  f f .  H G B . A b s t e l l u n g e n  a u f g r u n d  e i n e s  
g e s o n d e r t e n  L a g e r v e r t r a g e s  r i c h t e n  s i c h  n a c h  d e n  § §  4 6 7  f f .  H G B . D i e  
b e k a n n t g e g e b e n e n  F a h r p l ä n e  s i n d  k e i n e  L i e f e r f r i s t e n .
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D i e  H a f t u n g  i s t  b e g r e n z t
b e i  V e r l u s t  u n d  B e s c h ä d ig u n g  d e s  G u t e s  g e rn .  § 4 3 1  H G B  a u f  8 , 3 3  S Z R  f ü r  j e d e s  
K i l o g r a m m  d e s  R o h g e w i c h t s  d e r  b e s c h ä d i g t e n  o d e r  v e r l o r e n e n  S e n d u n g ,  
b « l  V a r lu s t  o d er  B ssc h ld lg u n g  d a s  O utas währ and a in a r  A b s ta llu n g , auch i n  dan 
F ä lla n  a in a r  g a so n d a r ta n  L agarung, a u f  2  SZR fü r  ja d a s  K ilograsm  das 
R oh gaw ich ts dar b a sc h ä d ig ta n  od ar v a r lo r a n a n  Sandung,
b e i  Ü b e r s c h r e i t u n g  d e r  L i e f e r f r i s t  a u f  d e n  d r e i f a c h e n  B e t r a g  d e s  E n t g e l t e s .
D i e  H a f t u n g  h i n s i c h t l i c h  a l l e r  s o n s t i g e n  A n s p r ü c h e ,  i n s b e s o n d e r e  g e rn .  § 4 6 1  
A b s .  2  H G B , i s t  b e g r e n z t  a u f  d e n  d r e i f a c h e n  B e t r a g  d e s  E n t g e l t e s ,  s o w e i t  
z w in g e n d e  o d e r  A G B - f e s t e  R e c h t s v o r s c h r i f t e n  n i c h t s  a n d e r e s  b e s t im m e n .
D ia  H aftu n g  i s t  b a g r a n z t a u f  2  M ill io n a n  DSM ja  S c h a d a n s fa l l  und 10 M illio n a n  
DKM j a  S c h a d a n sa r a ig n is  odar a u f  2  SZR fü r  ja d a s  K ilograam  dar v a r lo r a n a n  und 
b a s c h ä d ig ta n  O ü tar, j a  nachdam, w a lch a r  B a tra g  höhar i s t .  B ai mahraran  
G a sch ä d lg ta n  a u s  alnam  S c h a d a n sa r a ig n is  h a f t a t  Koaabivarkahr a n t a i l l g  in  
V a r h ä ltn ls  dar a ln s a ln a n  A nsprücha.
D i e s e  H a f t u n g s b e g r e n z u n g e n  g e l t e n  a u c h  f ü r  a u ß e r - v e r t r a g l i e h e  A n s p r ü c h e .
D i e  v o r s t e h e n d e n  H a f t u n g s b e f r e i u n g e n  u n d - b e g r e n - z u n g e n  g e l t e n  n i c h t ,  w e n n  d e r  
S c h a d e n  v e r u r s a c h t  w o r d e n  i s t ,
d u r c h  V o r s a t z  o d e r  g r o b e  F a h r l ä s s i g k e i t  d e r  K o m b i v e r k e h r  o d e r  i h r e r  l e i t e n d e n  
A n g e s t e l l t e n ;
i n  d e n  F ä l l e n  d e r  § §  4 2 5  f f . ,  4 6 1  f f .  H G B  d u r c h  K o m b i v e r k e h r  o d e r  d i e  i n  SS 
4 2 8 ,  4 6 2  H G B g e n a n n t e n  P e r s o n e n  v o r s ä t z l i c h  o d e r  l e i c h t f e r t i g  i n  d e m
B e w u ß t s e i n ,  d a ß  e i n  S c h a d e n  m i t  W a h r s c h e i n l i c h k e i t  e i n t r e t e n  w e r d e .
I 9 S ch a d a n sa n za lg a
E s  o b l i e g t  d e m  K u n d e n ,  b e i  d e r  A b h o l u n g  d e r  L a d e e i n h e i t  V o r b e h a l t e  w e g e n  
B e s c h ä d ig u n g e n  o d e r  F e h lm e n g e n  g e rn .  S 4 3 8  H G B  e n t w e d e r  g e g e n ü b e r  d e m  ö r t l i c h e n  
V e r t r e t e r  v o n  K o m b i v e r k e h r  a n z u m e ld e n  o d e r  g e g e n ü b e r  d e m j e n i g e n ,  d e r  d a s  G u t  
a b l i e f e r t .  E r f o l g t  k e i n  V o r b e h a l t ,  s o  w i r d  v e r m u t e t ,  d a ß  d i e  L a d e e i n h e i t  i n  
e i n e m  v e r t r a g s g e m ä ß e n  Z u s t a n d  a b g e l i e f e r t  w o r d e n  i s t .
V o r b e h a l t e  w e g e n  ä u ß e r l i c h  n i c h t  e r k e n n b a r e r  B e s c h ä d ig u n g e n  o d e r  F e h lm e n g e n  
s i n d  i n n e r h a l b  v o n  f ü n f  T a g e n  a n z u m e ld e n .
I  10 S ch lu ß b a s tinniungan
A l l e  A n s p r ü c h e  a u s  d e m  S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g  v e r j ä h r e n  g e rn .  S 4 3 9  HGB i n  e in e m  
J a h r .
D e r  G e r i c h t s s t a n d  f ü r  a l l e  R e c h t s s t r e i t i g k e i t e n ,  d i e  a u s  d e m  S p e d i t i o n s v e r t r a g  
o d e r  i m  Z u s a m m e n h a n g  m i t  d i e s e m  e n t s t e h e n ,  i s t  f ü r  a l l e  B e t e i l i g t e n  F r a n k f u r t  
a m  M a i n .  D e r  K u n d e  k a n n  a u c h  a n  s e in e m  G e r i c h t s s t a n d  v e r k l a g t  w e r d e n .
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